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The Short- and Long-Term Career Effects of Graduating in a Recession: 
Hysteresis and Heterogeneity in the Market for College Graduates
*
 
This paper analyzes the long-term effects of graduating in a recession on earnings, job 
mobility, and employer characteristics for a large sample of Canadian college graduates 
using matched university-employer-employee data from 1982 to 1999. The results are used 
to assess the role of job mobility and firm quality in the propagation of shocks for different 
groups in the labor market. We find that young graduates entering the labor market in a 
recession suffer significant initial earnings losses that, on average, eventually fade after 8 to 
10 years. Labor market conditions at graduation affect firm quality and job mobility, which can 
account for 40-50% of losses and catch-up in our sample. We also document that higher 
skilled graduates suffer less from entry in a recession because they switch to better firms 
quickly. Lower skilled graduates are permanently affected by being down ranked to low-wage 
firms. These adjustment patterns are consistent with differential choices of intensity of search 
for better employers arising from comparative advantage and time-increasing search costs. 
All results are robust to an extensive sensitivity analysis including controls for correlated 
business cycle shocks after labor market entry, endogenous timing of graduation, permanent 
cohort differences, and selective labor force participation. 
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1.  Introduction 
Increasing evidence suggests that even short term labor market shocks can have substantial and 
differing long-term effects on workers’ careers.
2 A high degree of persistence and substantial worker 
heterogeneity has implications for the nature and importance of frictions in the labor market – a key 
building block in many micro and macro economic models. An important question has been the role 
of changes in job quality and job mobility in the adjustment of individual workers and the labor 
market to business cycle shocks.
3 However, lack of longitudinal data on both workers and employers 
often limits the ability to measure the long-term consequences of short-term labor market shocks 
and to assess the channels through which different workers recover from the effects of cyclical labor 
market conditions. 
In this paper, we analyze the dynamic effects of graduating in a depressed labor market on 
college graduates with different educational backgrounds using an unusual match between 
administrative university-employee-employer data from Canada. We take advantage of the wide 
coverage of our data to analyze how wages and firm placements are affected by initial labor market 
conditions, how workers respond to these shocks, and how these short and long-term effects differ 
for individuals graduating with varying degrees of skill.  We provide a theoretical explanation of the 
pattern of career progression observed in our data based on a model of endogenous job search. In 
the model, incentives to search for better employers from comparative advantage interact with 
search costs that increase over time due to the accumulation of firm-specific capital and aging.  This 
leads high-skilled workers to search harder for high-wage firms than low-skilled workers and catch-
up before age related costs become important. Lower-skilled workers search less intensely and some 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993), Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), 
Oyer (2006, 2008), Kahn (2006), and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). 
3 Although a long literature in labor economics assigns an important role to job search, a full assessment of its role in the 
growth of earnings or in adjustment to shocks stands out (e.g., Topel and Ward 1992). In macroeconomics, a growing 
recent literature examines the role of worker flows in determining the cyclical properties of unemployment (e.g., Shimer 
2005).   3 
never move to better firms before age related search costs start to bind or before they accumulate 
specific capital at low-wage firms. We evaluate these and other predictions from the model using the 
detailed information on employer characteristics and career outcomes available in our matched data.   
Our data allow us to distinguish between temporary and persistent labor market shocks using 20 
years of graduating cohorts over two large recessions with differential strength across ten regions.
4 
College graduates are an ideal group to study the effects of initial labor market shocks because we 
can assess labor market conditions’ effects for an entire cohort beginning to search for full-time 
work.  Since graduates differ little in terms of labor market experience, information on college, 
program, and length of study allow us to categorize our sample into more and less advantaged 
groups based on predicted labor market success. Detailed information on longitudinal employment 
patterns and the timing of college entry and exit allows us minimize the confounding effects from 
selective participation or graduation. The study of labor market entrants is also of interest in its own 
right, since young workers have been shown to be particularly susceptible to external labor market 
shocks.
5 
Our results suggest several key findings. First, luck matters – graduating in a recession leads to 
large initial earnings losses that eventually fade, but over a period of eight to ten years after 
graduation. A typical recession – a rise in unemployment rates by five percentage points in our 
context –  implies an initial loss in earnings of about 9 percent that halves within 5 years and finally 
                                                 
4 Several previous studies on the persistent effects of aggregate labor market conditions have used the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (Devereux 2003) and the National Longitudinal Studies of Youth (Gardecki and Neumark 1998, 
Neumark 2002, Kahn 2006). While providing detailed survey information on careers and worker demographics, the 
small samples of these data sets do not allow controlling for cohort, state, and year effects in a flexible way, controlling 
for persistent correlated labor market conditions, or studying other career outcomes than wages with sufficient degree of 
precision. Often by necessity the range of cohorts studied is limited. 
5 See for example, Katz and Autor (1999), Freeman (1979), and Okun (1973). During the first 10 years of work, 
individuals experience 70% of overall wage growth, change jobs frequently, and find a career occupation and employer 
(Murphy and Welch 1990, Topel and Ward 1992). In this formative period young workers relative to their older 
counterparts are particularly at risk of earnings losses (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994), job losses (Farber 2003), and 
unemployment (Ryan 2001) from a recession. Clearly, this does not mean that older workers are not affected by external 
labor market conditions. Especially older job losers are known to suffer significant earnings losses.   4 
fades to zero by 10 years. This result is robust to the use of both national and regional 
unemployment rates, does not appear to arise due to correlation with labor market shocks occurring 
later in workers’ careers, and does not seem to be due to selective employment and graduation 
decisions.   
Second, persistent effects from changes in labor market conditions are much larger for 
individuals in the process of searching for work (at the beginning of their careers) than for 
individuals already working.  The result points to an important role for initial job placement in 
determining long-term labor market success.  We also find that graduates with the lowest predicted 
earnings (our measure of skill) suffer significantly larger and much more persistent earnings losses 
than those at the top. Thus, we see a persistent increase in inequality from recessions lasting up to 
ten years, which translates into permanent increases in inequality in the present discounted value of 
earnings. 
Third, initial labor market shocks affect job mobility and firm placement. The dynamic 
adjustment process is characterized by increased mobility across employers and industries and 
improvements in average firm characteristics. This pattern differs by worker type. Workers at the 
top of the wage-distribution catch up quickly by moving to better firms.  Workers with low 
predicted earnings are permanently down-ranked to firms paying lower wages and consequently 
never catch-up. We also find an important degree of persistence of unemployment rate shocks 
within firms, especially for very large and high paying employers.   
Our model of job search that incorporates time-varying costs of mobility and comparative 
advantage yields a parsimonious explanation of the strength and the heterogeneity in the patterns of 
persistence and catch-up we find.
6 This does not preclude a role for other important channels. 
                                                 
6 The model can also predict several other aspects of the recovery process observed in our data, including faster recovery 
in industries with high average turnover, slower catch-up within high-quality firms, and a positive experience-gradient in 
firm quality.   5 
Decomposing earnings losses into their sources, we find that lasting reductions in the quality of 
employers can explain up to 40-50% of persistent earnings losses. This complements influential 
studies finding unemployment rates have persistent effects for employment spells within firms,
7 and 
suggests that, at least for labor market entrants, both mobility towards better firms and recovery 
within firms are important margins of adjustment to labor market conditions.  
The paper contributes to recent strands of labor economics by helping to establish that cyclical 
shocks have persistent effects on careers for a broad segment of the labor market.
8 The paper 
extends this literature by assessing persistent effects not only on earnings but on job mobility and 
firm quality.  In particular, the paper shows how cyclical changes in job quality can have a lasting 
impact on workers’ careers, and how mobility to better firms is an important channel of recovery 
after cyclical labor market shocks.
9 We further add to the literature by showing how these effects 
differ by initial skill. We also offer a coherent theoretical explanation of the persistence and the 
complex adjustment process we find. The paper also contributes to the literature on job search by 
providing direct evidence on how job mobility and firm quality reacts to exogenous labor market 
shocks, and how this pattern differs by workers’ educational background.
10 
Our paper also contributes to recent strands of literature in macroeconomics. First, the slow and 
heterogeneous speed of recovery and the role of job mobility and firm quality we find can have 
important implications for understanding cyclical adjustment in the labor market either in models of 
job search (e.g., Shimer 2005, Krause and Lubik 2006a,b) or mismatch (e.g., Shimer 2007, Moscarini 
                                                 
7 E.g., Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994), McDonald and Worswick (1999), and Grant 
(2003) focus on the effect of unemployment rates on earnings within a given spell of job tenure.  
8 This extends the existing literature documenting that luck can matter for particular occupations (e.g., Oyer 2006, 2008, 
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001), for job losers (e.g., Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan 1993, von Wachter and Bender 
2006), for young unemployed workers (e.g., Elwood 1982), or for particular cohorts of workers (e.g., Freeman 1975, 
Welch 1979, Beaudry and DiNardo 1991, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom 1994, Kahn 2006). 
9 By comparing mobility pattern of different cohorts the paper also adds to the literature on cyclical upgrading. See 
footnote number 13. 
10 A small empirical literature documents how job characteristics respond after a job loss (e.g., Farber 1994, Stevens 
1997, von Wachter and Bender 2006) without explicitly modeling the recovery process.   6 
and Vella 2008). Our results suggest that temporary labor market shocks can persistently alter the 
allocation of workers to firm-types through cyclical downgrading. Second, we provide an 
explanation why labor market shocks can have larger effects for lower-skilled labor market 
entrants.
11 Our data shows large differences in the declines of the present discounted value of 
earnings due to a recession for more and less advantaged workers. 
2.  A Model of Job Mobility with Endogenous Search and Initial Conditions 
The following section presents an augmented model of endogenous on-the-job search that 
allows us to interpret our empirical results. Our model combines several key features of previous 
theoretical and empirical research on wage determination to show that age-related mobility costs 
interact with skill-dependent search incentives to lead to long-lasting and differential effects of labor 
market conditions.  First, search theory predicts that a temporary worsening of the wage offer 
distribution causes workers entering the labor market in a recession to catch-up by searching for 
higher paying jobs.  Second, evidence suggests high-wage jobs are concentrated in particular firms 
and sectors.
12 Supply of high-wage jobs appears to be pro-cyclical, leading young and less able 
workers to be down-ranked to low-wage firms in recessions.
13 Third, models of job assignment or of 
long-term contracting, for example, can imply persistent recession effects within firms.
14 This is 
                                                 
11 Lucas’ (1987) original measure asked how much additional consumption would make a representative worker 
indifferent between economies with and without consumption risk. More recent papers distinguish between individuals 
with and without wealth holdings, or between workers on the job and those laid-off (see, e.g., Barlevy 2005). Several 
studies have shown that recessions have different earnings effects for different groups of workers (e.g., Hoynes 2000, 
Hines et al. 2002, Bils 1985, Solon, Barsky, and Parker 1994), but none were able to trace out differences in the ensuing 
long-run effects. 
12 Firms and industries pay wage premiums that cannot be easily rationalized by worker characteristics (e.g., Krueger and 
Summers 1988, Dickens and Katz 1987, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis 1999, Abowd, Creecy, and Kramarz 2002).  
13 Sectors paying higher wages have more pro-cyclical job creation, partly because of more volatile demand for their 
products (Okun 1973, McLaughlin and Bils 2001, Aaronson and Christopher 2004). There appears to be cyclical down-
grading of young and lower skilled workers (e.g., Reynolds 1951, Reder 1955, Cutler and Katz 1991, and Hines et al. 
2002). Less able workers tend to flow to larger firms and high wage sectors in booms (e.g., Vroman 1977, Albaek and 
Sorensen 1998, Devereux 2002). 
14 E.g., Prendergast (1993, 1999), Gibbons and Waldman, (1999, 2004), Harris and Holmstrom (1982), MacLeod and 
Malcolmson (1993). For empirical papers on within-firm wage mobility, see Baker, Gibbs, and Holmstrom (1994)  and 
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991).   7 
more likely to occur in larger firms that may provide rents, insurance, career-options, or other non-
pecuniary benefits reducing workers’ job mobility. Fourth, job search dynamics may differ by worker 
age and ability.
15 An increasing empirical literature suggests that the cost of job search increases with 
age and that higher-skilled young workers are more likely to move between regions or industries in 
response to adverse labor market shocks.
16  Thus, differences in the response of job mobility and 
firm quality to recession shocks among alternative skill groups are important for understanding the 
mechanisms driving persistence in the labor market.
17 
2.1  Endogenous Job Search with Skill and Age Differences 
Model Setup. We consider the case of an economy of infinitely lived, risk-neutral workers. 
Workers start their careers employed at one of two types of firms. High-productivity firms pay 
higher wages than low productivity firms. Workers are either of high or low skill, and we assume 
that high wage firms pay high skill workers more than low skill workers.
18 This is a key assumption 
that will lead to sorting of high skilled workers to high productivity firms. We assume that wages are 
deterministic within firms and increase with job tenure.
19 The model is set in discrete time, and 
recessions are characterized by periods of fewer job openings available at high productivity firms. 
                                                 
15 Among others, Mortensen (1986), Pissarides (2000), Shimer (2004) discuss the theoretical implications of differential 
search intensities.  
16 Among others, see Blau and Robins (1990), Bloemen (2005), Boeheim and Taylor (2001), Bound and Holzer (2000), 
Wozniak (2006), Saks and Wozniak (2007), Neal (1999). 
17 In addition to differences in workers’ search behavior, in the presence of rents or complementarities, firms have 
incentives to select the most able workers for employment, and to reduce the employment of less able workers. A 
cyclical process of adjustment in hiring and promotion standards has been often noted (e.g., Reder 1955). Rents can arise 
due to rigid pay scales as in Hall (1974), or unions, as in Solow and McDonald (1985).  
18 This is a way of introducing the effects of comparative or absolute advantage by skill into our model and it allows us 
to analyze differences in the effect of initial conditions by skill groups. Also introducing wage differences by skill group 
at the low productivity firm would not alter our insights. 
19 Adding stochastic increases to wages on the job as function of job tenure would add complexity without affecting our 
main predictions (see Topel 1986, Topel and Ward 1992, Mortensen 1988).   8 
Consistent with the low effect of adverse initial conditions on unemployment in our sample, there is 
no job destruction in this economy and jobs last until the worker quits.
20 
Workers employed in the less productive firm search for a job in the more productive firm. We 
allow search effort to affect the probability of getting a job at the good firm in a proportional way.
21 
If p is the fraction of jobs at high productivity firms in the economy, λ  is the constant natural 
arrival rate of job offers, and s is the chosen search intensity, we assume 
{} p s t × × = ≡ λ π in t   Firm   Good at    Job Obtain  Pr  
Note that p takes the role of the mean of the stationary distribution of wage offers in this model.
22 
Both p and λ  could differ over time, across skill-groups, or across cohorts. Workers choose search 
intensity  s optimally given benefits and costs. The cost of job search  ) , ( a s ψ is convex and may 








ψ = , where  0 ) ( ' > a γ ; none of our 
results depend on a quadratic specification. The parameter  ) (a γ  captures implicit increases in the 
cost of job search with age as workers buy a house, get married to a working spouse, get children, or 
more generally begin to settle down. The Canadian Census shows that these incident rates rise 
quickly after graduation. For example, the fraction married rises more than six-fold after graduation 
until age 30 to reach 68.7%, and reaches 86.3% by age 40. The rate of homeownership nearly 
                                                 
20 Note that in the absence of job destruction, the fraction of those working at high productivity firms increases 
steadily within a cohort; however, due to the presence of age-related search costs and specific skills, our model contains 
an explicit behavioral mechanism limiting this tendency. Introducing job destruction into our models would imply that 
low-skilled workers graduating in a tight labor market initially employed at the high-wage firm will be gradually pushed 
down to the low-wage firms. There are also no endogenous quits into non-employment in the model. Since it may be 
relevant for low-skill workers, the introduction of labor supply decisions would be a promising extension of the model.  
21 This is a frequent assumption in theoretical (e.g., Pissarides 2000, Chapter 5, Mortensen 1986) and empirical (e.g., 
Christensen et al. 2005) work. Shimer (2004) provides a critique of the implicit complementarity between search intensity 
and the probability of successfully finding a job. He proposes a specification implying that workers may trade to reduce 
their search intensity when the probability of success is high. This alternative formulation would have no bearing on our 
mean results, since the overall job finding probability would still be increasing in search intensity. In fact, our 
comparative static results for  2 , , , δ τ γ θ  are unaffected, while the derivatives with respect to  p , λ  now depend on the 
the level of the product  p λ . 
22 Several key insights of the model also attain in a context of endogenous search among a continuous distribution of job 
offers (see, e.g., Mortensen 1986).   9 
doubles between age 25 and 35. Mobility between provinces peaks at age 26 and then declines. 
Mobility within province peaks at age 27, and then declines steadily after age 30. In general, these 
numbers corroborate results from the existing literature that mobility of college graduates is high 
when workers are young and declines with age. 
Value Functions. If a worker is employed at a high productivity firm (firm 1) he stops 
searching and stays at firm 1 forever. The deterministic value of this event can be expressed as 
() ( ) θ τ β τ δ θ θ τ , 1 ) ( ,
1
1 1
1 + + + = V g w V , 
where τ  indexes job tenure, 1 w  is the starting wage at firm 1, g(τ ) is a concave function, and  1 δ  
indexes the returns to tenure at the high wage firm.
23 Since firm 1 pays high skilled workers more, 
we have that for a low skilled worker  1 = θ , while for a high skilled worker  1 > θ . β  is the discount 
factor. 
  If the worker is at a low-wage firm (firm 2) the worker can decide to search for a job at a 
firm of type 1. We have that the value of employment at firm 2 is 
() ( ) 1 , , 1 ) ( , , 2 2
2 + + + + = a J g w a V θ τ β τ δ θ τ , 
where age (a) enters through the cost of job search. The value of job search is captured by 
() ( ) ( ) { } ) , ( ) 1 , , 1 ( ) ( 1 , 0 ) ( max 1 , , 1
2 1
0 a s a V s V s a J
s ψ θ τ π θ π θ τ − + + − + = + +
≥
. 
Given our assumptions, both  () θ τ,
1 V  and  ( ) a V , ,
2 θ τ  are concave in s. 
Optimal Search Intensity. If the worker decides to put effort into search, by the envelope 
theorem and our assumption on the shape of search costs, optimal search intensity is implicitly 
defined by the first order condition 
                                                 
23 Note that we have to impose restrictions on g(τ ) such that the value of employment at firm 1 is finite. For simplicity, 
we assume here that g(τ ) is linear until 
* τ  and constant there after. Given consensus estimates of the returns to 
tenure, such a piecewise specification with a low value for 
* τ  appears realistic (e.g., Altonji and Williams forthcoming).   10 
  () ( ) [ ] 1 , , 1 , 0
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2 1 * + + − = a V V
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Search intensity is chosen by trading off the marginal benefits of an increase in search intensity with 
the marginal cost. We use this relationship to obtain basic comparative static results needed to assess 
the predicted persistence of initial conditions in this model. Note that optimal search intensity does 
not itself depend on initial conditions a worker faces in the labor market. Instead, these conditions 
will affect the fraction of workers in any given cohort that is still searching for a job at the high-
productivity employer at a given skill and age. 
Comparative Statics.  Differentiating equation (1) allows us to obtain key inputs into our main 
results concerning the persistence of initial conditions. First, search intensity declines with job tenure 
at the low productivity firm,  0 ) ( '
2
*








. Similarly, search intensity declines with the 












. These results capture the notion that 
the incentives to search decline as workers age into the labor market. While labor market entrants 
are ‘newly minted’ and flexible, the cost of job mobility and with it the degree of persistence of 
initial conditions increases over time. 










. This is a direct implication of our assumption on the wage structure, and leads to 
sorting of more able workers to high productivity firms over time. The model predicts various other 
interaction effects exploited in the empirical and simulation analysis.
24  
                                                 
24 Among others, increases in the wage offer distribution p or the natural arrival rate of offers λ  offset the tendency to 
reduce search with age; thereby higher frequencies of job offers increase search intensity more for high skilled workers. 
Similarly, the advantage of high skilled workers is decreasing with mobility costs, which affect them more than low 
skilled workers, i.e.,  0 / /
2
1
* 2 < − = γ λ γ θ pw d d s d .   11 
2.2 The  Long-Term  Effect  of Initial Conditions 
We next turn to the implication of these results for the persistent effect of initial labor market 
conditions. This yields the main implications of our model. Since for workers at low-wage firms age 
and job tenure are equal to the overall time spent in the labor market, for simplicity we will index 
both by a single variable T; T indicates the relevant time horizon for the effect of initial conditions 
in our model. Compatible with our empirical evidence, we define a short-term negative labor market 
shock to be a temporary reduction in the hiring rate of high-wage employers. Let the probability that 
a worker in a given cohort C is employed by firm 2 in the initial period be 
C p0 1− , where  p p
C < 0 . 
The fraction of workers changing from firm 2 to firm 1 in each following period is  p t s ,...) , ( θ λ . 
Then by recursion, after T periods in the labor market the conditional probability of still being at 
firm 2 for a given skill-level θ  (the conditional CDF of wages in our model) is  







C t ps p θ λ θ  
This probability is an important determinant of the evolution over time of the conditional rate of 
job mobility and conditional mean earnings of any given cohort of new entrants into the labor 
market.
25 
                                                 
25 Dropping the skill index for notational simplicity, one obtains for the probability of changing employers and for mean 
earnings 
{} { }
{ } () () () [] {} , , | 2   Firm Pr , , , , |
, | 2   Firm Pr ,..) ( , | Move   Job Pr
2 1 1 C T C T C T C T C T w E






where  () C T, 1 ω  and  () C T, 2 ω  are conditional mean earnings for workers in firm 1 and 2 at time T and cohort C, 
respectively. Since  () () C T C T , , 2 1 ω ω − >0 under weak conditions for all T, convergence of the mean wage after an 
initial down ranking of workers to lower quality firms will eventually occur. (Note that 
(){ } 2 , 1 , C T,   j,   Firm | , = = j w E C T j ω  depends on search intensity and on initial conditions through average job 
tenure and average ability;  () () C T C T , , 2 1 ω ω − >0 holds as long as  2 1 δ δ ≥  and  { } T   1,   Firm | ) (τ g E  converges 
reasonably fast to g(T). This will hold in particular for smaller values of
* τ  (as T>
* τ ), the tenure year at which we 
assume the returns to tenure to become constant. As argued above, a small value of 
* τ  fits empirical estimates of the 
causal returns to job tenure.)   12 
To examine the effect of initial conditions, it turns out to be useful to define the rate of decay of 
initial labor market conditions as  
 
() {} { }
0 ,...) , (
) 1 (
, C T, | 2   Firm Pr
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T R C C θ λ
θ θ
θ .  (2)
) , ( θ T R  captures the change of the marginal effect of initial conditions over time on the probability 
of being in the low state for skill-level θ . It determines how fast mean wages converge after an 
initial shock, and how the rate of job mobility responds.
26 The rate of convergence differs by skill, 
with time spent in the labor market (indexing increases in age and tenure at the low-productivity 
firm for those that are searching), and with other parameters affecting the optimal choice of search 
intensity. 
Implication 1: “Time Dependent Search.”   Implication 1 follows directly from our 
comparative static results above – increases in job tenure reduce the rate of decay 
() 0 / ) , ( > τ θ d T dR . That is, as workers accumulate specific human capital in firm 2, their benefits 
from search decline and they reduce their search effort. In the process, the rate of catch-up in wages 
due to job search declines.
27 A long literature argues that it is highly probable that workers 
accumulate at least some industry, occupation, or firm specific skills. Our model shows that this can 
lead to increases in the persistence of temporary labor market conditions.  
Increases in the cost of search with age as workers settle into family and working lives has a 
parallel effect – while search intensity is high initially, it drops off with time in the labor market 
() 0 / ) , ( > γ θ d T dR . For example, we know that marriage rates of male college graduates begin rising 
quickly after graduation. In so far as their spouses work or perhaps have children, their search costs 
                                                 
26 The second equality in equation (2) holds approximately for small values of the product  ,...) , ( θ λ T ps . 
27 None of these results hinge on our assumptions of two firms and hold with continuous wage-offer distributions.   13 
might rise, reducing their ability to shed the effects of initial conditions by moving and taking jobs at 
better firms.
28 
Implication 2: “Differences by Skill Group.”  Differentiating the rate of decay by our index 
of skill θ  shows that high skill workers catch-up faster from bad initial conditions, i.e., 
0 / ) , ( < θ θ d T dR . This is a direct implication of our result that search intensity increases in skill 
levels. If search intensity is low enough, low-skilled workers may be trapped in the less productive 
firm, something discussed further in Implication 4. Another implication from our model is that 
increases in search costs with age have a larger negative effect on search intensity (and thus on the 
rate of decay) for high skilled workers, i.e.,  . 0

















 That is, if 
aging plays a role, the difference in search intensity between high and low skilled workers should be 
strong initially but decline as workers age. 
Implication 3: “Catch-Up On-the-Job.”  Once a worker finds a job at a type 1 firm, given our 
assumptions on g(τ ), her earnings will continuously revert to that of similar workers already in the 
firm as she deterministically accumulates firm specific skills. Given typical estimates of the non-
linearity of the wage-tenure profile, this process is likely to be strongest for the first few years on the 
job, when returns to tenure are thought to be most relevant. Note that the importance of human 
capital accumulation on the job may differ by skill groups. Similarly, an alternative interpretation is 
that the wage-tenure profile reflects moves up the job ladder within the firm. If firms tend to offer 
jobs with high growth potential when economic conditions are good, these improvements may be a 
                                                 
28 With a fixed intensity of search, the rate of decay would be constant  ( ) sp R T R λ θ − = ≡ , . In this case, a low offer 
arrival rates can lead to persistent effects of shocks. Although few direct estimates of the ‘rate of contact’ between 
workers and firms exist, typical estimates in the literature suggest that convergence of mean wages would occur within 5 
to 7 years after entry into the labor market (e.g., Cristensen et al. 2005). However, the rate of decay does not appear 
constant in our data. Moreover, if we simulate our model, at reasonable values a constant intensity of search cannot 
explain both the observed rate of catch-up as well as average turnover rate and experience-earnings profiles observed in 
the data.   14 
function of external labor market conditions (Gibbons and Waldman 2004), something we discuss 
as a possible extension of our model below. 
Implication 4: “Zero Search.”  In our model, job search is only positive if 
( ) ( ) . 0 0 ,...) , ( ; 1 , , 1 0 ,...) , ( ; 1 , , 1
* * > = + + − > + + ≡ ∆ θ θ τ θ θ τ T s a J T s a J J  Since this difference 
is monotonously decreasing in job tenure in firm 2 (or in search costs), over time an increasing 
fraction of workers completely stops searching. If this occurs, there is no further catch-up. Given 
the assumptions of our model, if search drops to zero it both occurs earlier and is more prevalent 
for low skilled workers. Thus, it may be that catch-up is incomplete for workers at the lower end of 
the skill spectrum.
29 
Extensions. Our model’s parsimony helps highlight our main implications. A variety of 
extensions could be added to provide a richer set of outcome predictions.  First, there may be many 
firms of either firm type, and workers may keep searching for a good match even once they settle 
for a particular class of firms. If the intensity of this additional search is fixed, firms post wages, and 
offers are drawn from a continuous distribution, this affects the continuation value of staying at 
either firm without affecting our main results. Although this would help to explain continuing job 
mobility observed in some cases, it adds complexity without affecting our core insights, so we do 
not pursue it here.  
Second, influential models have argued that external labor market conditions affect workers’ 
wages even on the job because of long-term contracting or job assignment.
30 In this case, workers 
would be affected by initial labor market conditions even after they found a better employer. This 
                                                 
29 To see this, note that 







1 a s V a V a V V s J s s s ψ θ τ θ τ θ τ θ π − + − + + + + + − = ∆ = > > Only the first 
two terms depend on job tenure at firm 2, and both are monotonously decreasing in tenure. Similarly, the expression 
decreases monotonously with age, since an increase in age reduces the benefit from search while increasing the direct 
costs. 
30 See Harris and Holmstrom (1982) for models of implicit insurance contracts; see Gibbons and Waldman (2004) for 
model of variable job assignment; similarly, models of job search, wage-contracting, and renegotiation could potentially 
give rise to persistence of labor market conditions on the job (e.g., Cahuc, Postel-Vinay, and Robin 2006).   15 
has been shown to be empirically relevant (e.g., Beaudry and DiNardo 1991, Baker, Gibbs, and 
Holmstrom 1994). We will show below that a similar phenomenon could be at play in our data as 
well. However, the introduction of non-stationarity would increase the complexity of our basic 
model without core additional insight.  
Third, another explanation for why lower skilled workers suffer more in a recession may be if 
they benefit more from human capital accumulation at highly productive employers. This could be 
introduced into our model by allowing for a non-zero chance that low skilled workers skills improve 
(their θ  increases) after spending some time at firm 1. This would tend to reduce the difference 
between high and low skilled workers introduced by our assumption of comparative advantage. We 
do not further pursue this in our partial equilibrium approach, since a full exploration of this aspect 
would require modeling of employers’ decisions.
31 
Further Implications.   Several recent papers explore on-the-job search and heterogeneity 
among workers and firms in a general equilibrium setting to establish the degree of assortative 
matching (Lentz 2007, Garibaldi and Moen 2007, Moscarini and Vella 2008) and the implications for 
business cycle dynamics (Krause and Lubik 2006a). The key implication of our partial equilibrium 
analysis for this literature is that the sorting and adjustment processes involved can take a long time. 
We also provide a mechanism through which the allocation of workers to firms could be 
permanently affected by a temporary shock. The time dependent search costs we emphasize imply 
that some workers are less responsive to firm wage differentials than others, weakening one channel 
leading towards assortative matching (e.g., Lentz 2007, Moscarini and Vella 2008). Similarly, such 
                                                 
31 We could also allow workers to choose the intensity of human capital accumulation in response to their initial 
placement and initial conditions in the labor market. Since we do not have direct observations on training or time 
worked in our data, the most straightforward way to introduce this into our model would be to allow workers to choose 
whether to work and accumulate specific (or general) human capital or not (and collect unemployment benefits). For 
some workers at the low end of the earnings distribution (for whom the non-employment option is typically most 
attractive) increasing labor supply and with it human capital accumulation may be an alternative channel of catch-up to 
more intensive job search. We will return to this point in Section 5.   16 
costs are likely to dampen the cyclical flows between sectors emphasized in Krause and Lubik 
(2006a). 
Another important question is how costly the inefficiencies due to search frictions are in terms 
of lost output from increased mismatch between workers and firms. Consider the case of age-related 
frictions. Since a temporary aggregate shock can persistently alter the allocation of workers to firms, 
this leads to a lasting cohort-specific increase in the degree of mismatch due to search frictions (e.g., 
Moscarini and Vella 2008). If wages are approximately equal to workers’ productivity, the resulting 
total loss in output can be approximated by the long-term earnings losses we estimate. We find 
below that for some cohorts, the earnings losses are shown to be quite large and very persistent, 
implying potentially important efficiency losses.
32   
Last, our model predicts that temporary shocks can lead to lasting increases in earnings 
inequality, and this is confirmed in our empirical results. To explore this aspect, we have conducted 
a simulation exercise, with two salient results (see the Sensitivity Appendix V in Oreopoulos, von 
Wachter, and Heisz 2008). First, the persistence due to age-related costs increases with the 
dispersion of firm quality. Thus, the higher the pre-existing inequality in the labor market, the bigger 
is the persistent rise in inequality due to initial shocks predicted by the model. Second, the larger the 
initial shocks the more likely the age-related slow-down in search occurs before the initial effect has 
dissipated, especially for lower-skilled college graduates. Thus, larger recessions exhibit more lasting 
increases in inequality and mismatch. 
3.  Empirical Strategy and Matched Data 
3.1. Cell-Level Regression Strategy and Sensitivity 
                                                 
32 The argument is more complex if the allocation is distorted by tenure-related costs, since a change in job-specific skills 
also implies a modification of the optimal assignment of workers to firms.   17 
Our data allow us to observe almost the universe of male college graduates in Canada graduating 
from 1976 to 1995 from the end of their first college degree for ten years into their careers. To 
measure the long-term effects on earnings of starting to work in a recession, our main specification 
exploits cyclical variation in unemployment rates for young workers at the regional level. Since our 
main independent variable – the rate of unemployment – varies across provinces and across cohorts, 
we collapse the individual level data at the level of graduation cohort (c), initial region of residence 
(r), and calendar year (t) and work only with the cell means  crt y  of the log of annual earnings and 
other variables (weighted by the corresponding cell sizes).
33 The cell level model on which most of 
the estimates in the paper are based on is 
 
crt c e r t cr e crt u UR y + + + + + + = χ γ θ φ β α 0 (3)
where  r θ ,  c χ ,  e γ ,  and  t φ  represent unrestricted fixed effects for first region of residence, year of 
graduation, year of potential labor market experience (e), and calendar year. The unemployment rate 
is measured at the time of graduation and the region of first residence ( 0 cr UR ). Given the presence 
of experience, region, and cohort effects the main coefficients of interest  e β  on the initial 
unemployment rates measure changes in experience profiles in earnings and other outcomes resulting 
from province-cohort-specific variation in unemployment rates.
34 To account for group specific 
error-components, we cluster standard errors at the cohort-region level. 
We interpret the variation in  0 cr UR  to arise from changes in aggregate labor demand that are 
uncorrelated with characteristics of different graduation cohorts. To make sure we pick up mainly 
                                                 
33 Note that below, to estimate versions of equation (4), we also work with a version of the data that is collapsed at the 
level of graduation cohort, initial region of residence, calendar year, and region of current residence.  
34 As it is well-known, cohort, potential experience, and year effects cannot be identified separately without an additional 
restriction on cohort effects is needed. Since we are mainly interested in experience effects and in their change over the 
business cycle, we simply drop one additional cohort effect from the regression. We could have chosen to restrict cohort 
effects to sum to zero (as suggested by Deaton 1997). This alternative does not alter our estimates of the experience 
profile. We also have assessed the linearity assumption implicit in equation (3) by plotting and regressing the residuals of 
earnings and unemployment rates (from first stage regressions on province, year, and cohort dummies) by experience 
years. The results (shown in Appendix Figure C2) suggest that the linearity assumption is highly plausible.   18 
effects occurring due to demand conditions and avoid influences from cohort-specific changes in 
labor supply of young workers, in our sensitivity analysis we have also used the unemployment rate 
for all workers as measure of initial labor market shock.
35 Remaining differences between graduation 
cohorts at the national level are taken out by cohort fixed effects. Below and in the Supplementary 
Appendix of Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2008) we address other potential biases (and 
many robustness checks, such as different specification, sample, or cohort restrictions). In particular, 
we conduct multiple specification and robustness checks to show that our results are unaffected by 
selective changes in the timing of college graduation or by selective labor force participation.  
Dynamic Effects. Since the state of regional labor markets continues to influence workers’ 
earnings even after labor market entry (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald 1994), our basic estimate of 
the effect of the first unemployment rate exposure captures the average change in earnings from 
graduating in a recession given the regular evolution of the regional unemployment rate faced afterwards. In 
other words, it estimates the dynamic effect of the first unemployment rate plus the weighted sum 
of the effect of unemployment rates a worker faces in his career. To isolate the effect of labor 
market conditions at entry net of subsequent effects on earnings from exposure to a possibly 
prolonged recession or expansion, we have also estimated a series of models that control for the 
entire history of regional unemployment rates that workers experience throughout their career. This 
helps to distinguish the role of labor market conditions at entry (at the time when all cohorts search 
for work) from the effect of labor market conditions when working or entering a new firm in mid-
career (as stressed for example by Beaudry and DiNardo 1991). This also allows us to assess whether 
                                                 
35 To assess the role of participation changes, we also replicated our results using the employment-population-ratio for 
15 to 24 year olds. It appears that year-to-year variations in cyclical labor market conditions that identify our estimates in 
our data move at a higher frequency than age-specific population, participation, or enrollment trends. This is confirmed 
by Beaudry et al. (2000) show that despite increases in college enrollment rates in Canada since the 1980s the correlation 
between unemployment rates for young and old workers is high and it has remained stable. Although education-specific 
unemployment rates are too noisy for most provinces, the unemployment rate for young college educated men for the 
larger states, such as Ontario or Quebec, are closely correlated with the youth unemployment rate and the average 
unemployment rate. Similarly, changes in female labor participation are unlikely to be correlated with province-specific 
changes in unemployment rates.   19 
the effects of aggregate unemployment rates at time of entry differ from that experienced by more 
mature workers. 
In Section 4 we begin exploring this issue by examining whether the effect of the early 
unemployment rate remains stable even when we include the cohort’s current unemployment rate. 
In addition, we also allow for persistent effects of the aggregate unemployment rate a worker was 
exposed to at each experience year (e) in the relevant region ( e r ), denoted by  e re UR . Denote the 
effect on earnings in experience year e from the unemployment rate at experience year 0 (1,2,3,4,…) 
by  0 , e β  ...) , , , ( 3 , 2 , 1 , e e e β β β . Dropping other regressors and the region subscripts on the 
unemployment rates for simplicity, the complete dynamic model can be written succinctly as 
crt r e r e r e cr e e c r t crt UR UR UR UR y ε β β β β γ χ θ φ + + + + + + + + + = 10 10 2 2 1 1 0 0 10 2 1 , , , , ... (4)
where we impose the restriction e s s e < ∀ = 0 , β . The full dynamic regression estimates the effect of 
the transitory component of each aggregate unemployment condition, net of its correlation with 
other unemployment rates affecting the worker in adjacent experience years. Due to high inter-
temporal correlation of aggregate unemployment rates, it is difficult to estimate the fully unrestricted 
model in equation (4). In our preferred specification, we use a restricted model in which we 
constrain the effects of unemployment to be the same in pairwise groups of experience years. For 
more detail see Sensitivity Appendix II in Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz (2008). 
Canadian Administrative Data Our results are based on a unique match between three large 
administrative data sets collected and compiled within Statistics Canada that is described in detail in 
the Data Appendix. The data combines administrative information on about 70% of Canadian 
college students and college graduates from 1976 to 1995 with longitudinal individual income tax   20 
records and firms’ payroll information covering the years from 1982 to 1999.
36 The data contains 
exceptional information about individual students’ course of study (such as type of degree, major, 
date of graduation), with detailed career information (e.g., annual earnings, province of residence, 
receipt of unemployment benefits) and information on employers. Exploiting the panel nature of 
our firm data, we calculate average firm size, average median wage, and total payroll at the firm level, 
with year fixed effects taken out. All firm characteristics in our empirical analysis refer to permanent 
attributes so that they remain unchanged across the worker panel (i.e., an individual’s firm 
characteristics can change only if she moves employers).
37 
To generate a uniform sample with a common definition of labor market entry, we focus on the 
effect of recessions at the end of the first exit from college and exclude workers obtaining higher 
degrees from our sample.
38 As shown in Table A1 of the Supplementary Appendix in Oreopoulos, 
von Wachter, and Heisz (2008; hereafter called the Supplementary Appendix), even within this 
relatively homogeneous sample there is a high rate of drop out and high variance in college duration. 
Despite the use of administrative data, there may still be some measurement error in actual 
graduation in our data. Thus, our main sample excludes early college dropouts to focus on a more 
homogenous group of workers with better measured graduation date. To do so, we calculate the 
difference (D) between actual and predicted graduation year (based on length of program in first or 
second year), and keep only workers with non-negative differences. The right columns of Appendix 
                                                 
36 The word ‘college’ is somewhat a misnomer in Canada because it is used usually to refer to one or two year 
community-level post-secondary institutions rather than degree-granting universities. In keeping with the terminology 
most often used, we shall refer to Canadian universities as colleges. 
37 The information is at the firm level; for simplicity, we use the terms firm, company, and employer interchangeably. 
38 Since we find early recessions do not affect the probability of obtaining a graduate degree, this does not affect our 
results. We have experimented with other definitions of the relevant date of labor market entry (such as last degree or 
last degree of continuous education), with little effect on the results. In the sensitivity analysis, we also show results using 
a sample that includes workers obtaining a post-graduate degree.   21 
Table A1 show characteristics for that sample. Among the sample of workers on or above grade 
89% graduate, and average duration of college is about 4 years.
39 
To assign the unemployment rate at the time of graduation, we have to choose a relevant 
province of residence. We settled for the province of first residence as the relevant labor market for 
young college graduates.
40 We impose some additional basic sample restrictions and limit the degree 
of missing observations on earnings. In particular, we drop workers who permanently stop filing 
taxes with the purpose of removing individuals who stopped being recorded annually because they 
left the country, obtained a new personal identification number, entered the underground economy, 
or their file was simply miscoded along the way.  None of these restrictions affect our results. 
Figure A1 in the Supplementary Appendix shows that the general experience profiles in annual 
earnings and job mobility for our baseline Canadian data are similar to those for the United States. 
In addition, we document a strong experience gradient in average size and average wages paid by 
employers – from year one to ten, average firm size and average firm wage increase by 34% and 
24%, respectively. Male Canadian graduates tend to move to firms that on average pay more and are 
larger the longer they progress through the labor market.
41  
Canada experienced two major recessions in the early 1980s and 1990s that increased young 
workers’ unemployment rates for certain years by more than seven percentage points. We use this 
variation for our national specification.
42 Figure 1 shows the time series of annual unemployment 
                                                 
39 By restricting our main discussion to graduates, we are also more likely to pick up the effect of early unemployment 
rather than the drop out decision. Our data suggests undergraduates are unlikely to finish early or drop out because of 
labor market conditions. The results hardly differ when replicated with the full sample. 
40 The alternative, province of college, gives similar results for both our basic estimates as well as our instrumental 
variable results. 
41 The first years of the careers of young male Canadian college graduates are characterized by steep wage growth (also 
documented for the U.S. by Murphy and Welch 1990), frequent job changes (Topel and Ward 1992), initially unstable 
labor force attachment (Ryan 2001, Gardecki and Neumark 1998), some interregional mobility (Wozniak 2006), and 
frequent industry changes (McCall 1990, Neal 1995, Parent 2000). Panel C of Appendix Figure A1 and Appendix Table 
A5 also suggest that average firm size tends to grow with labor market experience for college graduates in the U.S., too.  
42 The picture shows unemployment rates for 15 to 24 year olds. Using unemployment rates defined for workers age 20 
to 24 or for college graduates only does not substantially alter the pattern of unemployment over time or across regions, 
nor does it affect our results.   22 
rates at the provincial level.  The figure displays a high degree of regional heterogeneity. During this 
period, an increase of unemployment rates of 5 percentage points (or about two standard deviations) 
describes a typical large recession.
43 
4.  The Persistent Effect of Initial Labor Market Conditions on Earnings 
Figure 2 plots mean earnings by experience and year of college completed using our baseline 
data at the national level together with their entry wage at experience one (their first full year of 
work) and the average wage for ‘mature’ workers (workers with 5 to 10 years of experience). One 
can clearly see differences in starting wages across graduation cohorts leading to differences in 
average cohort earnings. Thus, as found by others, if we were to add cohort effects in a simple 
earnings regression, they significantly improve the fit of the model. The figure also shows a clear 
pattern of convergence. Initial differences in starting conditions appear to fade over time. Cohort 
effects appear to have a time-varying component, or, as noted by Beaudry and Green (2001), 
experience profiles vary across cohorts.  
There exists a strong correlation between starting wages and initial unemployment rate 
conditions, which persists into higher experience years and slowly fades over time. This is shown in 
Figure 3, which graphs national unemployment rates for young workers and wages at different years 
of experience by graduation cohort (both expressed as deviations from their means across cohorts). 
The correlations in the figure strongly suggest that part of the initial but fading earnings differences 
in Figure 2 are driven by variation in initial labor market conditions.  
The correlations at the national level shown in Figure 3 are also used to produce results in 
columns 1-2 and columns 4-5 of Table 1.  The table shows the long-term effects of national 
                                                 
43 If we regress regional unemployment rates on year and region fixed effects, the R2 is 0.9, which is a common finding 
in the U.S. and other country. The remaining variation in regional unemployment rate allows us to obtain precise 
estimates of the effect of province recession shocks and to include further interaction terms, such as region-specific year 
effects. We should stress that our results are robust for excluding large Canadian provinces such as Ontario or Quebec.   23 
unemployment rates on log real earnings, controlling for year and experience effects and linear or 
quadratic cohort trends. Column (1) and (4) show the shift in experience profiles due to an 
unemployment shock in experience year zero including a linear cohort trend for all workers with 
some college and those in the graduate sample ( 0 ≥ D ), respectively. Standard errors are clustered at 
the level of graduation cohort to allow for group level error terms. The results suggest a strong initial 
effect that persists but fades after about five years in the labor market.
44  
4.1. Main Regional Models   
Our main results are drawn from regional models that include cohort effects as well as effects 
for initial province of residence as described in Section 3. The shifts in experience profiles due to an 
initial provincial unemployment shock are shown in Column 3 of Table 1 for all workers with at 
least some college and Column 6 for our baseline graduate sample. The initial effects are similar in 
size to those from the national model, but starting at experience year four the regional estimates 
remain more persistent, and converge to zero only after 10 experience years. Although estimates for 
graduates are slightly more precise (Column 6), there is little difference in the point estimates for 
graduates and all workers with some college (Column 3). This is apparent in Figure 4, Panel A, that 
plots the main coefficient estimates against potential experience. It does not appear that those with a 
college degree fare better than the full sample. 
The similarity between the national and regional results suggests we can exclude a strong 
correlation of initial unemployment rates at the national level with changing unobserved cohort 
characteristics. Below, we show that higher persistence in our regional results is not driven by more 
persistent unemployment shocks. National estimates may be more affected by measurement error 
problems due to mis-assignment of the relevant initial labor market shock. Inter-regional mobility is 
                                                 
44 Note that the effects in Table 1 exhibit a pattern of over-shooting in experience year 10 which is significant with 
quadratic cohort trends. While this has potentially interesting behavioral implications, it is not confirmed in the regional 
specifications, and may thus be due to the particular cyclical pattern of national unemployment rates.   24 
less common in Canada than in the U.S. Thus, the relevant labor market shock is at the regional 
level, an effect only partially absorbed by the national unemployment rate. Low regional mobility 
also may explain why results from the national model are not larger than the regional model.  
Using the results from our main regional model, with an increase in unemployment of 5 
percentage points – roughly a shift from boom to recession in our sample – annual wages are about 
9 percent lower in the first year after college, still 4 percent lower after 5 years out, and about 2 
percent lower 9 years out.  Overall, we view the regional and national results as telling a consistent 
story.  Graduating during a recession leads to significantly lower earnings at the beginning of an 
individual’s labor market, but the gap converges to zero within ten years after graduation. These 
results are consistent with estimates from the literature on the “wage curve” in the U.S. 
(Blanchflower and Oswald 1994).  They are also consistent with estimates by Bloom and Freeman 
(1988) who find that initial effects due to differences in cohort sizes fade after ten years. Similarly, 
Devereux (2003) finds among a sample of workers from all ages that half of a wage-shock, 
instrumented by local unemployment conditions, is still present after about five years. Kahn (2006) 
finds somewhat more persistent losses in earnings than ours, partly due to her focus on graduates 
entering the strong recession of the early 1980s. 
Dynamic Effects. Due to the presence of continuing exposure to adverse labor market 
conditions, the estimates in Table 1 represent a summary of the earnings losses the average worker 
can expect due to entry in a depressed labor market. To isolate the extent to which our baseline 
results occur primarily from initial labor market conditions while beginning one’s fulltime job search 
and not from correlated labor market conditions in later years, the large samples and ample cohort 
variation at our disposition allow us to control for the confounding effects of regional 
unemployment persistence. This is done in the first column of Table 2, which shows results after 
adding an interaction between experience and the regional unemployment rate prevalent in the   25 
relevant year and current province of residence, as well as fixed effects for current province of 
residence.
45 As predicted, the initial unemployment rate effect is reduced by persistence of labor 
market conditions, but the difference is small. Results by Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), McDonald 
and Worswick (1999), and Grant (2003) suggest that ensuing labor market conditions may have 
persistent effects themselves for workers not changing employers. Similarly, job search predicts that 
unemployment conditions at the beginning of employment spells can persist for job changers. As 
shown in the remaining columns of Table 2, the basic results are not affected if we allow for 
persistent effects of other labor market conditions as discussed in Section 3. A part of the effect of 
initial unemployment rates is due to persistent effects of initial and continuing regional labor market 
conditions, but the majority of the effect we find is driven by the very first shock alone.  
To put the magnitude of the effect of initial labor market conditions into further perspective, 
column 7 of Table 2 shows the dynamic effect of a shock occurring at experience years two to three 
from the grouped model with full history controls. Panel A of Figure 5 displays the corresponding 
coefficient estimates that are comparable to our main result in Panel A of Figure 4. To make the 
dynamic pattern comparable with that of the first group, the table shows coefficients relative to the 
time of the shock (i.e., experience zero now relates to the moment of the shock). The effect of a 
shock experienced at experience years 2-3 is much smaller than the effect of a shock at entry (0-1) 
for all experience years. Our period is too short to observe complete reversion but the point 
estimates are insignificant after 4-6 years. Inspection of the data leads us to believe that the dynamic 
effects for shocks at later experience years are small.
46 The result is notable in suggesting the greater 
                                                 
45 Note that since we only observe full history of province of residence for cohorts graduating 1982 onward, Table 2 
uses only these cohorts 
46 Our sample of cohorts is small at later experience years, such that the cohort variation shown in Supplementary 
Appendix Figure C2 limits our ability to estimate the average dynamic effects of shocks at later experience years.  "To 
further explore the difference between labor market entrants and workers already in the labor market, we also estimated 
the effects of unemployment rate conditions for workers by experience level on job mobility, regional mobility, firm 
quality, and unemployment (see Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz 2006, Table 6). The results confirm the 
exceptional effect of economic conditions at time of entry compared to workers already in the labor market.   26 
relative importance that economic conditions have at the beginning of one’s labor market career 
than after finding an initial job.  
Sensitivity Analysis.  Our overall results hold up well against a variety of sensitivity checks.  
Figure 5 (Panel B) addresses the question of selective timing of college graduation, which is 
discussed in detail in Sensitivity Appendix I of our Supplementary Appendix (Oreopoulos et al. 
2008). Since most of our measures indicate insignificant effects of unemployment rates on college 
duration, selective timing of graduation does not appear to be an important phenomenon in our 
data. Not surprisingly, when we use the unemployment rate in the predicted year of graduation 
(based on starting year of college and typical degree-duration) as an instrument our estimates 
confirm the main ordinary least squares results. Although all our results carry over with the 
instrumental variable estimate, in what follows we report the more efficient ordinary least squares 
estimates. 
The remaining panels of Figure 5 show two further sensitivity checks. First, Panel C shows that 
there are only small (and insignificant) differences in the effects when we only include workers 
always present with positive earnings. Panel D shows that although there are some expected 
differences in the effects of initial labor market conditions across cohorts (e.g., graduates entering in 
the strong recession of the early 1980s suffer slightly larger and more persistent effects), our results 
are quite similar for different groups of labor market entrants.
47 
We have also tried various other sample and specification choices, none of which substantially 
affected our results. Including college students who enter the labor market after a graduate degree 
has no effects on our results (Supplementary Appendix Figure C3, Panel B) suggesting workers do 
not selectively enter advanced degree programs due to unemployment. We also tried various ways of 
                                                 
47 Coefficient estimates and standard errors for Panels B-D of Figure 5 (and many other sensitivity checks) are 
shown in the Supplementary Appendix in Oreopoulos et al. (2008).   27 
excluding workers with repeatedly missing wages, and find little effect on our results.
48 We have re-
estimated all of our results using the province of college as the region for the relevant initial shock 
with no basic change in our results.
 49 Part of the reason why regional results show more persistent 
effects of initial labor market conditions on wages might be that workers are ‘stuck’ in persistently 
slack regional labor markets. To address this possibility, we also included current province by 
current year fixed effects (shown in Supplementary Appendix Figure C1, Panel D), which barely 
show any differences from the main results. This is also an additional indicator that mobility towards 
provinces with higher wages is not a strong source of catch-up in our sample.
 50 
Effects on Employment.   If unemployment rates affect participation, part of the recovery 
process in earnings we find may be due to sample selection. Similarly, losses in employment could 
depress wages by reducing accumulation of labor market experience. Table 3 replicates the same 
results as in Table 1 using as outcome variables the fraction of workers claiming unemployment 
insurance benefits, the fraction of workers filing taxes with zero earnings, and the fraction of 
workers not filing taxes in a given year. The point estimates for our preferred specification are 
displayed in Figure 4, Panel D. The table and figure show an initially significant increase in fraction 
zero earnings and the fraction of unemployment insurance (UI) claimants that fades within three 
experience years. The effects are numerically small and become small and insignificant when we 
                                                 
48 Supplementary Appendix Figure C3, Panel A shows the results with those who permanently stop filing included. 
49 As shown in Supplementary Appendix Figure C1, Panel C the results are marginally weaker initially but as persistent. 
This is likely due to measurement error, since in this case the shock in the province of residence at experience year one 
has very strong effects. If we group experience years zero and one together, the effects are very similar. While there may 
be a concern about selective mobility based on the unemployment shock in the province of college, we feel the effect of 
measurement error due to the mis-assignment of initial province is larger. This is supported by relatively low incidence 
and gains from regional mobility (Oreopoulos et al. 2008, Sensitivity Appendix III). 
50 The results in Table 1 are also robust to a variety of additional sensitivity checks. First, our results do not seem to be 
driven by any particular measure of labor market conditions. To counter the concern that the unemployment rate for 
young workers may be affected by cohort characteristics, we replicated our results with the unemployment rate for all 
workers (Supplementary Appendix Figure C1, Panel A). We also find similar results from using the employment 
population rates for workers age 15 to 25 (or men only). Second, we compare the effect of average unemployment rates 
in experience year zero, 0 to 1, 0 to 2, and 0 to 3 (Supplementary Appendix Figure C1, Panel B). While high average 
unemployment in the early years tends to make the effects more persistent, it does not appear that the effects captured 
in the main models are driven by periods of extended unemployment. As confirmed by the results Table 2, the driving 
force behind our main results is the shock in the very first years after entry into the labor market.   28 
control for persistence of local unemployment rates (not shown). In other words, a temporary 
unemployment rate shock has no persistent effects on employment or participation of male college 
graduates.
51 
Since our sample does not contain information on time worked, we also replicated our results 
with the Canadian Census (see Sensitivity Appendix IV in Oreopoulos et al. 2008). Decomposing 
the effect of early unemployment rates on annual earnings into the effect on weeks worked and on 
weekly wages we find that the effect on weeks worked is short lived. The majority of the persistent 
effects we find is driven by a reduction in weekly earnings. Thus, neither reduction in the 
accumulation of experience nor selective entry or exit from the earnings sample of workers of 
different abilities affect the main pattern of reversion we see.
52 
4.2. Larger Effects for Entrants at the Bottom of the Skill and Earnings Distribution 
Although differences in the effect of labor market conditions by initial background is a recurring 
question in economics, little is known about the degree of heterogeneity in the persistence of initial 
effects, or how different groups of workers catch-up after an initial shock. We use our data to 
examine whether college graduates with lower predicted wages, based on college background, are 
more adversely affected by higher unemployment rate conditions. We first use a linear regression 
model to predict log earnings based on college attended, program of graduation, and years of study, 
conditional on province of study and cohort year.
53 Since individuals are likely to be sorted into 
                                                 
51 The effects are very similar for the sample of all workers (see Supplementary Appendix Table D1 and Figure D1). 
Overall, the loss in experience due to labor market entry in recessions is not very large for the average college student. 
These results are echoed by Kahn (2006), who finds small initial effects on hours, employment, and weeks worked for 
male college graduates in the U.S. after the 1982 recession. Table 3 also displays a pattern of ‘overshooting’ after 
experience year 7 for some measures; this would imply that workers who had initially higher instability become more 
stable later relative to their more lucky counterparts. One could think of various hypothetical explanations of such a 
phenomenon. However, the estimates are numerically very small and never above 0.2 percentage points.  
52 Only workers in the lowest skill group have significantly lower propensity to become unemployed (see Figure 6, Panel 
D). Thus, for these workers increases in labor supply and experience accumulation may help to explain part of the 
process of catch-up. Section 2 discusses how this could be integrated in our model (‘Extensions’). 
53 A similar approach to assess college quality is followed by Betts, Ferrall, and Finnie (forthcoming), who use the same 
college data and information on wages after graduation as we do. After analyzing majors and colleges separately, in our   29 
colleges, these estimates will capture both differences in innate ability as well as differences in college 
quality.
54 We then group individuals into quintiles based on these predicted wages.  
Figure 6 shows the same coefficients for the effects of the initial unemployment rate on log 
earnings, job mobility, individual’s firm’s log median earnings, and employment as in the baseline 
model, but for regression models estimated separately for the first, third, and fifth predicted wage 
quintiles (this figure corresponds to Figure 3, Panel A for the full sample).  Table 4 summarizes the 
key structure of losses by quintile and compares them to results for the full sample. For exposition, 
the table displays three parameter estimates for the initial dip, first recovery, and final fade of 
earnings losses in an approach mirroring that of Jacobson, Lalonde, and Sullivan (1993, Table 2). As 
apparent from the table and figure, those with the lowest predicted annual earnings are most 
affected by higher initial unemployment conditions and experience permanent earnings losses.   
Earnings one year into the labor market are about 15 percent lower from a 5 percentage point 
increase in the initial unemployment rate, and, in this case, remain about 7.5 percent lower even after 
10 years.  The top quintile’s earnings are on average about 7.5 percent lower in the first year after a 
five point increase in unemployment rates, but the gap falls to less than 2 percent after only 4 years. 
Overall Costs of Recessions.   The longitudinal data allows us to obtain a direct measure of 
the cost of recessions that is a useful complement to measures in the literature based on the standard 
deviations of earnings. Figure 7 graphs the percentage decline in the present discounted value of 
annual earnings by deciles of the predicted earnings distribution. We discount earnings at an interest 
rate of five percent and only include the first ten years of earnings in our calculation. This assumes 
                                                                                                                                                             
final specification we interact major and college dummies. Differences by major or college in itself are as expected (e.g., 
humanities graduates do worst, then come social sciences, economists and engineers are in the middle range, see 
Supplementary Appendix Figure G1), but too broad to yield a prediction of individual earnings capacity. This exercise is 
done for the graduate sample only, since it is conceptually harder to assign college quality for drop-outs. 
54 This is discussed extensively in Black and Smith (2004), Black, Kermit, and Smith (2005), or Dale and Krueger (2002). 
An advantage of our data relative to the literature on college quality in the U.S. is that we have access to earnings 
histories. Using similar data to ours, Betts et al. (forthcoming) find that the effects of observable measures of college 
quality on earnings are small.   30 
that the difference in annual earnings has decayed after ten years. We thus understate the loss for 
less advantaged workers whose earnings have not fully recovered by that time. Given the short time 
horizon we use, we view our calculations merely as indicative of the full life-time loss in earnings. 
Figure 7 has two key messages. First, there is an important gradient in the cost of recessions in 
predicted earnings – those individuals with lower earnings capacity face four to five times the cost of 
recessions than the most advantaged workers. The least advantaged appear to bear most of the costs 
of recessions. Second, the losses from starting to work in a recession as measured by actual changes 
in the present discounted values of earnings or utility losses are high even for the more able workers. 
In particular, for the median worker in our sample they are much higher than what is typically found 
in the literature.
55  
5.  Predicted and Actual Mechanisms of Recovery 
The predictions from our model outlined in Section 2 hold up well when compared with our 
empirical results for the channels of recovery after an adverse initial labor market shock. In our 
stylized model, an initial shock consists of a temporary shift in the number of job openings at high 
productivity firms. Besides being a convenient modeling decision, this also turns out to capture 
important features of our data.
56 Figure 4, Panel C, shows that graduates in our data entering the 
                                                 
55 The median worker in our sample loses about 22,000 Canadian Dollars (in 2005 prices), about 6% of the present 
discounted value of earnings in the first ten years in the labor market. This compares to average annual earnings in the 
first experience year for the median worker of about 25,000 Canadian Dollars (in 2005 prices). In Oreopoulos et al. 
(2006), we also show the fraction increase in annual earnings a worker would require to be indifferent between a noisy 
earnings path and an alternative stable path using a constant relative risk aversion utility function. This corresponds 
conceptually to the original Lucas measure. The results convey the same message as Figure 7. We find that an uncertain 
stream of earnings had to be increased by about 7% for the median worker in our sample to be of equal utility as a 
comparable certain path. The typical estimate in the literature is below 1%. Some studies, such as Storesletten, Telmer, 
and Yaron (2001) or Krusel and Smith (1999) find effects comparable to ours for households with no wealth.  
56 High wage sectors have more pro-cyclical employment (e.g., Bils and McLaughlin 2001), and we find a corresponding 
pattern for firms. Typical high wage and pro-cyclical industries are durable goods manufacturing and construction. 
Typical low wage, less pro-cyclical sectors are retail trade or personal services. At the firm level, the patterns may arise 
due to changes in demand for products of different quality, differences in the costs of job creation, or because of 
changes in product market competition.   31 
labor market during times of high unemployment are more likely begin work at lower quality 
employers. The corresponding coefficient estimates are shown in Table 5. 
If workers’ search costs increase with tenure and age, our model predicts that the effects 
from initial shocks decline through temporary increases in job mobility that occur less frequently 
over time. Figure 4 shows that after an initial downranking, firm quality improves quickly in the first 
3-5 years in the labor market when job mobility is higher than average.
57 As the effect of initial 
unemployment on job mobility declines (Panel B of Figure 4), improvements in firm quality visibly 
slow down (Panel C). Reversion in firm quality continues, but at a reduced rate. 
Our results in Figure 6 confirm that the catch-up process appears to occur in two phases, 
especially for the middle-skilled workers in our sample (Implication 1). In the first phase of catch-up, 
workers experience rapid improvements in the quality of their employers through job mobility. This 
phase lasts four to five years. Improvement in employer quality is absent in the second phase, where 
reversion appears to occur within firm type (Implication 3). The catch-up process within firms appears 
to be completed in the course of a few years, consistent with returns to tenure mainly playing a role 
in the first years on a job.
58 
Also consistent with our model, the results in Figure 6 indicate important differences in 
catch-up for workers with different skill levels (Implication 2). High skilled workers experience large 
temporary increases in rates of job mobility and completely close the gap in employer quality within 
                                                 
57 As found in the U.S. by Topel and Ward (1992), we find that job mobility in Canada is on average very productive in 
the first ten years of workers’ careers. The positive association job changes and wage changes strengthens for workers 
graduating in a recession; if we calibrate the magnitude of the effects of job change or improvements in firm quality, we 
find that 40-50% percent of earnings losses could be explained by productive job mobility. This is discussed in detail in 
an earlier working paper version (Oreopoulos et al. 2006, Sections 4.3 and 4.4, Table 5). Table 5 also reports effects on 
the propensity of change among 2-digit industry classes. In addition to job shopping workers also actively search for a 
match with the ‘right’ industry (e.g., Neal 1995 or McCall 1990). Note that we find a similar pattern of cyclical 
downgrading towards low-wage industries as we find for low-wage firms (see Supplementary Appendix Table E3 in 
Oreopoulos et al. 2008), but that downgrading also occurs within industries. 
58 A few qualifications of this interpretation are in order. First, it appears that for middle-skilled workers catch-up occurs 
partly through further job changes within given firm types. As discussed in the section 3, it is straightforward to add 
such continuing job mobility within ‘sectors’ to our model but leave this to future research. Second, we will see below 
that catch-up in the second phase could be partly driven by the persistent effect of external labor market conditions. As 
discussed, allowing for such an effect would be a useful extension of our model that is left for future research.   32 
four years (Figure 6). Medium skilled workers experience above-average job mobility and increases 
in firm quality within the first four years. College graduates at the bottom of the skill distribution 
experience little increases in job mobility and improvement in firm quality in the years after 
graduation, but instead are permanently down graded to lower-paying employers and sectors 
(Implication 4). For these workers, catch-up within firms is particularly important. 
What’s behind the catch-up process?  To assess the magnitude of alternative channels 
underlying the catch-up process, we added controls for a cohort’s average firm quality and current 
and lagged regional unemployment rates in a regression of average log annual wages to our cell-level 
regression. Since recessions do not appear to affect the timing of graduation or labor force 
participation in our data, the inclusion of cell-level variables allows decomposing the persistent 
effect of the initial unemployment rate on earnings into the part explained by differences and 
changes in firm quality, by persistent effects of unemployment rates, and by other factors.   
Figure 8 shows the effect of initial unemployment rates in years 0-1 in the labor market on 
earnings for workers entering the labor market in 1982 or later (since only for these cohorts we can 
match workers to initial firms).
59 The second line from below shows the remaining effect of initial 
unemployment rates once we condition for average employer quality in a given cell. The figure 
suggests that an important part of the earnings difference (about 40-50%) is explained by reductions 
in firm quality. As predicted by the model, differences in firm quality matter especially in the first 
years after entry. We then add the current unemployment rate to the model, interacted with labor 
market experience to allow for persistent effects (as in Column 6, Table 2). Once we add persistent 
effects of further labor market conditions, the long-term effect of initial unemployment fades 
completely in the fifth year in the labor market. Thus, temporary reduction in firm quality plus 
                                                 
59 The coefficient estimates are contained in Supplementary Appendix Table I1. Appendix Table I2 shows that the 
same results hold separately within skill group, but are more pronounced for the medium skilled workers.   33 
continuing exposure to adverse labor market conditions correlated with the effect at entry explain a 
large fraction of the earnings losses we find.  
Additional Implications.   Our model predicts that a higher ‘natural’ rate of arrival of job 
offers λ  increase the speed of decay of initial conditions (Equation 3). To assess this prediction, we 
have constructed mean turnover rates in 2-digit industries (calculated over a period of more than 15 
years) as imperfect proxy of the mean rate of offer arrival at the industry level. We then compared 
the dynamics of earnings losses in industries with differences in average turnover rates (Figure 9, 
Panel A). As predicted by the model, the results show that the decay of earnings losses is 
significantly faster in sectors that have higher average turnover rates.
60 
Second, if an important source of reversion of earnings losses is driven by differences in firm 
quality, the earnings loss for recession graduates that are lucky to find a first job at a high wage firm 
should be minimal. Unfortunately, this prediction is hard to assess directly because different types of 
workers will start at high wage firms in recessions and in booms. If we nevertheless include a fixed 
effect for a worker’s first employer in our model, about half of the earnings loss can be explained 
(Figure 9, Panel B).
61 The result offers further evidence that search effort and initial luck are 
important sources of reversion of adverse conditions at labor market entry. 
Third, once workers have obtained a job at a high quality employer, we observe that the rate 
of catch-up slows significantly compared to workers whose first employer pays high average wages 
                                                 
60 A simulation exercise contained in Sensitivity Appendix V (Oreopoulos et al. 2008) highlights additional predictions 
from the model relating to firm-hiring rates that help understand the pattern in our data. First, the fact that high skilled 
workers appear to do better initially suggests that their hiring rate at good firms falls less in recessions. Second, the large 
observed discrepancy in the rate of catch-up between high and low skilled workers is unlikely due to differences in 
search intensity alone, suggesting that steady state hiring rates at good firms ( p ) appear to be higher for high skilled 
workers. 
61 Coefficients estimates and standard errors for Figure 9 are contained in Supplementary Appendix Tables F. Figure 9, 
Panel B, also shows results for the interaction of initial firm fixed effects and experience effects. The results suggest that 
find firm-specific experience profiles do not explain an important part of earnings losses. Note that since comparative 
advantage and sorting implies that average ability of workers starting to work at high wage firms in a recession should be 
higher than that of workers starting in the same firm in booms, the results in Figure 9, Panel B, tends to overstate the 
importance of the first employer.    34 
(Figure 9, Panel C). This is consistent with the structure of the model by which the nature of catch-
up changes once workers enter high productivity firms. If the worker starts at a low paying 
employer, job search is more intense, leading to a high rate of catch-up. Catch-up slows once the 
worker enters a high-wage firm, and is driven (in the model) by faster accumulation of specific skills, 
or (in an extension) by additional job offers by firms of the same type. Given the large differences in 
average employer quality on the one hand and rather small consensus estimates of the returns to 
tenure on the other hand, it is not surprising that this second phase is slower.
62  
Finally, the model is consistent with the general patterns of career development of college 
graduates in Canada. In particular, our search model predicts that with rising experience an 
increasing proportion of workers is employed at high-wage firms. We find evidence of this with 
positive concave experience profiles in firm-size and average firm-wages (Supplementary Appendix 
Figure A1). Improvements in firm quality can explain an important part of initial earnings growth in 
Canada, and similar trends appear in US data (Oreopoulos et al. 2008). 
Overall, our empirical results closely support an environment in which heterogeneous 
workers gradually search for jobs at better firms, but recovery is slowed due to accumulation of 
specific capital and increases in the cost of mobility as workers age. These results have important 
implications for our understanding of the role of job search in workers’ careers and in the 
adjustment of the labor market to cyclical shocks. A key insight of our model is that effects of initial 
unemployment rates lead to permanent earnings differences only if coupled with search frictions 
that intensify with age. Without a distinction between ‘newly minted,’ flexible workers and workers 
settling down, nothing would prevent workers to keep seeking better jobs once they have entered 
                                                 
62 Even if workers continued to search, once at a large firm they are less likely to obtain a better job match. Again, the 
probability of starting to work at a ‘high quality’ employer may be correlated with workers’ ability, and the degree of 
selectivity might be affected by early unemployment rates. To address this problem, we have included control functions 
in the fraction of workers starting to work at ‘high quality’ firms. Similarly, we have included average fathers’ income as 
control function. Neither strategy affects our results (results available upon request). Since young workers’ earnings may 
not be entirely a function of their ability (due for example to the presence of employer learning), including worker fixed 
effects or working with changes in earnings is not an ideal strategy to deal with this problem.   35 
the labor market. Another key insight is that these adjustment processes can differ by workers’ skill 
level. Under realistic assumptions on comparative advantage, low skilled workers are more likely to 
be affected by time-increasing mobility costs and to be persistently down-ranked to lower paying 
firms. Thereby, low-skilled workers are more likely to experience permanent effects from initial 
labor market conditions. 
6.  Conclusion 
We have estimated the long term effects of entering the labor market in a recession for a large 
sample of Canadian men leaving college whose earnings, employers, and career outcomes are 
tracked for ten years. Our main results suggest that the average worker graduating college in a 
recession faces earnings losses that are very persistent but not permanent.  On average, a two 
standard deviation increase in the unemployment rate (roughly comparing the difference between 
those exiting college in a bust versus boom) leads to an initial wage gap of about 10 percent.  This 
gap declines relatively slowly, and fades to zero after about the eighth year.  Controlling for 
unemployment rate conditions after the first year of labor market entry, we also conclude that 
virtually all of the wage deficit can be attributed to the unemployment rate variation in the very first 
year after leaving school. The results are robust to selective graduation or selective labor force 
participation, and to the many alternative specifications we tried.   
We also find that college graduates at the bottom of the wage and ability distribution have larger 
and more persistent losses, while the effects at the top are small and short lived. Our estimates of 
how the path of earnings declines suggests that the present discounted value of losses in annual 
earning could be three to four times larger for the least advantaged to the most advantaged workers, 
indicating that even within the group of college graduates there is a large degree of heterogeneity in 
the costs of recessions. We also find that the effects of recession shocks are strongest for young 
workers, while workers with a couple of years of labor market experience are less affected.    36 
To assess potential mechanisms behind the persistent losses and catch-up process we developed 
a model in which high and low skill workers chose optimal strategies to search for jobs with better 
employers in the presence of age-dependent search costs and comparative advantage. We derive the 
predictions of our model for the long-term effects of recessions and compare them to the process of 
recovery we observe in the data. We find that recessions initially lead workers to start at less 
attractive employers. As implied by our model, an important part of earnings catch-up occurs by 
workers moving to higher-paying firms, especially in the first years after the shock. The importance 
of mobility towards better firms and the differences between more and less advantaged workers 
support an important role for job search that is influenced by comparative advantage and evolving 
search frictions. Lack of job search or lower offer rates from high-wage firms could explain why the 
least advantaged are permanently down-ranked to lower wage firms. 
On balance we believe that our search model delivers a parsimonious explanation of the high 
and differential degree of persistence and the role of firm quality we find in our data. Our model’s 
emphasis of the role of job search does not preclude contributions of other relevant mechanisms 
explaining the catch-up process, such as gradual sorting and employer learning (e.g., Gibbons, Katz, 
Lemieux, and Parent 2005), human capital accumulation (e.g., Neal 1995), or recovery on-the-job 
due to contracting (e.g., Beaudry and DiNardo 1991) or job assignment (e.g., Gibbons and Waldman 
2004). Some of these mechanisms could be integrated into the model, but we leave an explicit 
theoretical and empirical analysis to future work. To further examine the implications of our results 
for economic efficiency, it would also be important to embed our model in a general equilibrium 
framework that explicitly accounts for the hiring decisions and wage setting of firms and the ensuing 
sorting process. Last, by focusing on male college graduates we have left out other groups of 
workers – such as high school graduates and women – that could be important in determining the 
overall response of the labor market to cyclical shocks.   37 
Data Appendix 
Our data combines three administrative datasets from Statistics Canada.  The first is the University 
Student Information System (USIS), which includes enrollment and graduate information of post-secondary 
students in Canada from 1974 to 1997.  We augment the USIS data by linking it to income data from the T1 
Family File (T1FF) between 1982 and 1999, and to an employer-employee matched dataset called the 
Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program database (LEAP).  Each is described below, followed by how we 
defined the variables used in our analysis. 
USIS is a national database containing pertinent up-to-date information on student participation in and 
graduation from Canadian degree granting institutions obtained from administrative records provided at the 
individual level. USIS has two main components. The enrolment survey collects information on student counts, 
and requests information on a broad array of student and program characteristics including institution, 
province, gender, age, mother tongue, immigration status, country of citizenship and country of origin, full- 
or part-time status, type of qualification sought (e.g., bachelor, masters, etc., or none), field of study, year of 
study in program and an individual identifier. The degrees survey collects information on all students who have 
received a degree, diploma or certificate during the calendar year. The degrees survey has a more limited 
number of data elements than the enrolment survey. These datasets have been merged by the Education, 
Culture and Tourism Division of Statistics Canada, creating a third file commonly referred to as the linkage 
file. We use the linkage file in this analysis. 
The information is obtained from the administrative records of Canadian degree-granting institutions, 
generally in an individual record format.  Approximately 70 percent of post-secondary institutions provided 
regular annual individual information, including student identifiers that allow matching to the other two 
administrative datasets.  We therefore focus on students from these institutions.63  All information in the 
USIS is checked for validity edited by the universities and, in some cases, by the province and by Statistics 
Canada.  
The enrolment survey collects information on student counts as of December 1st in all provinces except 
Ontario, where the reference date is November 1st.  This means that each student who attends university in 
the fall session is counted only once annually, even though the student may be enrolled in more than one 
program.  This student count is used as a proxy for the total number of students enrolled during a complete 
academic year. 
The degrees survey collects information on all students who have received a degree, diploma or certificate 
during the calendar year ending in December.   It is a count of the number of degrees, diplomas and 
certificates awarded, not the number of individual students who receive them. 
From the enrolment data, we keep all males that began a full-time undergraduate program at a post-
secondary school institution between the ages of 17 and 20.  We note students’ graduation date, or last year 
enrolled full time (plus one since enrolment was recorded as of December 1).  Experience is defined as 
number of years since graduation or number of years since ending full-time post-secondary education.  We 
examine earnings starting when experience equals zero, since students are likely to have worked for 7 months 
since graduation.  We remove any student taking longer than 8 years to complete an undergraduate degree 
(dropping less than 1 percent of the sample).  We also calculate predicted graduation year based on entry year 
plus four. 
The enrolment data includes information on home province.  If missing, home province was assumed to 
be the province of the institution the student began their program. After finding that national and regional 
unemployment rates at time of graduation were not correlated with obtaining a subsequent degree, we focus 
on students that obtain no more than one degree.    
  The post-secondary students we examine from the USIS are matched to the T1FF using the student 
identifier.  The T1FF is a data set of individual tax records from 1982 to 1999.  The T1FF includes 
information on earnings, defined as the sum of taxable earnings from employment and self-employment.  
The dataset also contains information on transfers, as well as age, gender, residential address and an 
identification number for the firm at which the individual is employed.  Some students (fewer than 15 percent 
of the sample) were not matched, mostly due to missing identifiers.  Missing ID may be because (1) the 
                                                 
63 For more on the USIS and the match to the T1FF, see Heisz (2001) and Heisz (2003).    38 
student did not have an ID code (perhaps because he or she was a foreign student), (2) the student had an ID 
code, but either did not give it to the institution or the institution did not request it, or (3) the institution 
collected the ID code but did not report it on the USIS survey.  To remove individuals that have left the 
country, we drop any student that does not file in the last two years of the T1FF data.   
Our baseline sample compares well with Census data for the same underlying population.  Supplementary 
Figure A2 of our Supplementary Appendix, for example, shows mean earnings profiles generated from a 
1995 cross section of our baseline data with analogous profiles generated from the 1996 Canadian Census 
(that surveys 1995 annual earnings) of college graduate males.  Predicted differences over potential experience 
are highly similar.    
The cross-section outcome variables we examine include whether a student receives a degree, and years 
in post-secondary school.  The annual outcome variables we focus on are log earnings, dummy variables for 
not filing taxes, zero earnings, and living in different province than initial province. 
Individuals working in the USIS-T1FF are also matched annually to information about their firms from 
Statistics Canada’s Longitudinal Employment Analysis Program database (LEAP), beginning in 1983.  The 
match rate was 96 percent.64  LEAP is a company-level database that includes all employers in Canada, both 
corporate and unincorporated.  The database tracks the employment and payroll characteristics of individual 
firms from their year of entry to their year of exit.65  Employers in Canada are required to register a payroll 
deduction account and issue a T4 slip to each employee that summarizes earnings received in a given fiscal 
year.  The LEAP database includes every business that issues a T4 taxation slip. 
The LEAP includes a 3-digit industry code and information on annual firm size and total payroll 
amounts.  We recorded average firm size, and total firm size between 1982 and 1999, and also subtracted the 
mean amounts for each year before averaging.  Both methods produced similar results.66  We also recorded 
when individuals switched firms and industries.  
The data are collapsed into cell means by home province, year left post-secondary education, predicted 
year left post-secondary education, and experience.  The cell means are matched to national and provincial 
unemployment rates both at time of school exit and predicted school exit. We use Statistics Canada’s youth 
unemployment rate (ages 16 to 25).  Results with the full unemployment rate were similar. 
We work with two samples – the two-way student-earnings match, and the three-way match that also 
includes firm variables. The main results are obtained on the former, but estimates differ little between the 
two samples. To maximize the range of cohorts with as much as possible experience history we focus on the 
full range of graduation cohorts that we can match to unemployment rates at time of labor market entry 
(1976-1995). In the empirical analysis, we also report alternative results with subsets of cohorts. 
Supplementary Appendix Table A3, Panel A and B show sample sizes of the two-way match by graduation 
and experience year for graduation cohorts from 1977 to 1995 (including and excluding observations with 
missing earnings). 
                                                 
64 In the case of multiple employers, the main employer is the one from which a worker has the most earnings. In 
defining our mobility measures, we have taken particular care with missing values for firm identifiers and industry codes. 
To address the problem of missing values, we first fill in single missing values with the adjacent past firm identifier or 
industry code. We then estimate a conservative and a more inclusive measure of mobility. The first only considers 
changes between two valid firm identifiers or industry codes. The second treats remaining missing values as a job or 
industry change. The two measures approximate upper and lower bounds of job mobility.  
65 The self-employed that do not draw a salary are not included on the LEAP database.  In addition, businesses 
comprised solely of individuals or partnerships who do not draw a salary are also excluded from the LEAP. 
66  The USIS industry code is documented in Statistics Canada’s USIS user guide, 1995.   39 
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Entry Level Annual Earnings (Experience 
Year One)
Mature Workers' Annual Earnings 
(Experience Years 5 to 10)
Annual Earnings by Potential Labor Market 
Experience
Notes: The figure plots average log annual earnings profiles by year of degree completion for our baseline sample (all males in 
our administrative data that began a full-time undergraduate program at a post-secondary school institution in Canada between 









































Exp =1  Exp = 2
Exp = 3 Exp = 4
Exp = 5  Exp = 6-10
 UR 15-24
Notes: The figure is constructed by first regressing log earnings from the baseline sample on fixed effects for year of college 
completion.  The figure plots the average residuals from this regression for different years of experience.  The figure also shows 
the national 15 to 24 year-old unemployment rate matched to the year of college completion (these values are from Statistics 
Canada). See text for more details.National/Regional National National Regional National National Regional
Trend Linear Quadratic NA Linear Quadratic NA
D>=0? No No No Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experience Year
0 -0.021 -0.0224 -0.0168 -0.0231 -0.0232 -0.0187
[0.0047]*** [0.0039]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0036]*** [0.0024]***
1 -0.0177 -0.0187 -0.0194 -0.0168 -0.0169 -0.0181
[0.0052]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0049]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0021]***
2 -0.0128 -0.0137 -0.0166 -0.0116 -0.012 -0.0154
[0.0033]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0019]***
3 -0.0084 -0.0089 -0.012 -0.006 -0.0066 -0.0117
[0.0022]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0022]** [0.0015]*** [0.0017]***
4 -0.0061 -0.006 -0.0093 -0.0036 -0.004 -0.0096
[0.0025]** [0.0027]** [0.0020]*** [0.0028] [0.0021]* [0.0016]***
5 -0.0065 -0.0055 -0.0072 -0.0035 -0.0032 -0.0081
[0.0029]** [0.0020]** [0.0019]*** [0.0024] [0.0015]** [0.0016]***
6 -0.0027 -0.0023 -0.0062 -0.0018 -0.0012 -0.0071
[0.0032] [0.0020] [0.0020]*** [0.0027] [0.0018] [0.0017]***
7 -0.003 -0.0027 -0.0061 -0.0019 -0.001 -0.0071
[0.0043] [0.0023] [0.0020]*** [0.0034] [0.0018] [0.0017]***
8 -0.0001 0.0002 -0.0043 -0.0008 0.0006 -0.0061
[0.0049] [0.0028] [0.0019]** [0.0034] [0.0016] [0.0017]***
9 0.0035 0.0038 -0.0035 0.0021 0.0038 -0.0051
[0.0047] [0.0027] [0.0019]* [0.0033] [0.0017]** [0.0017]***
10 0.0066 0.0051 -0.0015 0.0047 0.0049 -0.0032
[0.0048] [0.0028]* [0.0020] [0.0034] [0.0022]** [0.0017]*
Constant 7.3951 -3.6341 8.8017 7.673 -2.0294 9.0456
[0.2571]*** [2.3916] [0.1012]*** [0.2095]*** [0.8040]** [0.0668]***
N 14407 14407 14407 8679 8679 8679
R-squared 0.76 0.77 0.8 0.93 0.93 0.95
Specification
Table 1: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Log Real Earnings by 
Potential Experience
Notes: The sample includes males in Canada leaving university between 1976 and 1995 (see the data appendix). 'D'
indicates the difference between the actual year left and the predicted year of graduation based on year of entry and
program. Sample sizes reflect cell sample sizes after collapsing the micro data by graduation cohort, province of
residence in each year of graduation, and experience year. The national model regresses log annual earnings on the
youth unemployment rate in the country at the year of college exit, interacted with experience years 0 to 10, plus
experience fixed effects, and a linear or quadratic graduation cohort trend. The regional model regresses log annual
earnings on the youth unemployment rate in the province of first residence, interacted with experience years 0 to 10,
plus province of first residence fixed effects, experience fixed effects, and year of graduation fixed effects (see
equation 4 in the text). The coefficients shown are the unemployment rate at college exit and experience interactions.
Standard errors clustered at the first province cohort level are in square brackets. One, two, and three asterix indicates
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively. See text for more details.Panel A: Log Real Annual Earnings Panel B: Probability of Annual Change in Employers
Panel C: Average Firm 'Quality', Graduates Only
Figure 4: The Persistent Effects of Unemployment in the Year of Graduation on Earnings, Job Mobility, and Firm Outcomes 
(Graduation Cohorts 1976-1995)


































































































Notes: The figures show coefficients from regressing specified outcome variables on regional unemployment rates at the end of college completion interacted with
experience dummies, controlling for effects for cohort of graduation, experience, and region of first residence (equation 4 in the paper). Panel A and B are based on
the sample of all 17 to 20 year olds who started a college program in the data and our main sample of only college graduates. Panel A shows coefficient estimates with
log annual earnings as the outcome variable. Panel B shows coefficient estimates using a dummy variable for whether an individual was classified working in a different
firm as the one indicated in the previous year as the outcome variable. Panel C and D only show results based on our main sample of college graduates. PanelC
shows coefficient estimates using measures of current firm quality as the outcome of interest: the employer's average log total payroll (averaged across all years in the
dataset), average log employee size, and average median log wage. Panel D shows coefficient estimates for employment status measures: dummy variables for whether
receiving any unemployment insurance in a given year, whether recorded as having zero earnings, or whether not recorded as filing a tax return in a given year. See




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience Year
0 -0.0174 -0.0184 -0.0173 -0.0159 -0.0165 -0.0147 ---
[0.0028]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0031]*** ---
1 -0.0176 -0.0178 -0.017 -0.0172 -0.0177 -0.016 ---
[0.0024]*** [0.0047]*** [0.0044]*** [0.0048]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0026]*** ---
2 -0.016 -0.0142 -0.014 -0.0121 -0.0167 -0.0141 -0.0026
[0.0021]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0041]*** [0.0041]*** [0.0020]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0025]
3 -0.0128 -0.0117 -0.0087 -0.0094 -0.0134 -0.0107 -0.004
[0.0019]*** [0.0020]*** [0.0037]** [0.0035]*** [0.0018]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0024]*
4 -0.0117 -0.0113 -0.0063 -0.008 -0.0122 -0.0102 -0.0036
[0.0018]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0039] [0.0038]** [0.0018]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0030]
5 -0.011 -0.0108 -0.0076 -0.0082 -0.0113 -0.0095 -0.0026
[0.0018]*** [0.0018]*** [0.0046] [0.0043]* [0.0016]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0041]
6 -0.0104 -0.0102 -0.008 -0.0076 -0.0109 -0.0065 -0.0071
[0.0019]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0055] [0.0048] [0.0018]*** [0.0030]** [0.0043]
7 -0.0105 -0.0105 -0.0104 -0.0099 -0.0108 -0.0072 -0.0044
[0.0019]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0049]** [0.0046]** [0.0019]*** [0.0032]** [0.0041]
8 -0.0095 -0.0095 -0.0067 -0.0049 -0.0099 -0.0066 -0.0024
[0.0019]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0050] [0.0043] [0.0020]*** [0.0029]** [0.0040]
9 -0.0086 -0.0085 -0.0103 -0.0091 -0.009 -0.0054 -0.0029
[0.0019]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0051]** [0.0038]** [0.0020]*** [0.0032]* [0.0045]
10 -0.006 -0.0054 -0.0125 -0.0115 -0.0062 -0.0021 -0.0032
[0.0021]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0055]** [0.0050]** [0.0023]*** [0.0039] [0.0051]
Constant 9.2257 9.2636 9.2633 9.2379 9.2195 9.2031 ---
[0.0982]*** [0.1023]*** [0.0969]*** [0.1034]*** [0.1040]*** [0.1102]*** ---
N 7536 7536 7536 6994 7536 7299 ---
R
2 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.96 ---
Specification
Table 2: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation With Controls for UR History, Basic and Grouped 
Model - Graduate Sample, Regional Model, Cohorts 1982-1995
Effect of UR at Experience Year Zero
Effect of Average UR in 
Experience Years 0-1
Effect of Avg. 





Notes: The sample includes males in Canada graduating university (with D>=0) between 1982 and 1995 (see the data appendix). Sample sizes
reflect cell sample sizes after collapsing the micro data by graduation cohort, province of residence in each year of graduation, and experience year.
As in Table 1, Column 6, all models regress the log annual earnings on the youth unemployment rate in the province of first residence (the
columns indicate whether this rate is averaged over the first 0-1 or 2-3 years), interacted with experience years 0 to 10, plus province of first
residence fixed effects, experience fixed effects, and year of graduation fixed effects. All models all include fixed effects for the current province of
residence. The columns indicate additional controls for experience interacted with later unemployment rates. Column 2 includes the
unemployment rate in the current province of residence interacted with experience as additional controls. Column 3 includes the unemployment
rate in the province of residence of experience year 1, 2, and 3 interacted with experience. Column 4, 6, and 7 do the same for unemployment rates
encountered in all ten experience years we consider. Standard errors clustered at the first province cohort level are in square brackets. One, two,
and three asterix indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.  See text for more details.Panel A: Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Graduation on Earnings Controlling for 
Dynamic Effects of Further Unemployment Shocks (by Experience Groups)
Panel B: Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Graduation Instrumenting with 
Unemployment at Time of Predicted Graduation
Figure 5: Selected Results from Sensitivity Analysis, Graduates Only (Effect of Further Unemployment Shocks, Selective Graduation, Selective Participation, 
Cohort Differences)
Panel C: Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Graduation for Workers with Positive 
Earnings Each Period
Panel D: Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Graduation on Earnings for Different 
































Group 01 (No History)
Group 01 (Full History)
































































































Notes: The figures show coefficients from regressing specified outcome variables on regional unemployment rates at the end of college completion, controlling for effect for year of graduation, experience, and province of first residence
(equation 4 in the paper). Panel A displays coefficients from Table 2 columns 1, 5, 6, and 7. Panel B compares baseline coefficient estimates with those using predicted unemployment rate at completion based on time of entry and program
length as instrumental variables. Panel C compares baseline coefficient estimates with those from the sample with individuals having positive earnings in every year since college completion. Panel D compares baseline coefficient estimates





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience Year
0 0.0008 0.0014 0.0017 - -
[0.0001]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0003]*** - -
1 0.0003 0.0002 0.0011 0 0.0007 0.0023 0.001
[0.0001]*** [0.0003] [0.0002]*** [0.0003] [0.0005] [0.0004]*** [0.0010]
2 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0001 0.0003 0.0014 0.0029
[0.0001]** [0.0003] [0.0002]*** [0.0002] [0.0006] [0.0002]*** [0.0008]***
3 -0.0001 0 0 0 -0.0001 0.0008 0.0036
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0005] [0.0002]*** [0.0008]***
4 0 0.0001 0.0002 0 -0.0005 0.0001 0.0039
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0008]***
5 0 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0003 0.0038
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0006] [0.0002] [0.0008]***
6 0 -0.0005 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0036
[0.0001] [0.0003]* [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0006] [0.0002]* [0.0008]***
7 0 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.0035
[0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002]* [0.0005] [0.0002]*** [0.0008]***
8 0 -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0034
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0002]*** [0.0003] [0.0008] [0.0003]*** [0.0008]***
9 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0008 0.0031
[0.0001]*** [0.0002]* [0.0002]*** [0.0002] [0.0009] [0.0003]*** [0.0008]***
10 0 -0.0008 -0.0005 0 -0.0005 -0.0006 0.0031
[0.0001] [0.0003]*** [0.0002]*** [0.0002] [0.0008] [0.0003]** [0.0009]***
Constant -0.0032 0.0227 0.0162 0.006 -0.0399 0.0227 0.0305
[0.0025] [0.0118]* [0.0072]** [0.0097] [0.0315] [0.0068]*** [0.0307]
N 8679 8679 8679 5909 5942 5909 5942
R
2 0.2 0.39 0.34 0.08 0.14 0.4 0.71
Table 3: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Labor Force Participation and 
Province Mobility - Graduate Sample
Specification
Regional National Regional
Notes: Columns indicate outcome variable used as the dependent variable. The models in columns 1-3 and 6-7 regresses these
outcomes on the youth unemployment rate in the province of first residence, interacted with experience years 0 to 10, plus
province of first residence fixed effects, experience fixed effects, and year of graduation fixed effects. Model 4-5 do not include
first province of residence effects and use the national rate of youth unemployment. The coefficients shown are the
unemployment rate at college exit and experience interactions. Standard errors clustered at the first province cohort level are in
square brackets. One, two, and three asterix indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels
respectively.  See text for more details.Panel A: Log Real Annual Earnings Panel B: Probability of Annual Change in Employers
Panel C: Average Firm 'Quality', Graduates Only Panel D: Fraction Filing With Zero Annual Earnings
Figure 6: Changes of Earnings, Job Mobility, Firm Quality, and Employment due to Entering the Labor Market in a Recession 


















































































































































Notes: The figures show coefficients from regressing specified outcome variables on regional unemployment rates at the end of college completion, controlling for
effects for year of graduation, experience, and province of first residence (equation 4 in the paper). The samples are divided into predicted skill groups, based on
program of study and college (see text for more details). Panel A shows coefficient estimates with log annual earnings as the outcome variable. Panel B shows
coefficient estimates using a dummy variable for whether an individual was classified working in a different firm as the one indicated in the previous year as the
outcome variable. Panel C shows coefficient estimates using the employer's average log total payroll (averaged across all years in the dataset) as a measure for firm





Outcome Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Drop  -0.0183 -0.0282 -0.0240 -0.0134
(Dummy Year 0-1) (0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)***
Slope  0.0020 0.0021 0.0025 0.0019
(Slope Year 2-6) (0000)*** (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0019)
Fade 0.0015 0.0016 0.0021 0.0012
(Slope Year 7-10) (0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)***
Drop -0.0093 -0.0098 -0.0125 -0.0074
(0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)***
Slope  0.0010 -0.0001 0.0014 0.0014
(0000)*** -(0.0001) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Fade 0.0007 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0009
(0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)***
Drop -0.0102 -0.0078 -0.0162 -0.0073
(0000)*** (0000)*** (0001)*** (0000)***
Slope  0.0021 0.0004 0.0006 0.0036
(0000)*** (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0036)
Fade 0.0016 -0.0009 0.0008 0.0033
(0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)***
Drop 0.0032 0.0012 0.0025 0.0043
(0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)***
Slope  0.0002 -0.0002 0.0004 0.0003
(0000)*** -(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Fade 0.0001 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0001
(0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)*** (0.0000)
Drop 0.0030 -0.0010 0.0011 0.0066
(0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)***
Slope  -0.0002 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0013
(0000)*** (0.0005) (0.0004) -(0.0013)
Fade -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0008
(0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)***
Drop 0.0012 -0.0002 0.0009 0.0014
(0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)*** (0000)***
Slope  -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004
(0000)*** -(0.0003) -(0.0001) -(0.0004)
Fade -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002
(0000)*** (0000)*** (0.0000) (0000)***
Table 4: Heterogeneity in Initial Loss and Reversion by Worker Groups (Graduates Only)












Position in Distribution of Predicted Annual 






Notes: Coefficients from separate regression models of outcomes listed in the first column on DROP, SLOPE, and FADE 
parameterization of effect of unemployment rate at graduation, controlling for effects for year of graduation, experience, and province of 
first residence. The initial loss (DROP) is the effect of unemployment at graduation at experience zero and one, the first phase of the 
catch up (SLOPE) is the coefficient on the interaction of UR with linear experience for experience years two to six, and the second phase 
(FADE) of the catch up is same interaction for experience years seven to ten. Column 1 shows the results for the full sample of college 
graduates, whereas columns 2-4 show the results separately for college graduates in the first, third, and fifth quintile of predicted earnings 
at the time of graduation. Standard errors clustered at the first province cohort level are in square brackets. One, two, and three asterix 
indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.  See text for more details.Figure 7: Heterogeneity of Losses from Graduating in a Recession as Measured by 










































Notes: The figure shows the percentage loss in the present discounted value of annual earnings  in the first ten 
years after graduation due to graduation in a recession by deciles of the distribution of predicted earnings, assuming 
an interest rate of five percent. and that losses fade after 10 years in the labor market.  Please see text for details. 















































Basic Model: Grouped UR Exp 0-1
Basic Model with Avg. Firm Earnings
With Firm Earnings and Full UR History
Notes: The figure shows coefficients on initial unemployment rate interacted with year since graduation  for a 
model where the effect of unemployment in the first two experience years are grouped together (UR Exp 0-1) 
controlling for effects for year of graduation , experience, and province of first residence for workers graduating 
from 1982 to 1995; the figure also shows the same coefficients when average firm quality at the experience-
graduation cohort-first province level  interacted with experience was added as regressor;  as well as the same 
coefficient when in addition the history of unemployment shocks was allowed to have persistent effects. Please see 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience Year
0 ---- -0.008 -0.0016 -0.0097 -0.0169
---- [0.0050] [0.0008]* [0.0014]*** [0.0058]***
1 0.0029 0.0021 0.0038 0.0025 -0.0115 -0.002 -0.0096 -0.0224
[0.0008]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0011]** [0.0049]** [0.0009]** [0.0011]*** [0.0055]***
2 0.0031 0.0034 0.0046 0.0041 -0.0088 -0.002 -0.0073 -0.0173
[0.0007]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0050]* [0.0008]** [0.0011]*** [0.0056]***
3 0.0021 0.0023 0.0049 0.0045 -0.0034 -0.0012 -0.0057 -0.0107
[0.0007]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0047] [0.0008] [0.0010]*** [0.0052]**
4 0.0018 0.0015 0.0052 0.0046 -0.0022 -0.0009 -0.0044 -0.008
[0.0006]*** [0.0006]** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0048] [0.0008] [0.0011]*** [0.0054]
5 0.0022 0.0019 0.0043 0.0039 0.0025 -0.0003 -0.0039 -0.0023
[0.0005]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0051] [0.0009] [0.0012]*** [0.0057]
6 0.0015 0.0011 0.0043 0.004 0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0049 -0.0046
[0.0005]*** [0.0005]** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0050] [0.0009] [0.0012]*** [0.0056]
7 0.0018 0.002 0.0041 0.0039 0.0013 -0.0007 -0.005 -0.0047
[0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0054] [0.0009] [0.0012]*** [0.0060]
8 0.0018 0.002 0.0044 0.0042 0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0044 -0.0022
[0.0008]** [0.0007]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0054] [0.0009] [0.0011]*** [0.0060]
9 0.0016 0.002 0.0047 0.0052 0.0044 0.0001 -0.0035 0.0002
[0.0010] [0.0009]** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0055] [0.0009] [0.0011]*** [0.0063]
10 0.0013 0.0015 0.005 0.0055 0.0048 0.0002 -0.002 0.0021
[0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0010]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0068] [0.0010] [0.0015] [0.0077]
Constant 0.3407 0.3151 0.1391 0.523 8.1745 0.719 0.8069 7.2971
[0.0184]*** [0.0187]*** [0.0428]*** [0.0403]*** [0.1953]*** [0.0283]*** [0.0368]*** [0.2203]***
N 5871 5871 5863 5861 8435 8435 8435 8435
R
2 0.8 0.79 0.86 0.77 0.53 0.47 0.75 0.6
Specification
Table 5: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Job and Industry Mobility and 
Average Employer Characteristics - Graduates Only
Notes: Columns indicate the firm or industry mobility variable used as the dependent variable. Each model regresses these
outcomes on the youth unemployment rate in the province of first residence, interacted with experience years 0 to 10, plus
province of first residence fixed effects, experience fixed effects, and year of graduation fixed effects.  The coefficients shown are 
the unemployment rate at college exit and experience interactions. The coefficients shown are the unemployment rate at college
exit and experience interactions. Standard errors clustered at the first province cohort level are in square brackets. One, two, and
three asterix indicates statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively. See text for more
details.Panel B: Effect of Initial Unemployment Rate Controlling for First Firm and Industry 
Fixed Effects Interacted With Experience
Panel C: Effect of Initial Unemployment Rate by Average Quality of First Employer 
(Above/Below 75th Percentile)
Panel A: Differences in Effect of Initial Unemployment Rate by Quartile of Average 
Industry Turnover Rate
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Notes: Panel A shows coefficients on initial unemployment rate interacted with year since graduation when fixed effect for initial employer, initial industry, or interactions of initial employer fixed effects with 
experience profiles are added to our main model. Panel B shows shows coefficients on initial unemployment rate interacted with year since graduation and interacted with whether initial employer's log payroll 
(lpayroll) or log median earnings (lmedaern) were above or below its 75th percentile (sorted at the worker level).  Panel C shows coefficients on initial unemployment rate interacted with year since graduation for 
models run separately for workers employed in industries with average turnover rates in the top or bottom quartiles.  Turnover rates were calculated as the fraction of workers at a firm in a given year not 
working at the same firm the previous year, averaged across years and across 3-digit industry category.   1 
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Sensitivity Appendix I: Accounting for Selective College Graduation 
The decision to leave college may be a function of the business cycle.1 If workers postpone college exit in 
recessions, we would expect that the unemployment rate in the year of predicted graduation is positively related 
to college duration. Similarly, since workers with shorter durations are more likely to be able to further 
postpone graduation labor market entrants in a recession are more likely to have longer durations. Appendix 
Table H3 shows the effects on various basic measures of college duration of the national and regional 
unemployment rates, as well as of predicted regional rates, separately for all workers and for those at least on 
grade. We see no significant correlations at the national level or for regional unemployment at the time when 
workers should have graduated were they on grade. However, we see some significant effect of early 
unemployment rates at actual graduation with duration. For a five percent change in unemployment rates, this 
would imply an increase of 2.5 percentage points (10% relative to the 0.26 average shown in Appendix Table 
A1).  
Panels D to F of Appendix Table H3 show the same specifications for those workers on or above grade 
(see also Appendix Tables H1 and H2 for more detail). The effects are somewhat smaller. A five point shock 
to unemployment implies a 0.05 increase in average years of college (corresponding to three weeks or 1.4% 
relative to a mean of 4.11 years). These results suggest that a very small fraction of workers who are barely on 
or above grade tend to extend their stay in college by one or two years.2 The fact that unemployment at 
predicted graduation matters less suggests this is driven primarily by workers who are already beyond grade. 
Consistently, the fact that the results are even weaker for the full sample and the fact that being on or above 
grade is not affected indicates that students overall do not make significant attempts to avoid leaving school 
in a recession by delaying graduation or enrolling in a new program.3 
To directly address endogenous college exit we instrument unemployment in the actual year of exit with 
unemployment in the predicted year of exit based on official degree duration.  Predicted year of exit is a valid 
instrument for actual year if college entry is uncorrelated with unemployment rates in the year of predicted 
exit, if it has no direct effect beyond the actual unemployment rate, and if it correlates with unemployment at 
actual exit. We believe the exclusion restrictions are valid, since even if students wanted, given the covariance 
structure of unemployment rates it would be hard for them to forecast future unemployment rates. The case 
could be made that the unemployment rate at predicted graduation could in itself be viewed as the relevant 
‘shock’ to workers’ careers. Thus, we present and discuss both reduced form and instrumental variable (IV) 
estimates. 
                                                 
1 College enrollment decisions also depend on the state of the local labor market. However, the effects appear to be 
small in the U.S. since the 1960s (e.g., the fraction of men age 19 to 21 in college is not affected by the unemployment 
rate for mature workers, see Card and Lemieux (2000) Table 4, nor is the proportion of workers who finish 12th grade 
and start college (Table 5). The unemployment rate at age 17 does not affect the probability of having a college degree, 
but raises the fraction of workers with some college (Table6)). Note that if unemployment triggers entry into college of 
workers with particular unobserved characteristics, this could affect our instrumental variable strategy even if workers 
are not forward looking due to correlation of the unemployment rate at entry and at exit. However, as shown in the next 
section, most of the correlation of unemployment rates fades after three years. 
2 Additional results in Appendix Tables H suggest that for this sample the probability of being above grade 1-3 years is 
raised marginally. Taking the results from Panel F, if 0.85% of workers stay longer and raise average college duration by 
0.0056 years, the average additional time spent in college must be more than one year. 
3 Note that as pointed out in Section 2, the propensity of obtaining a graduate degree is also not affected by the 
unemployment rate in the year of the first exit from college (a 5 point unemployment shock leads to an increase in the 
probability to obtaining a post graduate degree of 0.008, relative to a mean of 0.2, with the lowest p-value of 0.157 in the 
regional sample for all workers). Post-graduate degrees are specially concentrated in the health professions, social 
sciences, and other majors (25-30% of all graduates obtain a graduate degree) and less concentrated in business, 
engineering, and teaching (8-12% obtain a graduate degree). Our sample restriction tends to more heavily exclude health 
profession and the social sciences than economics and engineering. To assess whether for some of these subjects the 
propensity to obtain a higher degree responds more strongly to unemployment at time of graduation, we ran the 
regressions by major. Social sciences is the only major experiencing consistent increases in the fraction of post-grad 
degrees during recessions, while health professions experiences consistent declines. All other majors show no clear 
patterns.  3 
The first two columns of Appendix Table H4 present the reduced form estimates of the interactions of 
potential labor market experience for the same specifications as in Table 1 (OLS). Columns 3 and 4 show the 
IV results and the coefficients on the instrument from the corresponding first stage. The reduced form 
estimates are either equal (all workers) or slightly smaller (graduates) than the corresponding OLS estimates. 
The numbers in Appendix Table H3 imply that delayed entry is unlikely to affect the estimates of the catch-
up pattern in the reduced form. The first stage coefficient is highly significantly different from zero and 
different from one. The ensuing IV results are either the same as OLS (for those on/above grade), or slightly 
more negative and more persistent (for all workers). All IV coefficient estimates are well within the 
confidence intervals for OLS results.4 Since the general effects of unemployment rates on labor market entry 
are quite small, it would have been surprising to find much of a difference. We conclude that OLS is 
appropriate to analyze the effects of early labor market conditions on the long-term career outcomes of 
Canadian college graduates. 
Sensitivity Appendix II: Accounting for Labor Market History 
All estimates presented so far represent summary effects of the dynamic impact of the initial 
unemployment rate plus the dynamic effects of ensuing unemployment rates that correlate with the first. 
They characterize the expected earnings loss of a worker graduating in a recession and help to assess the 
implications of different models of career determination. Another estimate of interest is the long-term impact 
of an isolated temporary shock of labor market conditions for individuals entering the full-time labor market 
for the first time, holding all else constant. This effect can also be compared to similar shocks at later 
experience years to benchmark whether initial shocks, when virtually all labor market entrants must search for 
employment, generate different permanent and transitory effects than subsequent shocks. 
Since the current province of residence is available from income tax records, we can use our data to 
construct unemployment rate histories for each individual starting in 1982. We interact these histories with 
unrestricted experience dummies and include them into the basic model as additional control variables to 
isolate the effect of the unemployment rate at time of college exit.  Since we only have complete data for 
‘market history’ of individuals graduated starting in 1982, we focus on this restricted group of cohorts.5 
Although shocks are highly persistent initially, the auto-covariance structure dips to zero after three to four 
years.6 Thus, the inclusion of two to three lags should suffice to absorb most of omitted variable bias.  
Table 2 shows a series of models with augmented controls for unemployment history, each interacted 
with experience. The table shows the basic regional model with the graduate sample for two models with 
outcomes recorded between 1982 and 1995. To compare similarly defined unemployment shocks, all models 
include current province fixed effects.7 The first model includes the unemployment rate at the current 
experience year interacted with experience dummies, without additional labor market history. As expected, 
this has some small initial effects for experience years one to three, but little thereafter. Given that each of 
these unemployment rates has itself a potentially dynamic effect, the next models include interactions of these 
unemployment rates with experience dummies.  
The first model, shown in Column 3 of Table 2 only includes dynamic effects of unemployment rates 
occurring in experience years one to three. The result shows an increasing spread in the two estimates that 
flattens out after experience year 5, exactly as predicted by a simple omitted variable bias calculation.8 At each 
                                                 
4 Note that Hausman tests cannot be read off the tables since standard are clustered at either graduation cohort or 
graduation cohort-initial province level. Although we could implement a test based on Davidson and McKinnon’s (1989) 
approach, we believe that the differences so small that it would not reverse our conclusions. 
5 As shown in Figure 4, this group of cohorts has slightly more persistent effects of initial labor market conditions. We 
have also experimented with including cohorts with incomplete unemployment histories. We also included 
unemployment histories based on unemployment rates for all workers, with no differences in the results. 
6 If as commonly done we specify the time series process of the unemployment rate as an AR(2), the coefficients are 
0.87 and -.158 for the first and second lag, respectively, in a sample pooling all states and including year and state fixed 
effects (a procedure followed by Blanchard and Katz 1992). Figures of the auto-covariance structure and further 
discussion are available in Appendix Figures B. 
7 As shown in Appendix Figure C1, Panel D and discussed in Section 4, this has little bearing on our original results. 
8 With the notation of Equation (4) the omitted variable bias of the coefficients on the first unemployment rates is   4 
experience year the worker is exposed to additional shocks correlated with the initial shock that in itself have 
dynamic effects, leading to an increasing bias; as the effects of shocks decline for mature workers (as shown 
in Table 6 of Oreopoulos et al. 2006) and the correlation with unemployment fades or becomes slightly 
negative, the size of the gap stabilizes. Towards experience year eight the estimates become imprecise as the 
number of cohorts decline. The next model in Column 4 includes the entire interacted history for each 
experience year from one to ten. As predicted, the model is extremely similar to the one in Column 3 
(however, the joint hypothesis that all additional coefficients or that all dynamic effects at higher experience 
years are jointly equal to zero is rejected by an F-test). Overall, the effect of the unemployment rate a worker 
faces in the year of college entry has a long term effect even when controlling for unrestricted dynamic effects 
of each single unemployment shock experience afterwards.  
Since the estimates at later experience become imprecise, we now turn to a grouped model. We restrict 
the dynamic effects to be equal in two-year intervals (i.e., the effects of the unemployment rate at experience 
years 0-1, 2-3, 4-5, etc., is constrained to be equal). To keep the size of the coefficients comparable to that of 
the main model, we take the averages of unemployment rates within groups (the results are the same if we 
were to compare coefficients at two standard deviations of the respective regressors). The fully interacted 
model with grouped unemployment rates then is 
crt r r e r cr e e c r t crt u UR UR UR UR w + + + + + + + + + = ... 2 / ) ( 2 / ) ( log 3 2 1 , 1 0 0 , 3 2 1 β β γ χ θ φ .        
Our data does not allow us to estimate the dynamic effects of unemployment shocks at experience years 
greater than three with a sufficient degree of precision due to a declining number of cohorts.9 Thus, we 
present dynamic estimates for groups 0-1 and 2-3, and include additional dynamic interactions as controls for 
omitted variable bias. The dynamic effect at experience year 2-3 will help us to give a benchmark for the size 
of the impact of initial labor market conditions.  
The effect of a single shock at experience zero and the effect of the average unemployment in experience 
years zero and one are very similar. The last columns of Table 2 then show the model with fully interacted 
controls for grouped unemployment history. The coefficient estimates are graphed in Figure 5 (Panel A). The 
effect of omitted variable bias is again as predicted. Moreover, now the estimated effects are smooth and 
show a similar convergence pattern as before.10 
Sensitivity Appendix III: The Role of Regional Mobility 
In our NBER Working Paper (Oreopoulos et al. 2006) we compare the effect of initial unemployment 
rates on the gains from regional mobility by experience (columns 6 and 7 of Table 5).11 Interestingly, while 
regional movers gain more if affected by an early recession initially, these gains fade after experience year 
three. It is those who stay in the region or residence who have consistently higher earnings growth. Thus, 
while regional mobility may still be as beneficial in booms as in recessions, it appears regional movers do not 
have permanently higher rates of catch up than regional stayers. That gains at regional mobility are not as 
exceptional as gains at job or industry moves also results from the fact that average earnings growth for 
region movers and stayers is quite similar, as shown in the last columns of Panel A, Table 5 (Oreopoulos et al. 
2006). This is also shown in Figure D3 in the Supplementary Appendix, which shows that the effect of 
graduating in a tight labor market fades faster for those moving province, but that the main results are driven 
by those staying in the same province.  
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9 Thus, dynamic estimates for unemployment shocks at higher experience years pick up the behavior of a limited 
number of cohorts. While interesting in its own right, the analysis of single cohorts is left to a separate study. 
10 If we repeat the exercise with the full set of cohorts (for which we do not have complete history controls) the results 
are very similar for the grouped model, with complete convergence occurring after six years in the labor market (shown 
in Appendix Figure B2). 
11 See also Supplementary Appendix Tables D5 and D6.  5 
It appears that regional mobility is not as important in Canada as in the U.S. (Wozniak 2006). To further 
explore whether the higher job mobility for workers entering the job market in recessions is associated with 
higher mobility across provinces, the last columns of Table 3 shows the effects of the unemployment rate at 
college exit on subsequent provincial mobility.  The national unemployment rate is uncorrelated with moving 
to other provinces for both the full sample and graduate sample in Columns 5 to 6 respectively.  The results 
here suggest no inter-provincial mobility response from worsening in overall economic conditions.  For the 
regression models identifying regional economic shocks, however, we do observe initially increased provincial 
mobility for cohorts exposed to higher unemployment conditions at time of college exit.  For the graduate 
sample, a 5 percentage point difference in the unemployment rate at entry is associated with about a .75 
percentage point difference in the provincial mobility rate in the first two years.  This rate is about half that 
for firm mobility, and drops quickly after the third year.12 The small effect of unemployment at college exit on 
provincial mobility suggests that most of the pattern of catch-up in wages over time for individuals that began 
the labor market in a recession occurs within provinces. 
Sensitivity Appendix IV: Weeks Worked and Weekly Earnings in the Canadian Census 
Since our sample does not contain information on time worked, we also replicated our results with the 
Canadian Census (Appendix Table C5). We use four years from the Census (1981, 1986, 1991, and 1996). 
Due to the different nature of the data we have to make assumptions on the timing and province of college 
graduation. The fact that the main effects on annual earnings are very similar to our results is reassuring. 
Decomposing the effect of early unemployment rates on annual earnings into the effect on weeks worked 
and on weekly wages we find that the effect on weeks worked is short lived. The majority of the persistent 
effects we find is driven by a reduction in weekly earnings. Consistent with the small effects on employment 
we find our results change little if we restrict our sample to workers with positive earnings in each year (see 
Figure 5, Panel C). Thus, neither changes in labor market experience nor selective entry or exit from the 
earnings sample of workers of different abilities affect the main pattern of reversion we see.13 
                                                 
12 After the fifth year out of college, the unemployment rate at time of exit is negatively correlated with provincial 
mobility.  Those induced to move to another province from entering the local labor market during high unemployment 
appear to be less likely to move thereafter. We also replicated our estimates separately for workers who never switch 
region and for movers. Those never moving, about three quarters of our sample, behave very similar as the full sample 
(see Appendix Figure D3). 
13 This is corroborated by the fact that those who permanently stop filing do not appear to be any different from those 
who remain active (Panel A of Appendix Figure C3). The estimates based on the balanced panel in Figure 5 (Panel C) 
are by 0.002 smaller in absolute value than our main estimates, a difference that is not statistically significant. Note that, 
if at all, the figure suggests negative initial selection, possibly consistent with a certain degree of out-migration to the U.S. 
of high earners. This is consistent with small decline in average predicted earnings with experience in our sample.  6 
Sensitivity Appendix V:  Simulation Exercise 
While our model can reconcile important facts in the data, there are several potential channels in the 
theory to which the data does not speak directly. To assess the potential role of additional mechanisms 
implied by the model and to see whether they could be reconciled with the data as well, we simulated the 
model for different values of the basic parameters. We first simulated the model for the case of a stationary 
environment (i.e., without returns to tenure or age-related costs); second, we introduced different degrees of 
age-related costs of search. To keep the analysis simple, we work with two groups of workers (high and low 
skilled). The parameter values are chosen to replicate basic features of our data. The main outcome of interest 
is the effect of a one-period initial reduction of the hiring rate at good firms (a reduction in  0 p ).14 
  The simulation exercise highlights some important insights from the model. First, given that high 
skilled workers lose more from down grading to the low-wage firm, the fact they appear to do better initially 
suggests that their hiring rate at good firms falls less in recessions. Second, the large observed discrepancy in 
the rate of catch-up between high and low skilled workers is unlikely due to differences in search intensity 
alone; steady state hiring rates at good firms ( p ) appear to be higher for high skilled workers. Thus, we allow 
for differential steady state and initial hiring rates by skill-group in our simulations. Third, given differential 
steady state and initial hiring rates, age-related search costs have a larger effect on low-skilled workers 
(Appendix Figure J1, Panel B); the effect averages out in part at the mean (Appendix Figure J1, Panel A), but 
is still present. Fourth, the effect of age-related costs is particularly strong for very low skilled workers; it also 
increases with the dispersion of firm quality. Thus, the higher the pre-existing inequality in the labor market, 
the bigger is the persistent rise in inequality due to initial shocks predicted by the model. Fifth, the model 
implies that the degree of persistence increases with the size of the shock, especially for older and lower-
skilled college graduates. This arises because for large initial shocks it is more likely that the slow down in 
search occurs before the initial effect has dissipated. 
  These simulations are robust to alternative choices of parameter values. They further underline the 
ability of the model to make rich predictions regarding the long-term effects of early short-term labor market 
shocks. In particular, the simulations underscore the importance of interactions of age-related costs with 
other factors determining search intensity (such as skills), the hiring rate, and the size of the initial shock. Yet, 
another result apparent from the figure is that the predicted slowdown in the recovery due to age-related 
costs, although significant, is not as large as in the data. This suggests that other factors may matter as well, 
such as long-term contracting or on-the-job human capital accumulation. 
                                                 
14 The basic parameter values are  4 . 1   and , 1 , 4 . 1 , 5 . 0 , 9 . 0 1 2 = = = = = w w α λ β , where we think of wages as 
log-wages for this purpose (so high-skilled workers earn 40% than low-skilled workers at firm 1, and firm 1 pays 40% 
higher wages than firm 2). In addition, we set the fraction of high skilled workers in the economy to 0.4. We let returns 
to job tenure be 5% in the first four years, 1% in the five following years, and zero thereafter, which is in the middle to 
high range of what has been estimated in the literature. Age-dependent search costs γ are benchmarked at 1 initially, and 
are allowed to increase 20% in the first five years after graduation, and 10% for the five following years (30% and 20%, 
respectively, in the scenario for “steep” rise in costs). These increments loosely follow the observed increase in marriage 
and home ownership rates among Canadian college graduates observed in the Canadian Census. Note that to avoid 
needing to model further job mobility, we have set age equal to job tenure at low firm equal to time since exit from 
college. We then chose alternative values for the initial hiring rate ( 0 p ) and the steady state hiring rate ( p ). We allow 
for separate values for high and low skilled workers as described in the text. The values were 
5 . 0 , 8 . 0 = =
Low High p p  in scenario with a higher steady state hiring rate for low skilled workers (“more offers”, and 
4 . 0 =
Low p  for the scenario with a lower hiring rate; the values for the initial hiring rate were 
1 . 0 , 65 . 0 0 0 = =
Low High p p  for the “severe” shock and  25 . 0 , 7 . 0 0 0 = =
Low High p p  for the less severe shock, 
respectively. Note that given the size of the earnings premium and the speed of observed recovery, the baseline and 
initial hiring rate have to be higher for high skilled workers to match the patter of the data.  A Sample Statistics
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F Estimates of Early Recession Effects by Firm-Type
Table F1 Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Log Real Earnings Controlling for 
Fixed Effects for First Industry or First Firm (Figure 7 in Paper)
Table F2 Estimates with Fixed Effects for First Firm or Industry, Alternative Samples and Models
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Tables and Figures of Supplementary AppendixTable F4 Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation by Average Industry Turnover 
Rate- Regional Sample with D>=0
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J Simulation Exercise
Figure  J1 Simulation of Predicted Effect of Decline in Initial Hiring Rate at Good Firms on Earnings in 
our Model of Endogenous Job SearchNotes: The figure shows average cross-sectional profiles in potential labor market experience (years since graduation) in Canada and the U.S.; the 
Canadian figures are derived from the administrative data we use in the paper; the U.S. data are taken from various years of the Current Population Survey 
(CPS). The underlying sample are all workers with some college in the relevant range of potential experience. Panel A shows percentage increases in 
annual earnings (for the U.S. from the March Demographic Supplement of the CPS in 1994-1996). Panel B shows the fraction of workers changing jobs in a 
given experience year (for the U.S., these figures are calculated as the fraction of workers with one year of tenure from the CPS’ tenure, mobility, and 
pension supplements from 1979 to 2000.). Panel C shows the percentage change in firm employment (for Canada, this is average firm employment taken 
over all years the firm was alive from 1982 to 1999, controlling for year fixed effects; for the U.S., this is current firm size from firm size brackets taken from
Supplements to the CPS in 1979, 1983, and 1988; for the U.S., we also show a polynomial approximation). Panel D shows average firm log median earnings
or firm log payroll taken over all years the firm was alive from 1982 to 1999, controlling for year fixed effects (see text for details).
Appendix Figure A1: Experience-Profiles in Earnings, Mobility, and Firm Charachteristics for workers with some college in Canada 
(Administrative Data) and U.S. (Current Population Survey)
Panel A: Change in Annual Earnings Panel B: Fraction Job Change










































































































































Avg. Log Med. Firm Earnings
Avg. Log Firm PayrollPanel A: All Sample Years
Panel B: Single Year 1995
Appendix Figure A2: Compare Census Experience Profile with Sample Profile, with and 
without Controlling for Region and Years of College (Graduate Sample)
Notes: Figures compare cumulative growth in annual earnings for male workers with a college degree in 
the 1996 Census with the earnings data drawn from income tax records matched to administrative 
university data. Only cohorts graduating from 1976 to 1995 are included. Other restrictions on the 
administrative data are the same as in the paper. Since the distribution of years of college and regions are 
different in the two sample, the figures also compare estimates controlling for fixed effects for years of 



























































































Average Sample, All Years
Average 1995 Census
Regression Sample, All Years























3.31 0.63 0.26 -0.10 4.11 0.89 0.40 0.86


















0.13 0.06 0.23 0.10 0.52 0.20 0.09 --




National  14.76 2.42 19.2 11.0
Province 14.13 3.98 32.7 6.3
National Detrended 0 2.41 4.53 -3.83
Province Demeaned 0 3.01 6.53 -7.12
 
Panel C: Provinces
N Fraction Average Std. Dev.
Nova Scotia 1,143 0.84 18.99 2.50
PEI 109 0.08 18.91 2.08
Newfoundland 2,535 1.86 27.11 3.51
New Brunswick 7,281 5.33 20.07 2.13
Quebec 10,472 7.66 17.20 2.60
Ontario 71,995 52.69 13.03 3.14
Manitoba 10,308 7.54 12.59 1.81
Saskatchewan 4,557 3.34 11.84 2.26
Alberta 11,742 8.59 11.68 3.08
British Columbia 16,493 12.07 15.93 3.86
Unemployment Rate Sample Size
Appendix Table A1: Descriptive Statistics from Administrative College Data 1976-1995
Notes: See text and Data Appendix. D=Actual Graduation Year - Graduation Year Based on Program Duration.
At Exp. 
Zero
Entire Sample (Some College) Graduates (Actual ≥ Predicted Year)Appendix Table A2, Panel A. Sample Size by Graduation Cohort and Experience
01234567891 0 Total
1976                                                  3732 3732 3732 3732 3732 18660
1977                                          6875 6875 6875 6875 6875 6875 41250
1978                                  7863 7863 7863 7863 7863 7863 7863 55041
1979                         7780 7780 7780 7780 7780 7780 7780 7780 62240
1980                 7869 7869 7869 7869 7869 7869 7869 7869 7869 70821
1981         7899 7899 7899 7899 7899 7899 7899 7899 7899 7899 78990
1982 8033 8033 8033 8033 8033 8033 8033 8033 8033 8033 8033 88363
1983 9146 9146 9146 9146 9146 9146 9146 9146 9146 9146 9146 100606
1984 8746 8746 8746 8746 8746 8746 8746 8746 8746 8746 8746 96206
1985 9584 9584 9584 9584 9584 9584 9584 9584 9584 9584 9584 105424
1986 9379 9379 9379 9379 9379 9379 9379 9379 9379 9379 9379 103169
1987 9307 9307 9307 9307 9307 9307 9307 9307 9307 9307 9307 102377
1988 9621 9621 9621 9621 9621 9621 9621 9621 9621 9621 9621 105831
1989 9391 9391 9391 9391 9391 9391 9391 9391 9391 9391 9391 103301
1990 9408 9408 9408 9408 9408 9408 9408 9408 9408 9408         94080
1991 9288 9288 9288 9288 9288 9288 9288 9288 9288                83592
1992 9770 9770 9770 9770 9770 9770 9770 9770                        78160
1993 10429 10429 10429 10429 10429 10429 10429                                73003
1994 14416 14416 14416 14416 14416 14416                                        86496
1995 10117 10117 10117 10117 10117                                                50585
Total 136,635 144,534 152,403 160,183 168,046 164,804 154,120 143,691 133,921 124,633 115,225
Appendix Table A2, Panel B. Sample with Non-Missing Earnings by Graduation Cohort and Experience
01234567891 0 Total
1976                                                  3416 3364 3387 3367 3429 16963
1977                                          6320 6263 6322 6227 6303 6233 37668
1978                                  7284 7199 7199 7073 7173 7050 7168 50146
1979                          7119 7058 7088 6934 7026 6937 7032 7097 56291
1980                  7226 7134 7208 7073 7139 7041 7135 7194 7138 64288
1981         7166 7115 7160 7069 7097 7004 7102 7139 7131 7096 71079
1982 7083 7204 7274 7170 7214 7131 7209 7287 7218 7201 7288 79279
1983 7863 8144 8130 8249 8201 8221 8284 8221 8214 8221 8351 90099
1984 7723 7796 7896 7763 7858 7906 7876 7774 7835 7895 7899 86221
1985 8422 8637 8561 8637 8689 8672 8599 8616 8689 8693 8742 94957
1986 8443 8456 8512 8557 8524 8440 8457 8475 8476 8560 8571 93471
1987 8308 8428 8453 8375 8318 8311 8364 8383 8453 8473 8672 92538
1988 8790 8776 8717 8661 8670 8658 8668 8746 8773 8854 9029 96342
1989 8621 8530 8451 8433 8460 8411 8440 8557 8666 8785 9391 94745
1990 8532 8454 8427 8421 8445 8452 8532 8658 8742 9408         86071
1991 8325 8300 8294 8302 8392 8410 8510 8632 9288        76453
1992 8650 8707 8737 8806 8814 8895 9044 9770               71423
1993 9284 9389 9410 9371 9462 9650 10429                       66995
1994 12756 12863 12941 13160 13376 14416                                79512
1995 9149 9152 9291 9403 10117                                        47112































0 8.83 0.016 0.111 - 8.93 0.020 0.102 -
1 9.30 0.023 0.103 0.42 9.49 0.020 0.094 0.40
2 9.51 0.023 0.100 0.35 9.71 0.020 0.093 0.31
3 9.69 0.021 0.099 0.31 9.87 0.016 0.093 0.28
4 9.84 0.017 0.091 0.28 9.99 0.013 0.085 0.25
5 9.96 0.016 0.090 0.25 10.10 0.012 0.085 0.22
6 10.05 0.015 0.092 0.22 10.18 0.011 0.086 0.20
7 10.13 0.013 0.090 0.20 10.25 0.009 0.084 0.18
8 10.20 0.012 0.089 0.18 10.30 0.008 0.082 0.17
9 10.25 0.011 0.086 0.17 10.36 0.007 0.082 0.16






























1 8.94 0.047 0.150 0.349 8.91 0.044 0.144 0.386
2 9.21 0.068 0.132 0.310 9.30 0.064 0.128 0.326
3 9.49 0.045 0.120 0.267 9.57 0.041 0.119 0.258
4 9.59 0.038 0.054 0.216 9.62 0.036 0.054 0.208
5 9.79 0.028 0.055 0.202 9.84 0.025 0.059 0.198
6 9.87 0.040 0.052 0.190 9.91 0.032 0.055 0.180
7 9.81 0.030 0.048 0.171 9.89 0.024 0.048 0.183
8 9.92 0.028 0.039 0.170 9.98 0.019 0.036 0.169
9 9.98 0.015 0.037 0.155 10.05 0.012 0.037 0.146
10 10.03 0.023 0.034 0.142 10.12 0.021 0.035 0.133
aThese figures are calculated as the fraction of workers with one year of tenure from the CPS’ tenure, 
mobility, and pension supplements from 1979 to 2000.
Entire Sample (Some College) Graduates (Actual ≥ Predicted Year)
Appendix Table A3: Cross-Sectional Experience Profiles in Annual Earnings, Unemployment, 
Participation, and Job Change, Canada and USA 
Panel B: Average Experience Profile USA (March Current Population Survey 1994-1996)
Panel A: Average Experience Profile Canada (Income Tax Records, 1982-1999)
Notes: Years of experience refer to potential labor market experience in the U.S. (age-years of education-6), 
and years since graduation in Canada. In the U.S. data, graduates refer to workers with a college degree or 
more; those with some college are workers with more than a high school but less than a college degree. See 




























0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1 0.308 0.352 0.365 0.040 0.399 0.31 0.35 0.052
2 0.220 0.257 0.270 0.029 0.558 0.42 0.48 0.086
3 0.186 0.220 0.233 0.027 0.65 0.48 0.56 0.104
4 0.163 0.194 0.207 0.024 0.709 0.52 0.61 0.115
5 0.141 0.169 0.181 0.021 0.745 0.55 0.64 0.124
6 0.126 0.151 0.163 0.020 0.769 0.56 0.66 0.133
7 0.113 0.135 0.146 0.015 0.784 0.57 0.67 0.138
8 0.104 0.124 0.134 0.012 0.799 0.58 0.68 0.143
9 0.098 0.118 0.128 0.011 0.813 0.59 0.69 0.147
10 0.098 0.116 0.126 0.009 0.827 0.61 0.71 0.150

























0 6.94 27705 0.73 0.59 0.53 0.34 0.62 5.94
1 6.95 26563 0.74 0.59 0.53 0.33 0.70 6.00
2 7.03 28549 0.75 0.60 0.54 0.33 0.76 6.14
3 7.07 29701 0.75 0.61 0.55 0.34 0.81 6.22
4 7.08 30210 0.75 0.61 0.55 0.34 0.84 6.26
5 7.13 31429 0.76 0.62 0.55 0.35 0.87 6.34
6 7.17 33207 0.76 0.62 0.56 0.36 0.89 6.41
7 7.20 34164 0.76 0.63 0.56 0.36 0.91 6.45
8 7.21 34981 0.76 0.63 0.56 0.37 0.92 6.48
9 7.21 35286 0.76 0.63 0.57 0.37 0.93 6.50
10 7.20 35810 0.76 0.63 0.57 0.37 0.94 6.50
Difference >=0 (Graduates)
Difference >=0 (Graduates)
Appendix Table A4: Experience Profile in Mobility and Firm Characteristics, Canada 1982-1999, 
Graduates Only
























0 5.30 0.58 0.42 0.33 5.70 0.62 0.49 0.40
1 5.16 0.52 0.40 0.33 5.65 0.61 0.47 0.40
2 5.58 0.62 0.46 0.37 5.86 0.66 0.51 0.41
3 5.43 0.59 0.42 0.34 5.52 0.59 0.44 0.36
4 5.32 0.58 0.39 0.33 5.52 0.60 0.42 0.36
5 5.65 0.61 0.47 0.36 5.89 0.64 0.50 0.40
6 5.79 0.64 0.48 0.39 5.89 0.64 0.50 0.42
7 5.70 0.63 0.48 0.38 5.80 0.65 0.50 0.39
8 5.56 0.59 0.45 0.37 5.68 0.63 0.47 0.39
9 5.96 0.67 0.51 0.44 6.18 0.71 0.54 0.46
10 5.73 0.63 0.48 0.40 5.88 0.67 0.50 0.40
All Workers (Some College) At Least 16 Years of Schooling
Notes: Pension and Benefit  Supplements to The Current Population Survey, 1979, 1983, 1988. Sample size is 4607 
for all workers with 13 to 18 years of schooling and 2987 for workers with at least 16 years of schooling.



























0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1 0.329 0.374 0.387 0.029 0.423 0.33 0.37 0.034
2 0.253 0.293 0.306 0.028 0.586 0.45 0.51 0.059
3 0.217 0.252 0.265 0.027 0.677 0.52 0.59 0.076
4 0.191 0.225 0.239 0.025 0.736 0.56 0.64 0.090
5 0.165 0.195 0.208 0.022 0.772 0.59 0.67 0.099
6 0.144 0.170 0.183 0.021 0.791 0.60 0.69 0.105
7 0.127 0.151 0.162 0.019 0.806 0.61 0.70 0.110
8 0.114 0.136 0.146 0.018 0.82 0.62 0.71 0.116
9 0.108 0.129 0.139 0.016 0.831 0.63 0.72 0.120
10 0.105 0.124 0.134 0.015 0.844 0.64 0.74 0.124

























0 6.76 26978 0.70 0.56 0.50 0.32 0.52 5.66
1 6.78 26419 0.71 0.56 0.50 0.31 0.60 5.73
2 6.87 28656 0.72 0.58 0.52 0.32 0.67 5.88
3 6.92 29858 0.73 0.58 0.52 0.33 0.72 5.99
4 6.93 30342 0.73 0.58 0.52 0.33 0.76 6.03
5 6.98 31373 0.73 0.59 0.53 0.34 0.80 6.12
6 7.04 33148 0.74 0.60 0.54 0.34 0.83 6.21
7 7.07 34202 0.74 0.60 0.54 0.35 0.86 6.26
8 7.09 35085 0.74 0.61 0.54 0.35 0.87 6.31
9 7.10 35465 0.74 0.61 0.55 0.35 0.89 6.33
10 7.10 35933 0.74 0.61 0.55 0.36 0.89 6.35
All Workers With Some College
All Workers With Some College
Appendix Table A6: Experience Profile in Mobility and Firm Characteristics, Canada 1982-1999, 
All Workers with Some College
Notes: See text and Data Appendix.1995 1995 1995 1995
Average Controls Controls Average Controls Controls Average Controls Controls Average Controls Controls
0 000 000 000 000
1 0.563 0.560 0.476 0.002 0.040 0.128 0.078 0.082 0.084 0.058 0.103 0.194
2 0.782 0.775 0.753 0.084 0.148 0.125 0.140 0.149 0.193 0.197 0.275 0.288
3 0.942 0.928 0.933 0.123 0.222 0.293 0.184 0.197 0.257 0.274 0.395 0.513
4 1.062 1.043 1.058 0.133 0.270 0.356 0.217 0.235 0.328 0.314 0.481 0.653
5 1.169 1.142 1.196 0.187 0.312 0.494 0.245 0.255 0.358 0.397 0.545 0.848
6 1.248 1.213 1.314 0.229 0.350 0.604 0.267 0.271 0.418 0.465 0.603 1.000
7 1.320 1.278 1.391 0.255 0.382 0.601 0.282 0.284 0.429 0.510 0.650 1.014
8 1.377 1.328 1.434 0.266 0.409 0.614 0.297 0.297 0.456 0.540 0.694 1.054
9 1.428 1.371 1.511 0.269 0.432 0.672 0.306 0.308 0.466 0.556 0.732 1.124
10 1.472 1.409 1.565 0.259 0.450 0.651 0.311 0.314 0.470 0.554 0.763 1.109
1995 1995 1995 1995
Average Controls Controls Average Controls Controls Average Controls Controls Average Controls Controls
0 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.020 0.045 0.042 0.047 0.032 0.038
1 0.351 0.334 0.340 0.398 0.363 0.375 0.020 0.046 0.046 0.036 0.020 0.030
2 0.256 0.241 0.260 0.309 0.278 0.301 0.020 0.047 0.053 0.035 0.020 0.025
3 0.217 0.194 0.210 0.272 0.231 0.254 0.016 0.044 0.048 0.034 0.020 0.022
4 0.191 0.164 0.158 0.245 0.199 0.201 0.013 0.041 0.048 0.030 0.019 0.018
5 0.165 0.139 0.129 0.216 0.172 0.165 0.012 0.040 0.045 0.031 0.020 0.024
6 0.148 0.124 0.112 0.196 0.154 0.146 0.011 0.039 0.048 0.032 0.021 0.021
7 0.132 0.109 0.093 0.177 0.137 0.125 0.009 0.037 0.044 0.033 0.022 0.017
8 0.122 0.099 0.088 0.165 0.125 0.117 0.009 0.037 0.044 0.033 0.023 0.024
9 0.114 0.091 0.068 0.155 0.114 0.097 0.007 0.037 0.040 0.035 0.025 0.019
10 0.110 0.084 0.066 0.148 0.106 0.094 0.007 0.037 0.041 0.033 0.023 0.020
Earnings
All Years All Years All Years
Firm Size Firm Wage
All Years All Years All Years All Years
Years Since 
Graduation
Appendix Table A7: Longitudinal Experience Profiles in Career Outcomes, Full Sample with and without Cohort, Year, 
Region Controls and Cross-Sectional Experience Profile Calendar Year 1995 with Region Controls (Graduate Sample Only)
Notes: For full sample (All Years), model with controls includes fixed effects for cohort of graduation, region of first residence, and year. For year 




Industry Mobility Firm Mobility On UI Zero Earnings
All YearsAppendix B: Auto-Covariance Structure of Regional Unemployment Rates
         If as commonly done we specify the time series process of the unemployment rate as an AR(2), 
the coefficients are 0.87 and -.158 for the first and second lag, respectively, in a sample pooling all states 
and including year and state fixed effects (a procedure followed by Blanchard and Katz 1992).  
Additional lags are not significant. 
         The auto-covariance structure of the unemployment rate for the observations in our sample 
controlling for cohort, region, and year fixed effects is shown in the Figure. (These correspond to the 
auxiliary regression coefficients that pre-multiply the effects of the omitted unemployment rate history 
in the omitted variable bias calculation of Section 2.) Although shocks are highly persistent initially, the 
auto-covariance structure dips to zero after three to four years. Thus, the inclusion of two to three lags 
should suffice to absorb most of omitted variable bias.
         To account for the high persistence of unemployment shocks, often an ARIMA(1,1,0) process is 
specified instead of an AR(2). It is often difficult to distinguish the two processes in short samples, but 
given a prior of stationarity for the unemployment rate we opt for the latter. A strand of literature in 
time series econometrics models the unemployment rate accounting directly for asymmetry and short-
run persistence in the dynamics of unemployment rates (e.g., Koop and Potter 1999, Rothman 1998), 
although the AR(2)/ARIMA(1,1,0) appears to be a common choice (Montgomery et al. 1998). On the 
time series properties of the unemployment in Canada see Fauvel et al. (1999) or Mikhail et al. (2003).
References:
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and Provincial Employment in Canada.’ Working Paper No. R-99-6E Applied Research Branch, 
Strategic Policy, Human Resource Development Canada.
Mikhail, Ossama, Curtis Eberwein, and Jagdish Handa (2003). ‘Testing and Estimating Persistence in 
Canadian Unemployment.’ Mimeo, University of Central Florida.
Montgomery, Alan, Victor Zarnovitz, Ruey Tsay, and George Tiao (1998). ‘Forecasting the U.S. 
Unemployment Rate.’ Journal of the American Statistical Association 93 pp. 478-493.
Rothman, Philip (1998). ‘Forecasting Asymmetric Unemployment Rates.’ Review of Economics and 
Statistics pp . 164-168.Appendix Figure B1: Auto-Covariance of Unemployment Rate at Ages 15-24, Regional 
Graduate Sample
Panel B: Cohorts 1976-1995
Panel A: Cohorts 1982-1995
Notes:  Figure displays regression coefficients of regional unemployment rates in given experience 
year on unemployment rate at graduation, controlling for fixed effects for region of first residence, 
region of current residence, and year of graduation.  The regression are weighted by individuals 






















Year since GraduationNotes: See notes and discussion of Figure 5 in text.
Appendix FigureB2 (A): Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Graduation on Log Real 
Earnings With Controls for Unemployment Rate History: 1982-1995 Cohorts, Full Sample
Appendix Figure B2 (B): Grouped Model of Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Graduation 




























With Current UR Controls
With UR at Exp = 1, 2, 3
































Group 01 (No History)
Group 01 (Full History)

























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience Year
0 -0.0151 -0.016 -0.0153 -0.0125 -0.0151 -0.0139 -0.014 ---
[0.0032]*** [0.0032]*** [0.0031]*** [0.0029]*** [0.0032]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0036]*** ---
1 -0.0185 -0.0182 -0.0182 -0.0174 -0.0185 -0.0184 -0.0186 ---
[0.0028]*** [0.0054]*** [0.0052]*** [0.0052]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0029]*** [0.0032]*** ---
2 -0.0168 -0.0142 -0.0193 -0.0158 -0.0168 -0.0171 -0.015 -0.0045
[0.0025]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0056]*** [0.0051]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0029]*** [0.0030]
3 -0.0126 -0.0108 -0.0106 -0.0112 -0.0126 -0.0128 -0.0101 -0.0061
[0.0023]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0048]** [0.0042]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0027]**
4 -0.0105 -0.0098 -0.0052 -0.007 -0.0105 -0.0107 -0.0088 -0.0049
[0.0023]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0047] [0.0038]* [0.0023]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0033]
5 -0.0094 -0.009 -0.0071 -0.0074 -0.0094 -0.0092 -0.0091 -0.0008
[0.0022]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0051] [0.0040]* [0.0022]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0052]
6 -0.0087 -0.0085 -0.0088 -0.007 -0.0087 -0.0086 -0.0072 -0.0028
[0.0024]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0056] [0.0045] [0.0024]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0042]* [0.0054]
7 -0.0089 -0.0089 -0.0101 -0.01 -0.0089 -0.0088 -0.0075 -0.0024
[0.0025]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0055]* [0.0045]** [0.0025]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0042]* [0.0042]
8 -0.007 -0.0073 -0.0043 -0.0042 -0.007 -0.0071 -0.0061 -0.0021
[0.0024]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0050] [0.0038] [0.0024]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0034]* [0.0040]
9 -0.0062 -0.0063 -0.0089 -0.0087 -0.0062 -0.0061 -0.0035 -0.0049
[0.0024]** [0.0024]** [0.0051]* [0.0041]** [0.0024]** [0.0026]** [0.0036] [0.0049]
10 -0.0037 -0.0028 -0.0123 -0.0099 -0.0037 -0.0034 -0.0012 -0.0015
[0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0051]** [0.0042]** [0.0025] [0.0027] [0.0040] [0.0047]
Constant 8.9864 9.0247 9.0278 8.9509 8.9864 8.9719 9.0123 ---
[0.1300]*** [0.1303]*** [0.1272]*** [0.1239]*** [0.1300]*** [0.1334]*** [0.1387]*** ---
N 8304 8304 8304 7704 8304 8304 8038 ---
R
2 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 ---
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See notes and discussion of Table 2 in text.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Specification
Appendix Table B1: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation With Controls for UR 
History, Basic and Grouped Model - Full Sample, Regional Model, Cohorts 1982-1995Panel A: Different Early Labor Market Conditions (2 Std.Dev. Shock) Panel B: Different Early Labor Market Horizons (Average UR)
Panel C: Shock in Region of College vs. Region of First Residence Panel D: Current Province and Current Province-Year Controls 
Appendix Figure C1: Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Graduation on Log Real Earnings, Alternative Models, Regional 
Graduate Models for Cohort 1982-1995 (Unless Otherwise Noted) 
Notes: Panel A shows the main coefficients from the basic regional regression specification using alternative measures of the state of the labor market. 
To make effects comparable, the figure shows the coefficients multiplied by two standard deviations of the respective measure. Panel A shows the main 
coefficients from a basic regional regression specification using the average unemployment rates in the first years of labor market experience. Panel C 
compare estimates of the effect of the regional unemployment rate in the year of graduation in the province of college attendande and the province of 
first residence for different cohort ranges. Panel D compares the main coefficients from the basic regional model with fixed effects for province of first 


































































































Prov. 1st Residence (1982-1995)
Prov. Coll. (1982-1995)



























With Current Province-Year FE
With Current-Province FE
Only 1st Province of Residence FEAppendix Figure C2: Regression Residuals of Separate Regressions of Log Annual Earnings and Unemployment Rates including 
Fixed Effect for Current Year, First Province of Residence, and Year of Graduation, Plotted for Various Experience Years with 
Corresponding Line of Regression of Earnings Residuals on Unemployment Rate Residuals
Notes: Circles correspond to cell sizes. "Fitted Residuals" refer to the predicted regression line of a regression of earnings residuals on 
unemployment rate residuals, weighted by cell sizes. 
Experience=0
Unemployment Rate Residuals













































.4Appendix Figure C3: Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Graduation on Log Real Earnings 
for Different Samples: Regional Models, Some College (All) and Graduate Sample, All Cohorts
Panel A: Including Workers Who Stop Filing Income Taxes (Excluded From Main Models)


























Main Model: Regional, All
Regional, All



























Without Graduate Degrees (Main Model: All Workers)
With Graduate Degrees (All Workers)
Without Graduate Degrees (Main Model: BA Sample)
With Graduate Degrees (BA Sample)National/Regional National National Regional National National Regional
Trend Linear Quadratic NA Linear Quadratic NA
D>=0? No No No Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experience Year
0 -0.0212 -0.0229 -0.0172 -0.0235 -0.0234 -0.0177
[0.0058]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0042]*** [0.0033]*** [0.0025]***
1 -0.0153 -0.0167 -0.0186 -0.0134 -0.0135 -0.0156
[0.0067]** [0.0030]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0060]** [0.0027]*** [0.0021]***
2 -0.0106 -0.0118 -0.0153 -0.0087 -0.0093 -0.0129
[0.0045]** [0.0025]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0039]** [0.0020]*** [0.0019]***
3 -0.0066 -0.0072 -0.0111 -0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0096
[0.0034]* [0.0022]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0030] [0.0013]*** [0.0017]***
4 -0.0052 -0.0049 -0.0084 -0.0019 -0.0024 -0.0079
[0.0035] [0.0023]* [0.0020]*** [0.0034] [0.0015] [0.0016]***
5 -0.0046 -0.003 -0.0059 -0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0057
[0.0035] [0.0019] [0.0020]*** [0.0030] [0.0013] [0.0017]***
6 -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.006 0.0001 0.0009 -0.0058
[0.0040] [0.0018] [0.0021]*** [0.0032] [0.0016] [0.0018]***
7 -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.006 -0.0015 -0.0003 -0.0062
[0.0052] [0.0023] [0.0020]*** [0.0041] [0.0019] [0.0018]***
8 -0.0004 0 -0.0048 -0.0017 0.0002 -0.0055
[0.0059] [0.0028] [0.0020]** [0.0040] [0.0017] [0.0017]***
9 0.0034 0.0034 -0.0045 0.0014 0.0034 -0.0052
[0.0060] [0.0027] [0.0020]** [0.0042] [0.0017]* [0.0018]***
10 0.0071 0.0041 -0.0035 0.005 0.0048 -0.004
[0.0070] [0.0027] [0.0020]* [0.0049] [0.0021]** [0.0018]**
Constant 7.1728 -7.4295 8.8027 7.4451 -5.1739 8.9846
[0.3142]*** [2.2783]*** [0.0966]*** [0.2565]*** [0.7255]*** [0.0675]***
N 43728 43728 43728 26084 26084 26084
R-squared 0.74 0.75 0.78 0.89 0.89 0.91
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Specification
Appendix Table C1: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Log Real 
Earnings by Potential Experience for Workers with Positive Earnings Every Period (Panel 
Sample)
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See notes to Table 1 for information on regression 
specification. See also discussion and notes of Figure 5.National/Regional National National Regional National National Regional
Trend Linear Quadratic NA Linear Quadratic NA
D>=0? No No No Yes Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experience Year
0 -0.0195 -0.0211 -0.0166 -0.022 -0.0223 -0.0183
[0.0045]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0036]*** [0.0023]***
1 -0.0168 -0.0181 -0.0192 -0.0169 -0.0171 -0.0186
[0.0049]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0047]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0021]***
2 -0.0132 -0.0141 -0.0166 -0.0121 -0.0125 -0.0156
[0.0032]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0029]*** [0.0018]*** [0.0020]***
3 -0.0085 -0.009 -0.0119 -0.0061 -0.0066 -0.0116
[0.0023]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0023]** [0.0015]*** [0.0018]***
4 -0.0063 -0.0062 -0.0091 -0.0037 -0.004 -0.0093
[0.0026]** [0.0025]** [0.0019]*** [0.0029] [0.0018]** [0.0017]***
5 -0.0069 -0.0058 -0.0071 -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0083
[0.0030]** [0.0020]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0027] [0.0016]** [0.0017]***
6 -0.0027 -0.0023 -0.0061 -0.0028 -0.0022 -0.0071
[0.0032] [0.0019] [0.0020]*** [0.0026] [0.0017] [0.0018]***
7 -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0055 -0.0019 -0.001 -0.0065
[0.0041] [0.0022] [0.0020]*** [0.0031] [0.0014] [0.0018]***
8 0.0008 0.0009 -0.0038 -0.0001 0.0011 -0.0052
[0.0049] [0.0027] [0.0020]* [0.0033] [0.0014] [0.0018]***
9 0.0044 0.0041 -0.0029 0.0031 0.0042 -0.0036
[0.0049] [0.0028] [0.0020] [0.0034] [0.0018]** [0.0018]**
10 0.0073 0.005 -0.0013 0.0054 0.005 -0.0022
[0.0049] [0.0029]* [0.0020] [0.0034] [0.0022]** [0.0018]
Constant 7.0909 -3.9354 8.7626 7.4203 -2.112 9.0364
[0.2579]*** [2.3657] [0.1041]*** [0.2068]*** [0.7413]** [0.0661]***
N 14645 14645 14645 1731 1731 1731
R-squared 0.76 0.76 0.79 0.97 0.97 0.99
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Specification
Appendix Table C2: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Log Real 
Earnings by Potential Experience - Including Workers that Permanently Stop Filing Income 
Taxes
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See notes to Table 1 for information on regression 
specification. See also Appendix Figure C3, Panel A.National/Regional Regional Regional Regional Regional
With Graduates No Yes No Yes
D>=0? No No Yes Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experience Year
0 -0.0168 -0.0163 -0.0187 -0.0177
[0.0026]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0023]***
1 -0.0194 -0.0199 -0.0181 -0.0186
[0.0024]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0022]***
2 -0.0166 -0.0173 -0.0154 -0.0156
[0.0022]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0021]***
3 -0.012 -0.013 -0.0117 -0.0123
[0.0021]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0020]***
4 -0.0093 -0.0102 -0.0096 -0.0095
[0.0020]*** [0.0018]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0018]***
5 -0.0072 -0.0079 -0.0081 -0.0074
[0.0019]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0016]***
6 -0.0062 -0.007 -0.0071 -0.0066
[0.0020]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0018]***
7 -0.0061 -0.0065 -0.0071 -0.0062
[0.0020]*** [0.0018]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0017]***
8 -0.0043 -0.0042 -0.0061 -0.0046
[0.0019]** [0.0017]** [0.0017]*** [0.0015]***
9 -0.0035 -0.0031 -0.0051 -0.0035
[0.0019]* [0.0018]* [0.0017]*** [0.0016]**
10 -0.0015 -0.0005 -0.0032 -0.001
[0.0020] [0.0019] [0.0017]* [0.0017]
Constant 8.8017 8.7677 9.0456 9.0136
[0.1012]*** [0.1024]*** [0.0668]*** [0.0649]***
N 14407 26219 8679 15941
R-squared 0.8 0.76 0.95 0.82
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Specification
Appendix Table C3: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Log 
Real Earnings by Potential Experience Including Workers With Post-Graduate 
Degrees
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See notes to Table 1 for information on 
regression specification. See also Appendix Figure C3, Panel B.Area
Trend
D>=0?
Cohorts 1978-1995 1982-1995 1978-1992 1982-1992 1978-1995 1982-1995 1978-1992 1982-1992
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience Year
0 -0.0212 -0.0497 -0.0245 -0.0164 -0.0174 -0.0177 -0.0181 -0.0157
[0.0036]*** [0.0069]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0032]*** [0.0045]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0026]***
1 -0.0127 -0.0277 -0.0163 -0.0168 -0.0164 -0.0203 -0.0164 -0.0188
[0.0031]*** [0.0020]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0040]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0023]***
2 -0.0094 -0.0179 -0.0115 -0.0113 -0.0151 -0.0188 -0.0142 -0.0164
[0.0032]** [0.0030]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0029]*** [0.0020]*** [0.0022]***
3 -0.0054 -0.0103 -0.0067 -0.0071 -0.0127 -0.0141 -0.0115 -0.0134
[0.0025]* [0.0024]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0020]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0018]*** [0.0021]***
4 -0.005 -0.0069 -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0124 -0.0118 -0.0103 -0.0117
[0.0032] [0.0021]** [0.0019]** [0.0033] [0.0017]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0021]***
5 -0.0045 -0.0069 -0.0049 -0.0037 -0.0117 -0.009 -0.0089 -0.0104
[0.0026] [0.0018]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0029] [0.0016]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0020]***
6 -0.0024 -0.0052 -0.0021 0.0002 -0.0111 -0.0081 -0.0078 -0.0089
[0.0031] [0.0015]*** [0.0022] [0.0026] [0.0017]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0021]***
7 -0.001 -0.003 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0106 -0.0074 -0.0074 -0.0092
[0.0028] [0.0014]* [0.0020] [0.0023] [0.0017]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0021]***
8 0.0016 -0.0039 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0096 -0.0059 -0.0065 -0.0097
[0.0027] [0.0019]* [0.0015] [0.0026] [0.0018]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0021]***
9 0.0054 -0.0028 0.0032 0.002 -0.0088 -0.0046 -0.0054 -0.0104
[0.0025]* [0.0015]* [0.0018] [0.0023] [0.0020]*** [0.0023]** [0.0017]*** [0.0021]***
10 0.0079 -0.0026 0.0045 0.0057 -0.0062 -0.0038 -0.0036 -0.0073
[0.0026]** [0.0011]** [0.0023]* [0.0029]* [0.0022]*** [0.0025] [0.0017]** [0.0020]***
Constant -5.0063 -7.7747 -3.3741 1.2771 9.2186 8.7422 8.8482 9.3224
[3.5595] [4.2340]* [1.4871]** [2.9338] [0.1125]*** [0.1251]*** [0.0782]*** [0.0666]***
N 1150 841 1551 1110 1150 841 1551 1110
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See notes to Table 1 for information on regression 
specification. See also discussion and notes of Figure 5.
Specification
Appendix Table C4: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Log Real Earnings 






















0 -0.013 -0.009 -0.004 -0.011 -0.002 -0.010
(0.0084) (0.0073) (0.0026) (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0035)
1 -0.013 -0.009 -0.005 -0.011 -0.005 -0.005
(0.0086) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0095) (0.0058) (0.0057)
2 -0.012 -0.006 -0.006 -0.012 -0.005 -0.007
(0.0060) (0.0039) (0.0031) (0.0068) (0.0037) (0.0044)
3 -0.010 -0.008 -0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005
(0.0046) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0054) (0.0037) (0.0029)
4 -0.012 -0.010 -0.002 -0.014 -0.008 -0.006
(0.0046) (0.0037) (0.0020) (0.0048) (0.0036) (0.0025)
5 -0.009 -0.008 -0.001 -0.011 -0.005 -0.006
(0.0055) (0.0042) (0.0026) (0.0047) (0.0037) (0.0029)
6 -0.007 -0.007 0.000 -0.012 -0.006 -0.005
(0.0061) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0065) (0.0038) (0.0047)
7 -0.011 -0.008 -0.003 -0.010 -0.002 -0.008
(0.0053) (0.0040) (0.0024) (0.0062) (0.0041) (0.0034)
8 -0.005 -0.008 0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001
(0.0048) (0.0039) (0.0026) (0.0059) (0.0044) (0.0030)
9 -0.006 -0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.004
(0.0045) (0.0033) (0.0020) (0.0050) (0.0032) (0.0024)
10 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.006 0.008 -0.002
(0.0052) (0.0037) (0.0023) (0.0065) (0.0045) (0.0030)
Appendix Table C5: Effect of UR at Time of Predicted Graduation on 
Log Weekly Wages and Log Weeks, Canadian Census 
1981,9186,1991,1996
Without Current Year FE With Current Year FE
Notes: Replication of main estimates using Census data, see Sensitivity 
Appendix D. Notes: See text and notes to Figure 4.
Appendix Figure D1 (A): Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Graduation on Zero Earnings, 
on UI, and Missing - National Models, Cohorts 1976-1995
Appendix Figure D1 (B): Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Graduation on Provincial 






























On UI (All)Notes: See text and notes to Figure 4.
Appendix Figure D2: Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Graduation on Job and Insutry 
Mobility: National Models, Cohorts 1976-1995
Panel A: Graduate Sample








































Changed Firm (Grad) Left 1st Firm (Grad)






































Changed Firm Left 1st Firm
Changed Industry Left 1st IndustryNotes: See notes of Table 1 for regression specification.
Appendix Figure D3: Effects of Initial Unemployment Rates on Earnings For Workers 





























(1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7)
Experience Year
0 0.0003 0.0018 0.0002 0.0008 0.0014 0.0017
[0.0001]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0003] [0.0001]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0003]***
1 0.0003 0.0005 0.0011 0.0003 0.0002 0.0011
[0.0001]*** [0.0004] [0.0002]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0003] [0.0002]***
2 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0011 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0009
[0.0001]*** [0.0003] [0.0003]*** [0.0001]** [0.0003] [0.0002]***
3 0 -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0001 0 0
[0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0002]
4 0 -0.0005 0.0002 0 0.0001 0.0002
[0.0001] [0.0003]* [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0001]
5 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0003 0 -0.0001 -0.0001
[0.0001] [0.0003]** [0.0002]* [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0002]
6 0 -0.001 -0.0004 0 -0.0005 -0.0002
[0.0001] [0.0002]*** [0.0002]** [0.0001] [0.0003]* [0.0002]
7 0 -0.0007 -0.0003 0 -0.0002 -0.0002
[0.0001] [0.0002]*** [0.0002]* [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002]
8 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0007 0 -0.0002 -0.0005
[0.0001]** [0.0003]** [0.0002]*** [0.0001] [0.0003] [0.0002]***
9 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0007
[0.0001]*** [0.0002]*** [0.0002]*** [0.0001]*** [0.0002]* [0.0002]***
10 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.001 0 -0.0008 -0.0005
[0.0001]** [0.0003]*** [0.0002]*** [0.0001] [0.0003]*** [0.0002]***
Constant 0.0054 0.0334 0.0645 -0.0032 0.0227 0.0162
[0.0022]** [0.0121]*** [0.0093]*** [0.0025] [0.0118]* [0.0072]**
N 14407 14407 14407 8679 8679 8679
R
2 0.16 0.35 0.31 0.2 0.39 0.34
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See text and notes to Table 3 for 
information on regression specification.
Specification
Appendix Table D1: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on 



































1 0.0013 0.0007 0.0014 0.0005 0.0029 0.0021 0.0038 0.0025
[0.0007]* [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0008]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0011]**
2 0.0029 0.003 0.0029 0.0026 0.0031 0.0034 0.0046 0.0041
[0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]** [0.0007]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0011]***
3 0.0022 0.0022 0.0035 0.0035 0.0021 0.0023 0.0049 0.0045
[0.0007]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]***
4 0.0018 0.0015 0.0039 0.0037 0.0018 0.0015 0.0052 0.0046
[0.0007]** [0.0007]** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]***
5 0.0017 0.0014 0.0031 0.0032 0.0022 0.0019 0.0043 0.0039
[0.0007]** [0.0006]** [0.0009]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]***
6 0.0009 0.0005 0.0029 0.003 0.0015 0.0011 0.0043 0.004
[0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0005]** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]***
7 0.0012 0.0014 0.0027 0.0029 0.0018 0.002 0.0041 0.0039
[0.0007]* [0.0007]** [0.0009]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0010]***
8 0.0012 0.0012 0.0029 0.0032 0.0018 0.002 0.0044 0.0042
[0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0010]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0008]** [0.0007]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0010]***
9 0.0015 0.0016 0.0033 0.0039 0.0016 0.002 0.0047 0.0052
[0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0010] [0.0009]** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]***
10 0.001 0.001 0.0036 0.0041 0.0013 0.0015 0.005 0.0055
[0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0009]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0010]*** [0.0010]***
Constant 0.1485 0.1116 0.6686 0.5978 0.3407 0.3151 0.1391 0.523
[0.0269]*** [0.0254]*** [0.0357]*** [0.0357]*** [0.0184]*** [0.0187]*** [0.0428]*** [0.0403]***
N 9629 9629 9611 9606 5871 5871 5863 5861
R
2 0.69 0.68 0.8 0.68 0.8 0.79 0.86 0.77
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See text and notes to Table 5 for information on regression 
specification.
Specification
Appendix Table D2: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Job and Industry 


























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience Year
0 0.0018 0.0026 0.0003 -0.0016 0.0026 0.0018 0.0015 -0.0049
[0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006] [0.0038] [0.0005]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0006]** [0.0060]
1 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007 -0.003 0.001 0.0001 0.0008 -0.0044
[0.0005] [0.0003]** [0.0003]** [0.0042] [0.0005]* [0.0003] [0.0003]*** [0.0059]
2 0.0005 0 0.0002 -0.0047 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0001 -0.0058
[0.0004] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0048] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0067]
3 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0035 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0057
[0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0050] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0069]
4 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.003 0 0.0001 0 -0.0051
[0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0049] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0002] [0.0070]
5 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0028 0.0002 0.0001 0 -0.0039
[0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0047] [0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0070]
6 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0026 0.0003 0 -0.0002 -0.0034
[0.0004] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0047] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0069]
7 0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 -0.0032 0.0003 0.0005 0 -0.004
[0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0049] [0.0004] [0.0003]* [0.0002] [0.0072]
8 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.002 0.0005 0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0024
[0.0005] [0.0003] [0.0002]*** [0.0051] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0002]*** [0.0073]
9 -0.0002 0 -0.0009 -0.001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.001 -0.001
[0.0005] [0.0002] [0.0002]*** [0.0047] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0002]*** [0.0068]
10 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0012 -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0013
[0.0004] [0.0002]*** [0.0003]*** [0.0051] [0.0004] [0.0002]*** [0.0002]*** [0.0076]
Constant 0.1378 0.2133 0.0963 1.1904 0.1155 0.1942 0.0423 2.0907
[0.0148]*** [0.0158]*** [0.0139]*** [0.3531]*** [0.0139]*** [0.0153]*** [0.0134]*** [0.5703]***
N 14989 14989 14989 11547 8989 8989 8989 6412
R
2 0.23 0.26 0.19 0.08 0.26 0.32 0.28 0.16
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See text and notes to Table 1 for information on regression 
specification.
Specification



































1 0.0009 0 0.0016 0.0008 0.0031 0.0023 0.0036 0.0024
[0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0026] [0.0021] [0.0010]*** [0.0009]** [0.0027] [0.0022]
2 0.0046 0.0049 0.0039 0.0043 0.0057 0.0065 0.0054 0.0058
[0.0010]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0023] [0.0021]* [0.0011]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0026]* [0.0023]**
3 0.0039 0.0036 0.0047 0.0051 0.0038 0.0038 0.0057 0.006
[0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0017]** [0.0016]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0018]*** [0.0017]***
4 0.0033 0.0031 0.0041 0.0049 0.0035 0.0033 0.0048 0.0055
[0.0011]** [0.0011]** [0.0012]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0014]***
5 0.0023 0.0014 0.0031 0.0043 0.0026 0.0019 0.0038 0.0049
[0.0007]*** [0.0008]* [0.0013]** [0.0016]** [0.0006]*** [0.0007]** [0.0014]** [0.0017]**
6 0.0005 0.0001 0.0027 0.0039 0.0009 0.0007 0.004 0.0054
[0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0013]* [0.0016]** [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0014]** [0.0018]**
7 0.0005 0.0005 0.0026 0.0038 0.0004 0.0002 0.0036 0.005
[0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0013]* [0.0014]** [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0013]** [0.0016]**
8 0 0.0006 0.004 0.0051 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0049 0.006
[0.0020] [0.0022] [0.0013]** [0.0014]*** [0.0015] [0.0018] [0.0012]*** [0.0014]***
9 0.0006 0.0018 0.0053 0.0072 0.0001 0.0013 0.0058 0.008
[0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0018]** [0.0019]*** [0.0025] [0.0023] [0.0017]*** [0.0017]***
10 0.0009 0.0019 0.0054 0.0068 0.0005 0.0012 0.0058 0.0076
[0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0013]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0013]*** [0.0017]***
Constant -0.0756 0.0933 0.5615 0.4969 -0.1821 0.0026 0.0905 0.3862
[0.0314]** [0.0288]*** [0.0902]*** [0.0879]*** [0.0358]*** [0.0310] [0.1250] [0.0890]***
N 9854 9848 9836 9829 6025.0000 6023 6014 6012
R
2 0.74 0.74 0.83 0.72 0.8300 0.83 0.86 0.77
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See text and notes to Table 1 for information on regression 
specification.
Specification





National(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience Year
1 0.469 0.485 0.4588 0.4594 0.4589 0.5562 0.4667
2 0.2145 0.2707 0.1858 0.2861 0.1858 0.2828 0.2128
3 0.1834 0.2488 0.155 0.2736 0.1552 0.244 0.182
4 0.1542 0.2244 0.1272 0.2128 0.1269 0.1957 0.1533
5 0.1245 0.1922 0.1026 0.2202 0.1028 0.165 0.1238
6 0.0952 0.131 0.0853 0.1021 0.0854 0.1166 0.0948
7 0.0829 0.1216 0.0736 0.1049 0.0736 0.1089 0.0825
8 0.0646 0.0831 0.0606 0.0613 0.0606 0.0848 0.0643
9 0.0606 0.0847 0.0559 0.075 0.0559 0.0952 0.0602
10 0.0615 0.0962 0.0549 0.0744 0.0549 0.0823 0.0612
Experience Year
1 0.5571 0.5927 0.5363 0.5907 0.5364 0.6357 0.555
2 0.2186 0.2824 0.1908 0.2872 0.1907 0.278 0.2172
3 0.1614 0.2204 0.1395 0.2268 0.1395 0.2012 0.1606
4 0.128 0.1839 0.1099 0.1627 0.1096 0.1277 0.128
5 0.1051 0.1571 0.0907 0.1536 0.0908 0.1226 0.1048
6 0.0858 0.1107 0.0797 0.0744 0.0798 0.0788 0.0859
7 0.0769 0.1003 0.0719 0.0511 0.0716 0.0765 0.0769
8 0.0587 0.0716 0.0561 0.0444 0.0563 0.0714 0.0585
9 0.0578 0.0774 0.0542 0.0072 0.0541 0.0561 0.0578
10 0.0578 0.0762 0.0545 0.03 0.0543 0.0775 0.0575
Notes: See Oreopoulos et al. (2006) for discussion.
Panel A: All Workers
Panel B: Graduates
Appendix Table D5: Average Wage Growth for Stayers and Movers Between Firms, 
Industries, and Provinces -- Regional Model, Cohorts 1982-1995
 Gains of 
Province 
Stayers




 Gains of 
Job 
Movers
 Gains of 
Job 
Stayers
 Gains of 
Industry 
Movers
 Gains of 
Industry 
Stayers
 Gains of 
Province 
Movers(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Experience Year
1 -0.0017 0.0011 -0.0039 0.0065 -0.0039 0.0115 -0.0024
[0.0019] [0.0027] [0.0018]** [0.0058] [0.0018]** [0.0070] [0.0020]
2 0.0047 0.0062 0.0034 0.0071 0.0033 0.0006 0.0047
[0.0010]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0050] [0.0010]*** [0.0055] [0.0010]***
3 0.0063 0.0089 0.0049 0.0153 0.0049 0.0042 0.0063
[0.0007]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0056]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0053] [0.0007]***
4 0.0044 0.006 0.0037 -0.0007 0.0036 -0.0076 0.0047
[0.0007]*** [0.0018]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0061] [0.0005]*** [0.0058] [0.0007]***
5 0.0039 0.007 0.0029 0.0054 0.0029 -0.0037 0.0042
[0.0007]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0054] [0.0006]*** [0.0054] [0.0007]***
6 0.0028 0.0057 0.0021 0.0051 0.002 -0.0181 0.0033
[0.0007]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0056] [0.0007]*** [0.0058]*** [0.0007]***
7 0.0026 0.0036 0.0023 0.0062 0.0022 0.0006 0.0028
[0.0008]*** [0.0023] [0.0006]*** [0.0068] [0.0006]*** [0.0066] [0.0008]***
8 0.0044 0.007 0.0035 0.0047 0.0034 -0.0054 0.0046
[0.0008]*** [0.0020]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0066] [0.0006]*** [0.0069] [0.0008]***
9 0.0025 -0.0003 0.0025 -0.0095 0.0025 -0.0053 0.0027
[0.0007]*** [0.0023] [0.0006]*** [0.0066] [0.0005]*** [0.0092] [0.0008]***
10 0.004 0.0052 0.0034 -0.0038 0.0035 -0.0052 0.0042
[0.0009]*** [0.0026]** [0.0007]*** [0.0076] [0.0007]*** [0.0070] [0.0009]***
Constant [0.0380]*** [0.0512] [0.0175]*** [0.1588] [0.0373]*** [0.2047] [0.0198]***
39648 23240 16408 10654 18084 8587 31061
N 0000000
R-squared 0000000
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See Oreopoulos et al. (2006) for a discussion.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table D6: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Gains from Job, 





















































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience Year
0 -0.0051 -0.0012 -0.0107 -0.0135 -0.008 -0.0016 -0.0097 -0.0169
[0.0051] [0.0008] [0.0013]*** [0.0058]** [0.0050] [0.0008]* [0.0014]*** [0.0058]***
1 -0.0084 -0.0016 -0.0105 -0.0186 -0.0115 -0.002 -0.0096 -0.0224
[0.0052] [0.0008]** [0.0011]*** [0.0057]*** [0.0049]** [0.0009]** [0.0011]*** [0.0055]***
2 -0.0043 -0.0013 -0.0074 -0.0118 -0.0088 -0.002 -0.0073 -0.0173
[0.0050] [0.0008]* [0.0011]*** [0.0055]** [0.0050]* [0.0008]** [0.0011]*** [0.0056]***
3 0.0013 -0.0004 -0.0057 -0.0047 -0.0034 -0.0012 -0.0057 -0.0107
[0.0047] [0.0008] [0.0010]*** [0.0051] [0.0047] [0.0008] [0.0010]*** [0.0052]**
4 0.0025 -0.0003 -0.004 -0.0015 -0.0022 -0.0009 -0.0044 -0.008
[0.0048] [0.0008] [0.0010]*** [0.0052] [0.0048] [0.0008] [0.0011]*** [0.0054]
5 0.0061 0 -0.0032 0.0034 0.0025 -0.0003 -0.0039 -0.0023
[0.0048] [0.0008] [0.0010]*** [0.0053] [0.0051] [0.0009] [0.0012]*** [0.0057]
6 0.0048 -0.0002 -0.0039 0.0011 0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0049 -0.0046
[0.0047] [0.0008] [0.0011]*** [0.0052] [0.0050] [0.0009] [0.0012]*** [0.0056]
7 0.005 -0.0002 -0.0039 0.0014 0.0013 -0.0007 -0.005 -0.0047
[0.0050] [0.0008] [0.0011]*** [0.0055] [0.0054] [0.0009] [0.0012]*** [0.0060]
8 0.008 0.0002 -0.0029 0.0055 0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0044 -0.0022
[0.0051] [0.0008] [0.0011]*** [0.0056] [0.0054] [0.0009] [0.0011]*** [0.0060]
9 0.0095 0.0004 -0.002 0.0075 0.0044 0.0001 -0.0035 0.0002
[0.0051]* [0.0008] [0.0011]* [0.0057] [0.0055] [0.0009] [0.0011]*** [0.0063]
10 0.0122 0.001 -0.0002 0.0119 0.0048 0.0002 -0.002 0.0021
[0.0057]** [0.0009] [0.0013] [0.0063]* [0.0068] [0.0010] [0.0015] [0.0077]
Constant 7.5036 0.6255 0.702 6.4307 8.1745 0.719 0.8069 7.2971
[0.1883]*** [0.0280]*** [0.0500]*** [0.2252]*** [0.1953]*** [0.0283]*** [0.0368]*** [0.2203]***
N 13978 13978 13978 13978 8435 8435 8435 8435
R
2 0.36 0.32 0.53 0.4 0.53 0.47 0.75 0.6
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See text and notes to Table 5 for information on regression 
specification.
Specification
Appendix Table E1: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Firm Size and Firm 




























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience Year
0 -0.0283 -0.0045 -0.014 -0.0382 -0.0428 -0.006 -0.0143 -0.0543
[0.0088]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0043]*** [0.0095]*** [0.0088]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0043]*** [0.0099]***
1 -0.0333 -0.0049 -0.011 -0.0432 -0.0438 -0.0059 -0.0112 -0.0549
[0.0052]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0070]*** [0.0070]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0083]***
2 -0.0347 -0.0054 -0.0075 -0.0431 -0.042 -0.0061 -0.0074 -0.0508
[0.0058]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0073]*** [0.0072]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0027]** [0.0086]***
3 -0.0295 -0.0045 -0.0066 -0.0377 -0.0336 -0.005 -0.0057 -0.041
[0.0063]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0069]*** [0.0072]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0020]** [0.0079]***
4 -0.0266 -0.0043 -0.0046 -0.0323 -0.0267 -0.0042 -0.0035 -0.032
[0.0052]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0060]*** [0.0062]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0020] [0.0073]***
5 -0.0239 -0.0039 -0.006 -0.0306 -0.0238 -0.0035 -0.0046 -0.0297
[0.0058]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0071]*** [0.0058]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0022]* [0.0072]***
6 -0.0271 -0.0042 -0.0074 -0.0353 -0.0267 -0.0037 -0.0061 -0.0345
[0.0050]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0062]*** [0.0048]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0022]** [0.0059]***
7 -0.0199 -0.0029 -0.0064 -0.0264 -0.0237 -0.0035 -0.0062 -0.0311
[0.0050]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0027]** [0.0066]*** [0.0048]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0025]** [0.0064]***
8 -0.0115 -0.0013 -0.004 -0.0147 -0.0226 -0.0027 -0.0051 -0.0282
[0.0057]* [0.0009] [0.0031] [0.0073]* [0.0055]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0029]* [0.0072]***
9 -0.003 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0028 -0.0183 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0205
[0.0080] [0.0012] [0.0031] [0.0096] [0.0076]** [0.0012] [0.0029] [0.0091]**
10 0.0028 0.0016 0.0049 0.007 -0.0116 0 0.0031 -0.0096
[0.0071] [0.0011] [0.0030] [0.0092] [0.0080] [0.0012] [0.0024] [0.0096]
Constant 12.0757 1.2584 1.8382 11.9304 13.1274 1.445 1.9796 13.2333
[0.3681]*** [0.0570]*** [0.1541]*** [0.4772]*** [0.2838]*** [0.0460]*** [0.1542]*** [0.3754]***
N 13978 13978 13978 13978 8435 8435 8435 8435
R
2 0.29 0.25 0.45 0.35 0.42 0.38 0.64 0.51
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See text and notes to Table 1 for information on regression 
specification.
Specification
Appendix Table E2: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Firm Size and Firm 






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Experience Year
0 -0.0097 -0.0087 -0.009 -0.0028 -0.0027
[0.0014]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0005]***
1 -0.0096 -0.0089 -0.0082 -0.0025 -0.0024
[0.0011]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0005]***
2 -0.0073 -0.007 -0.006 -0.0019 -0.0018
[0.0011]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0005]***
3 -0.0057 -0.0057 -0.005 -0.0014 -0.0013
[0.0010]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0004]***
4 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0009 -0.0009
[0.0011]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0004]** [0.0004]**
5 -0.0039 -0.004 -0.0037 -0.0011 -0.0011
[0.0012]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0005]** [0.0004]**
6 -0.0049 -0.005 -0.0043 -0.0015 -0.0014
[0.0012]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0004]***
7 -0.005 -0.0052 -0.0043 -0.0013 -0.0013
[0.0012]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0004]***
8 -0.0044 -0.0045 -0.0043 -0.0009 -0.0009
[0.0011]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0005]** [0.0005]**
9 -0.0035 -0.0036 -0.0034 -0.0009 -0.0008
[0.0011]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0005]* [0.0005]*
10 -0.002 -0.0022 -0.0027 -0.0004 -0.0004
[0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0009]*** [0.0005] [0.0005]
Constant 0.8069 1.1159 0.0244 9.1073 0.0053
[0.0368]*** [0.0407]*** [0.0284] [0.0160]*** [0.0149]
N 8435 8512 8507 8479 8479
R
2 0.75 0.75 0.61 0.49 0.5
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Appendix Table E3: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Firm and Industry 
Wages (2-Digit), Graduate Sample
Specification
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. See text and notes to Table 5 for information on 










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Experience Year
0 -0.0091 -0.0091 -0.0146 -0.0021 -0.0157 -0.0025
[0.0033]*** [0.0033]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0022] [0.0028]*** [0.0020]
1 -0.0111 -0.0111 -0.0159 -0.0036 -0.0159 -0.0038
[0.0028]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0023] [0.0024]*** [0.0021]*
2 -0.009 -0.009 -0.0134 -0.0053 -0.0136 -0.0058
[0.0027]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0022]** [0.0024]*** [0.0021]***
3 -0.0069 -0.0069 -0.0109 -0.0051 -0.0101 -0.0068
[0.0025]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0023]** [0.0023]*** [0.0023]***
4 -0.0051 -0.0051 -0.0096 -0.0039 -0.0096 -0.0044
[0.0027]* [0.0027]* [0.0020]*** [0.0019]** [0.0021]*** [0.0018]**
5 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0082 -0.0026 -0.0088 -0.0026
[0.0024] [0.0024] [0.0018]*** [0.0016]* [0.0020]*** [0.0017]
6 -0.0031 -0.0031 -0.0067 -0.0043 -0.007 -0.0041
[0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0021]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0020]*** [0.0017]**
7 -0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0052 -0.0058 -0.0069 -0.0039
[0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0019]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0014]***
8 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.005 -0.0033 -0.0073 -0.0006
[0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0020]** [0.0018]* [0.0021]*** [0.0016]
9 -0.0013 -0.0013 -0.0036 -0.006 -0.0061 -0.0013
[0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0023] [0.0017]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0020]
10 0.0028 0.0028 -0.0011 -0.0049 -0.0022 -0.0034
[0.0030] [0.0030] [0.0026] [0.0016]*** [0.0025] [0.0021]
Constant 15.3696 15.3696 8.9546 -- 8.8768 --
[.] [.] [0.0908]*** -- [0.0664]*** --
N 418600 418600 12700 -- 14614 --
R-squared 0.8 0.8 0.93 -- 0.93 --
By Average Median Firm 
Wage
By Average Log Firm Payroll
Appendix Table F1: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Log Real 
Earnings Controlling for Fixed Effects for First Industry or First Firm and by Size of Average 
Median Firm Wage and Average Log Firm Payroll
Specification
Fixed Effects for First 
Firm/ Industry
Note: First two columns indicate models with firm or industry fixed effects. The remainign columns display
coefficients from two interacted regression models, respectively. Each columns shows the unemployment
rate and experience interactions from regressing log annual earnings on the youth unemployment rate in the
province of first residence, interacted with experience years 0 to 10, plus province of first residence fixed
effects, experience fixed effects, and year of graduation fixed effects. One, two, and three asterix indicates
statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.  See text for more details.National/Regional National National Regional Regional National National Regional Regional
Trend Linear Linear NA NA Linear Linear NA NA
D>=0? No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Industry Firm Industry Firm Industry Firm Industry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience Year
0 -0.0067 -0.0141 -0.0079 -0.0119 -0.0077 -0.0077 -0.0091 -0.0091
[0.0046] [0.0030]*** [0.0033]** [0.0026]*** [0.0048] [0.0048] [0.0033]*** [0.0033]***
1 -0.0058 -0.013 -0.0111 -0.0144 -0.0061 -0.0061 -0.0111 -0.0111
[0.0049] [0.0037]*** [0.0029]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0046] [0.0046] [0.0028]*** [0.0028]***
2 -0.0035 -0.0091 -0.0093 -0.0128 -0.0036 -0.0036 -0.009 -0.009
[0.0040] [0.0033]** [0.0030]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0034] [0.0034] [0.0027]*** [0.0027]***
3 -0.0005 -0.0047 -0.0056 -0.0087 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0069 -0.0069
[0.0026] [0.0024]* [0.0028]** [0.0021]*** [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0025]*** [0.0025]***
4 -0.0006 -0.0027 -0.0035 -0.0066 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0051 -0.0051
[0.0035] [0.0028] [0.0027] [0.0020]*** [0.0032] [0.0032] [0.0027]* [0.0027]*
5 -0.0021 -0.0039 -0.0019 -0.0056 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0032 -0.0032
[0.0038] [0.0028] [0.0023] [0.0019]*** [0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0024] [0.0024]
6 0 -0.0022 -0.0011 -0.0051 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0031 -0.0031
[0.0047] [0.0031] [0.0027] [0.0022]** [0.0045] [0.0045] [0.0025] [0.0025]
7 -0.0011 -0.0027 -0.0015 -0.0051 0.0011 0.0011 -0.0027 -0.0027
[0.0047] [0.0031] [0.0029] [0.0023]** [0.0041] [0.0041] [0.0027] [0.0027]
8 0.001 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0036 0.0024 0.0024 -0.0005 -0.0005
[0.0041] [0.0031] [0.0026] [0.0021]* [0.0025] [0.0025] [0.0023] [0.0023]
9 0.0032 0.0013 0.0001 -0.0036 0.0035 0.0035 -0.0013 -0.0013
[0.0044] [0.0029] [0.0028] [0.0022]* [0.0028] [0.0028] [0.0027] [0.0027]
10 0.0068 0.0041 0.0038 -0.0014 0.0075 0.0075 0.0028 0.0028
[0.0035]* [0.0023]* [0.0031] [0.0023] [0.0025]** [0.0025]** [0.0030] [0.0030]
Constant 6.8467 7.6874 10.1806 13.8693 13.8693 15.3696 15.3696
[.] [0.1990]*** [0.0825]***[5.4863e+11] [5.4863e+11] [.] [.]
N 596931 60212 596931 60212 418600 418600 418600 418600
R-squared 0.79 0.85 0.8 0.86 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Fixed Effects for 
First Firm/ 
Industry
Appendix Table F2: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation on Log Real Earnings 
Controlling for Fixed Effects for First Industry or First Firm
Specification
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Basic regression models described in text and notes to Table 1 with firm or 
industry fixed effects.Level Difference Level Difference Level  Difference Level  Difference








(3) (4) (1) (2) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Experience Year
0 -0.0168 -0.0025 -0.0174 -0.0028 -0.0146 -0.0021 -0.0157 -0.0025
[0.0025]*** [0.0020] [0.0024]*** [0.0024] [0.0028]*** [0.0022] [0.0028]*** [0.0020]
1 -0.0154 -0.0038 -0.0162 -0.0036 -0.0159 -0.0036 -0.0159 -0.0038
[0.0024]*** [0.0021]* [0.0021]*** [0.0023] [0.0026]*** [0.0023] [0.0024]*** [0.0021]*
2 -0.0119 -0.0058 -0.013 -0.0055 -0.0134 -0.0053 -0.0136 -0.0058
[0.0023]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0022]** [0.0024]*** [0.0021]***
3 -0.0074 -0.0068 -0.0091 -0.0055 -0.0109 -0.0051 -0.0101 -0.0068
[0.0025]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0020]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0023]** [0.0023]*** [0.0023]***
4 -0.0072 -0.0044 -0.0082 -0.0036 -0.0096 -0.0039 -0.0096 -0.0044
[0.0020]*** [0.0018]** [0.0018]*** [0.0015]** [0.0020]*** [0.0019]** [0.0021]*** [0.0018]**
5 -0.0065 -0.0026 -0.007 -0.0022 -0.0082 -0.0026 -0.0088 -0.0026
[0.0021]*** [0.0017] [0.0019]*** [0.0017] [0.0018]*** [0.0016]* [0.0020]*** [0.0017]
6 -0.0046 -0.0041 -0.006 -0.0025 -0.0067 -0.0043 -0.007 -0.0041
[0.0020]** [0.0017]** [0.0018]*** [0.0017] [0.0021]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0020]*** [0.0017]**
7 -0.0046 -0.0039 -0.006 -0.0024 -0.0052 -0.0058 -0.0069 -0.0039
[0.0018]** [0.0014]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0016] [0.0019]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0014]***
8 -0.006 -0.0006 -0.0063 -0.0002 -0.005 -0.0033 -0.0073 -0.0006
[0.0020]*** [0.0016] [0.0018]*** [0.0017] [0.0020]** [0.0018]* [0.0021]*** [0.0016]
9 -0.0046 -0.0013 -0.0049 -0.0011 -0.0036 -0.006 -0.0061 -0.0013
[0.0023]* [0.0020] [0.0020]** [0.0019] [0.0023] [0.0017]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0020]
10 -0.0012 -0.0034 -0.0008 -0.005 -0.0011 -0.0049 -0.0022 -0.0034
[0.0025] [0.0021] [0.0022] [0.0020]** [0.0026] [0.0016]*** [0.0025] [0.0021]
Constant 8.8768 8.943 8.9546 8.8768
[0.0664]*** [0.0664]*** [0.0908]*** [0.0664]***
N 14614 14569 12700 14614
R
2 0.93 0.93 0.93 0.93
Appendix Table F3: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of Graduation by Initial Firm Type - 
Regional Sample with D>=0
Firm Size Firm Size Average Median Firm 
Wage
Average Log Firm 
Payroll
Note: Columns indicate the sample selected on for each regression. Each columns shows the unemployment rate
and experience interactions from regressing log annual earnings on the youth unemployment rate in the province of
first residence, interacted with experience years 0 to 10, plus province of first residence fixed effects, experience fixed
effects, and year of graduation fixed effects. One, two, and three asterix indicates statistical significance at the 10

























Appendix Table F4: Effect of Unemployment Rate at time of 
Graduation by Average Industry Turnover Rate- Regional Sample 
with D>=0
Average Turnover Rate at 2-Digit Industry 
Level, Controlling for Year Effects
Note: Columns indicate the sample selected on for each regression.
Each columns shows the unemployment rate and experience
interactions from regressing log annual earnings on the youth
unemployment rate in the province of first residence, interacted with
experience years 0 to 10, plus province of residence fixed effects,
experience fixed effects, and year of graduation fixed effects. See text for
more details.Notes: See notes in Appendix Table F3.
Appendix Figure F1: Effects of Initial Unemployment Rates on Wages by Initial Firm 
Type




































firmsize>5000Notes: See notes of Table 1 and text for regression specification.







































Drop -0.0183 -0.0212 -0.0202 -0.0165
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Slope  0.0020 0.0015 0.0017 0.0024
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fade 0.0015 0.0011 0.0013 0.0018
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Drop -0.0094 -0.0097 -0.0140 -0.0092
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Slope  0.0010 0.0007 0.0010 0.0012
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fade 0.0007 0.0003 0.0006 0.0009
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Drop -0.0104 0.0347 -0.0177 -0.0245
(0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Slope  0.0021 0.0019 0.0020 0.0034
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fade 0.0016 0.0001 0.0020 0.0028
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Jump 0.0032 0.0023 0.0021 0.0061
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Slope  0.0002 -0.0004 0.0007 0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fade 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004 -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Drop 0.0030 -0.0018 0.0027 0.0067
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Slope  -0.0002 0.0004 0.0001 -0.0009
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fade -0.0001 0.0004 0.0000 -0.0006
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Drop 0.0013 0.0016 0.0012 0.0012
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Slope  -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fade -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes: Coefficients from separate regression models. The initial loss (DROP) is the 
effect of unemployment at graduation (UR) at experience zero and one, the first phase 
of the catch up (SLOPE) is the coefficient on the interaction of UR with linear 
experience for experience years two to six, and the second phase (FADE) of the catch 















Appendix Table G1: Heterogeneity in Initial Loss and Reversion for Workers 
from Top, Middle, and Bottom Colleges [Classified by Average Wage of 
Graduates]
Position in Average Annual Earnings 
by Colleges
All 

















Fraction in Sample 10.09 13.86 13.6 10.06 3.55 26.34 21.37 1.13
Average Log Annual Earnings 9.51 9.69 9.78 9.9 9.94 9.96 10.19 10.25
Drop -0.0183 -0.0228 -0.0194 -0.0182 -0.0106 -0.0218 -0.0146 -0.0180 -0.0098
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Slope  0.0020 0.0009 0.0020 0.0019 0.0019 0.0026 0.0017 0.0025 -0.0003
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fade 0.0015 0.0010 0.0015 0.0017 0.0019 0.0022 0.0012 0.0018 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Drop -0.0093 -0.0085 -0.0064 -0.0099 -0.0112 -0.0146 -0.0062 -0.0086 0.0014
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
Slope  0.0010 0.0002 0.0010 0.0007 0.0014 0.0009 0.0008 0.0016 -0.0004
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fade 0.0007 0.0001 0.0008 0.0005 0.0008 0.0004 0.0006 0.0010 -0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Drop 0.0030 -0.0015 -0.0007 0.0026 0.0031 0.0093 0.0021 0.0079 -0.0022
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Slope  -0.0002 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0014 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fade -0.0001 0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Drop 0.0013 0.0018 0.0011 0.0013 0.0017 0.0008 0.0004 0.0019 0.0074
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Slope  -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0005 0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fade -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fraction Zero 
Earnings
Notes: Coefficients from separate regression models. The initial loss (DROP) is the effect of unemployment at graduation (UR) at experience 
zero and one, the first phase of the catch up (SLOPE) is the coefficient on the interaction of UR with linear experience for experience years two
to six, and the second phase (FADE) of the catch up is same interaction for experience years seven to ten.
Classification of Major









1st EmployerAppendix Figure G2: Effect of Unemployment Rate at Graduation on Deciles of Distribution of Annual 





















0.9Appendix G (Part 2): Quantile Regressions
We also examined whether the negative effects from graduating in a recession differ for college 
graduates over different parts of the income distribution using quantile regression.  The main results 
consist of OLS coefficient estimates for the effects of the initial entry unemployment rate on log 
annual earnings.  These coefficients indicate the expected change in the average log wage from a one 
point increase in the initial unemployment rate over different experience levels.  In comparison, 
Appendix Figure G1 shows the expected change in the log wage at each decile along the earnings 
distribution from a one point increase in the initial unemployment rate, also over different experience 
levels.  These coefficients come from estimating the same regression model as before, but using 
quantile regressions for each decile instead of ordinary least squares.
The pattern in Appendix Figure G1 clearly reveals that differences in unemployment conditions at 
time of entry into the labor market affect the bottom part of the earnings distribution more than the 
top part.  The catch-up process occurs everywhere so that after 10 years in the labor market, the 
earnings distribution looks the same regardless of initial economic conditions.  But those in the lower 
part of the distribution suffer larger and longer earnings losses.  At the 10th percentile in the earnings 
distribution, for example, a 5 percentage point increase in the initial unemployment rate (about a two 
standard deviation increase) decreases earnings by about 18 percent in the first year in the labor 
market.  Five years later, earnings are still 7.5 percent lower.  This gap eventually fades to zero, but not 
until the tenth year.  Each higher earnings decile is less affected by initial unemployment conditions.  
The 90th percentile in the earnings distribution one year out is only about 2.5 percent lower from a 5 
percentage point increase in the initial unemployment rate.  While individuals in the upper part of the 
income distribution appear partially protected by the influences of the initial unemployment rate in the 
first five years, this does not translate to greater protection six to ten years out.  The catch-up process 
occurs most strongly over the lower deciles.  By the sixth year, the lingering effects from the initial 
unemployment rate on log earnings are about the same for all deciles except the lowest, and they fade 












Average 0.67 0.68 0.36 0.36 0.14 0.06
Panel A: National, All Workers
0.0007 -0.0031 -0.0028 -0.0032 -0.0022 0.0001
[0.0041] [0.0018]* [0.0022] [0.0038] [0.0027] [0.0013]
N 1514 1514 1514 957 957 957
R
2 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.01 0
Panel B: Regional, All Workers
-0.0022 0.0057 0.0046 0.0063 0.005 0.0027
[0.0028] [0.0022]** [0.0023]* [0.0032]* [0.0023]** [0.0011]**
N 1514 1514 1514 957 957 957
R
2 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.02
Panel C: Regional, Predicted UR, All Workers
-0.0021 0.0024 0.0003 0.0029 -0.0007 -0.0009
[0.0130] [0.0063] [0.0087] [0.0045] [0.0018] [0.0019]
N 1489 1489 1489 932 932 932
R
2 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.6 0.7 0.59





1 0.18 0.05 -3<= 0.10
2 0.13 0.01 -2 0.12
3 0.19 0.29 -1 0.11
4 0.30 0.60 0 0.32
5 0.17 0.05 1 0.22
6 0.04 0.00 2 0.08
7 0.01 0.00 >=3 0.06
Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Difference Between Actual 
and Predicted (D)








All Workers Workers D>=0Years of College N Percent N Percent
1 30,420 17.03 818 0.69
2 21,922 12.27 3,474 2.92
3 34,745 19.45 23,953 20.13
4 53,803 30.12 52,973 44.53
5 30,172 16.89 30,160 25.35
6 6,200 3.47 6,197 5.21
7 1,391 0.78 1,388 1.17
Total Exiting College 178,653 100 118,963 100
Appendix Table H2: Distribution of Years of College Among All Entrants and in Graduate Sample
Entire Sample  Graduates 





Fraction < 4 
Years






Panel A: National, All Workers
0.007 -0.0019 -0.0018 0.001 0.0012 -0.0006
[0.0138] [0.0039] [0.0039] [0.0025] [0.0043] [0.0157]
N 1591 1591 1591 1591 1591 1591
R
2 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Panel B: Regional, All Workers
0.0072 0.0046 0.0003 0.0041 -0.0032 0.0034
[0.0074] [0.0028] [0.0024] [0.0020]** [0.0028] [0.0108]
N 1591 1591 1591 1591 1591 1591
R
2 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.06
Panel C: Regional, Predicted UR, All Workers
0.0001 -0.0003 0.0019 0.0025 -0.0048 -0.0042
[0.0410] [0.0101] [0.0115] [0.0081] [0.0112] [0.0523]
N 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566 1566
R
2 0.14 0.07 0.15 0.1 0.16 0.11
Panel D: National, D>=0
0.0062 -0.0025 -0.0012 0.0017 0.0001 -0.0052
[0.0063] [0.0043] [0.0010] [0.0025] [0.0014] [0.0082]
N 955 955 955 955 955 955
R
2 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0 0.01
Panel E: Regional, D>=0
0.011 0.0083 -0.0002 0.0061 -0.0007 0.0157
[0.0052]** [0.0035]** [0.0009] [0.0027]** [0.0015] [0.0065]**
N 955 955 955 955 955 955
R
2 0.22 0.04 0.27 0.15 0.38 0.04
Panel F: Regional, Predicted UR, D>=0
0.006 0.0024 -0.0001 0.0042 -0.0002 0
[0.0042] [0.0038] [0.0008] [0.0026] [0.0016] [0.0000]***
N 930 930 930 930 930 930
R
2 0.83 0.64 0.46 0.71 0.54 1
Unemployment Rate







Note: The sample includes males in Canada leaving university between 1976 and 1995. 'D' indicates the difference between the
actual year left and the predicted year of graduation based on year of entry and program. The dependent variable is indicated
in the column heading. The national model regresses the dependent variable on the youth unemployment rate in the country
at the year of college exit, plus province of residence fixed effects, and a linear or quadratic graduation cohort trend. The
regional model regresses log annual earnings on the youth unemployment rate in the province of first residence, plus province
of residence fixed effects, and year of graduation fixed effects. One, two, and three asterix indicates statistical significance at
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels respectively.  See text for more details.Model
D>=0? No Yes No Yes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Stage Coefficient --- --- 0.8841 0.8984
--- --- [0.0502]*** [0.0391]***
Experience Year
0 -0.0119 -0.0134 -0.0162 -0.0186
[0.0023]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0034]***
1 -0.0154 -0.0134 -0.0215 -0.0179
[0.0030]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0041]*** [0.0033]***
2 -0.0145 -0.0114 -0.0204 -0.0147
[0.0030]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0042]*** [0.0028]***
3 -0.0117 -0.0086 -0.0165 -0.0106
[0.0027]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0024]***
4 -0.0093 -0.0072 -0.013 -0.0086
[0.0025]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0023]***
5 -0.0068 -0.0059 -0.0093 -0.0069
[0.0024]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0021]***
6 -0.0054 -0.0045 -0.0072 -0.0053
[0.0027]** [0.0019]** [0.0038]* [0.0024]**
7 -0.0059 -0.0046 -0.0079 -0.0058
[0.0026]** [0.0018]** [0.0036]** [0.0023]**
8 -0.0053 -0.0045 -0.0073 -0.0061
[0.0024]** [0.0018]** [0.0034]** [0.0023]***
9 -0.0046 -0.0041 -0.0065 -0.0056
[0.0024]* [0.0020]** [0.0034]* [0.0024]**
10 -0.0027 -0.003 -0.0043 -0.0044
[0.0025] [0.0020] [0.0034] [0.0024]*
Constant 6.9933 8.7117 7.0555 8.7857
[0.1012]*** [0.0668]*** [0.0981]*** [0.1075]***
N 14223 8495 14223 8495
R-squared 0.92 0.95 0.92 0.95
Reduced Form Instrumental Variables
Specification
Appendix Table H4: Effect of Unemployment Rate at Time of Predicted Graduation on Log Real 
Earnings by Potential Experience (Reduced Form) and Instrumental Variable Estimates, Regional 
Model 
Note: The sample includes males in Canada leaving university between 1976 and 1995. 'D' indicates the difference between
the actual year left and the predicted year of graduation based on year of entry and program. The reduced form model
regresses log annual earnings on the predicted youth unemployment rate in the province of first residence when D=0,
interacted with experience years 0 to 10, plus province of residence fixed effects, experience fixed effects, and year of
graduation fixed effects. The instrumental variable model regresses log annual earnings on the instrumented youth
unemployment rate in the province of first residence, interacted with experience years 0 to 10, plus province of residence
fixed effects, experience fixed effects, and year of graduation fixed effects. One, two, and three asterix indicates statistical






















1 -0.0177 -0.016 -0.0107 -0.0085 -0.0177 -0.0162 -0.0089 -0.0078
[0.0026]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0022]***
2 -0.0181 -0.017 -0.0092 -0.0083 -0.0181 -0.0171 -0.0059 -0.0057
[0.0021]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0018]***
3 -0.0169 -0.0155 -0.0095 -0.0083 -0.0168 -0.0157 -0.0069 -0.0066
[0.0019]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0018]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0014]*** [0.0020]***
4 -0.0134 -0.0111 -0.0083 -0.0065 -0.0134 -0.0112 -0.0062 -0.0048
[0.0017]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0017]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0014]*** [0.0019]**
5 -0.0113 -0.0077 -0.0074 -0.0043 -0.0113 -0.008 -0.006 -0.0033
[0.0016]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0019]** [0.0015]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0014]*** [0.0018]*
6 -0.0095 -0.006 -0.0068 -0.0026 -0.0095 -0.0063 -0.0053 -0.0016
[0.0015]*** [0.0024]** [0.0013]*** [0.0019] [0.0014]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0017]
7 -0.0087 -0.0028 -0.0052 0.0007 -0.0087 -0.0036 -0.0033 0.0017
[0.0016]*** [0.0029] [0.0013]*** [0.0019] [0.0016]*** [0.0028] [0.0013]*** [0.0017]
8 -0.0085 -0.0034 -0.0044 0 -0.0085 -0.0041 -0.0024 0.0009
[0.0017]*** [0.0030] [0.0013]*** [0.0022] [0.0017]*** [0.0029] [0.0012]** [0.0020]
9 -0.0075 -0.0028 -0.0034 -0.0012 -0.0075 -0.0035 -0.0013 -0.0007
[0.0017]*** [0.0028] [0.0013]** [0.0021] [0.0017]*** [0.0027] [0.0012] [0.0019]
10 -0.0062 -0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0017 -0.0062 -0.002 -0.001 -0.0014
[0.0018]*** [0.0028] [0.0014]* [0.0023] [0.0017]*** [0.0027] [0.0012] [0.0021]
Notes: Regressions in columns 1 to 4 at level of graduation cohort, state of first residence, state of current 
residence, and calendar year. Columns 5 to 8 add interaction with predicted earnings at time of graduation. 
All regressions include dummies for graduation cohort, state of residence at graduation, state of current 
residence, calendar year, and experience. Where appropriate, we also include skill-group dummies. The 
analysis is replicated by skill-group in the Appendix. All regressions weighted by cell size. Standard errors 
clustered at cohort-state of first residence level.
Based on Year-State-Cohort Cells
Based on Year-State-Cohort-Skill Group 
Cells
Appendix Table I1: Accounting for Sources of Catch-Up After Early Unemployment Exposure at 






































1 -0.013 -0.011 -0.0026 -0.0016 -0.0209 -0.0194 -0.0126 -0.0111 -0.0228 -0.0252 -0.0179 -0.0209
[0.0039]*** [0.0039]*** [0.0042] [0.0042] [0.0040]** [0.0041]** [0.0036]** [0.0038]*** [0.0065]** [0.0072]** [0.0056]** [0.0064]***
2 -0.0136 -0.012 -0.0068 -0.0061 -0.0267 -0.0261 -0.0133 -0.0129 -0.0295 -0.0324 -0.0234 -0.0269
[0.0025]*** [0.0026]***[0.0028]** [0.0029]** [0.0038]** [0.0038]** [0.0033]** [0.0034]*** [0.0064]** [0.0067]** [0.0052]** [0.0056]***
3 -0.0093 -0.009 -0.005 -0.0052 -0.0245 -0.0224 -0.0162 -0.0148 -0.0256 -0.0313 -0.0193 -0.0255
[0.0022]*** [0.0029]***[0.0021]** [0.0029]* [0.0032]** [0.0039]** [0.0030]** [0.0037]*** [0.0056]** [0.0060]** [0.0044]** [0.0052]***
4 -0.0046 -0.005 -0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0191 -0.016 -0.0128 -0.0107 -0.021 -0.0247 -0.0169 -0.0192
[0.0019]** [0.0025]* [0.0020] [0.0025] [0.0030]** [0.0036]** [0.0027]** [0.0031]*** [0.0055]** [0.0054]** [0.0045]** [0.0043]***
5 -0.0047 -0.005 -0.0043 -0.0046 -0.0171 -0.0124 -0.013 -0.0081 -0.0142 -0.0184 -0.0104 -0.0126
[0.0020]** [0.0028]* [0.0019]** [0.0025]* [0.0025]** [0.0033]** [0.0024]** [0.0030]*** [0.0054]** [0.0064]** [0.0047]** [0.0055]**
6 -0.0045 -0.005 -0.0041 -0.0053 -0.0132 -0.0085 -0.0102 -0.004 -0.0134 -0.0195 -0.0077 -0.0128
[0.0019]** [0.0027]* [0.0018]** [0.0026]** [0.0025]** [0.0033]** [0.0023]** [0.0029] [0.0050]** [0.0054]** [0.0040]* [0.0046]***
7 -0.0049 -0.002 -0.0041 -0.0023 -0.0114 -0.0044 -0.0077 0.0002 -0.0128 -0.0175 -0.0057 -0.0078
[0.0019]*** [0.0032] [0.0017]** [0.0030] [0.0027]** [0.0038] [0.0024]** [0.0031] [0.0056]** [0.0068]** [0.0047] [0.0059]
8 -0.0047 -0.001 -0.0041 -0.0023 -0.0113 -0.0045 -0.0075 -0.0007 -0.0121 -0.0127 -0.0076 -0.0052
[0.0020]** [0.0035] [0.0018]** [0.0034] [0.0030]** [0.0045] [0.0024]** [0.0035] [0.0055]** [0.0068]* [0.0045]* [0.0059]
9 -0.0046 0.000 -0.0036 -0.0024 -0.0099 -0.0037 -0.0051 -0.0001 -0.0107 -0.0121 -0.0049 -0.0042
[0.0021]** [0.0033] [0.0019]* [0.0031] [0.0029]** [0.0040] [0.0024]** [0.0034] [0.0054]* [0.0068]* [0.0044] [0.0057]
10 -0.004 0.000 -0.0034 -0.0029 -0.0064 -0.0022 -0.0021 0.0005 -0.018 -0.0175 -0.0109 -0.0109
[0.0021]* [0.0032] [0.0019]* [0.0033] [0.0031]** [0.0039] [0.0025] [0.0032] [0.0069]** [0.0068]** [0.0057]* [0.0060]*
Appendix Table I2: Accounting for Sources of Catch-Up After Early Unemployment Exposure At the Cell Level, Separately By 
Skill Group, Graduates Only
Notes: Regression at level of graduation cohort, state of first residence, and calendar year. All regressions weighted by cell size. Standard 
errors clustered at cohort-state of first residence level. See notes to Appendix Table I1 and text.
Top 20% Predicted Earnings Middle 20% Predicted Earnings Bottom 20% Predicted EarningsNotes: See notes of Figure 8 and discussion in text.
Appendix Figure I1: Sources of Catch-Up After Early Unemployment Exposure by Skill-Group, Cell Level Models
Panel A: Top 20% of Predicted Earnings at Graduation Panel B: Middle 20% of Predicted Earnings at Graduation


















































Basic Model: Grouped UR Exp 0-1
Basic Model with Avg. Firm Earnings



































































































sNotes: See discussion in Sensitivity Appendix E.
Appendix Figure J1: Simulation of Predicted Effect of Decline in Initial Hiring 

































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Years Since Shock
High Skill: Steep Increase H.S.: Some Inc.,More Offers
High Skill: Some Increase Low Skill: Steep Increase
L.S.: Some Inc.,More Offers Low Skill: Some Increase


















































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Years Since Shock
Rising Costs: Some Increase Rising Costs: Steep Incr.
Constant Costs
Panel A: Effect of Age-Dependent Costs on Average Earnings Losses